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Resum
Des del descobriment per part del bota`nic R. Brown al segle XIX de la prese`ncia d’un
moviment erra`tic en sistemes de tamany microsco`pic, me´s tard conegut com a moviment
Brownia`, grans avenc¸os van oco´rrer en el camp dels procesos estoca`stics durant els anys
segu¨ents. La inevitable prese`ncia de renou (o termes en les equacions del moviment que
provenen de l’eliminacio´ de graus de llibertat microsco`pics, i que nome´s es podien des-
criure de manera probabilı´stica) en un sistema es pensava que jugava un paper destructiu.
Recentment, pero`, han aparegut moltes situacions en les quals el renou pot jugar un paper
constructiu. Aixı´ doncs, feno`mens com la resona`ncia estoca`stica [1] mostra que el renou
pot millorar les propietats de transmissio´ d’un sistema 1. Tambe´ trobam les transicions de
fase induı¨des per renou, en les quals la prese`ncia de renou pot donar lloc a una transicio´
de fase de no-equilibri cap a un estat de ruptura de simetria [2].
Un altre aplicacio´ interessant te´ a veure amb feno`mens de transport: el renou pot ser
emprat per a obtenir moviment unidireccional, ac¸o` e´s, es poden rectificar les fluctuacions
causades pel renou te`rmic de l’ambient, obtenint aixı´ una corrent neta en el sistema.
Aquest model es coneix com a motor Brownia`. Ba`sicament consisteix en un sistema
de petita escala que es troba sotme`s a fluctuacions te`rmiques les quals so´n rectificades
mitjanc¸ant qualque tipus d’asimetria (ja sigui espaial o temporal) present en el sistema.
Aquest feno`men de transport es coneix com efecte ratchet. Depenent de la forma en
la qual aquesta asimetria e´s introduı¨da podem distingir entre diferents tipus de motors
Brownians. De totes maneres, el nostre intere`s es centrara` en un sol tipus de motor
Brownia` conegut com a flashing ratchet, i que es caracteritza per una partı´cula que es veu
sotmesa a un potencial asime`tric que s’ence´n i s’apaga perio`dicament o aleato`riament.
El flashing ratchet servı´ com a inspiracio´ al fı´sic espanyol Juan M.R. Parrondo per
a model.lar un exemple de caire pedago`gic amb dos jocs A i B en els quals ocorria un
efecte similar. Va crear aquests jocs l’any 1996, i els presenta` de manera informal a
Torino, Ita`lia [3]. Aquests jocs, me´s tard coneguts com a jocs de Parrondo, eren dos
jocs justos (o inclu´s jocs perdedors) quan s’hi jugava a un d’ells solament, mentre que
si un els combinava de forma perio`dica o inclu´s aleato`ria, s’obtenia com a resultat un
joc guanyador. Llavors aquest exemple mostrava d’una manera molt senzilla com quan
1Per a ser me´s precisos, existeix un valor o`ptim per a l’amplitud del renou, reflectit per la prese`ncia d’un
ma`xim quan dibuixam la relacio´ entre la senyal i el renou en funcio´ del renou.
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dina`miques. Tot el contrari, s’obtenia un resultat que era totalment inesperat. El resultat
d’obtenir un joc guanyador a partir de dos jocs justos o perdedors es coneix com a la
paradoxa de Parrondo [4–8].
Des de la seva aparicio´, aquests jocs varen atreure molt d’intere`s en altres camps,
com per exemple teoria d’informacio´ qua`ntica [9–12], teoria de control [13,14], sistemes
d’Ising [15], formacio´ d’estructures [16–18], resona`ncia estoca`stica [19], caminates ale-
ato`ries i difusions [20–24], sistemes dina`mics discrets [25–27], economia [28,29], motors
moleculars en biologia [30, 31], bioge`nesis [32] i dina`mica de poblacio´ [33, 34]. Tambe´
han estat tractats com a processos de naixement i mort [35] i auto`mates cel.lulars [36].
No obstant aixo`, a pesar de que la connexio´ entre el flashing ratchet i els jocs de Par-
rondo era patent, no existia una relacio´ precisa i quantitativa entre ambdo´s. ´Es la finalitat
doncs d’aquesta tesi poder aprofundir en aquesta connexio´ entre els jocs de Parrondo i
el flashing ratchet. La tesi es divideix en deu capı´tols, dels quals el Capı´tol 1 constitu-
eix una breu introduccio´ als conceptes preliminars necessaris per a un millor enteniment
dels capı´tols posteriors. Hi presentam els conceptes ba`sics de la teorı´a de processos es-
toca`stics, aixı´ com altres de teoria de cadenes de Markov i teoria de la informacio´.
El Capı´tol 2 esta` dedicat a una explicacio´ detallada del ratchet Brownia`. Concre-
tament ens centrarem en el flashing ratchet, explicant el mecanisme fı´sic que es troba
darrera l’efecte ratchet. En aquest capı´tol tambe´ presentam detalladament els jocs de
Parrondo tal com varen ser definits, juntament amb un ana`lisi mitjanc¸ant cadenes de
Markov a temps discret que ens conduira` a l’obtencio´ de la distribucio´ de probabilitats
estaciona`ries aixı´ com els ritmes de guany dels jocs. A me´s a me´s, presentarem de ma-
nera resumida altres versions dels jocs de Parrondo que podem trobar en altres treballs, i
que es diferencien dels originals en les regles emprades per a escollir les probabilitats.
Els jocs A i B que apareixen a la paradoxa de Parrondo poden considerar-se com un
proce´s de difusio´ sota l’accio´ d’un potencial extern. No obstant aixo`, no tenen la forma
general d’un proce´s natural de difusio´, ja que el capital sempre canvia amb cada joc,
mentre que en el cas me´s general de difusio´ la partı´cula pot moure’s cap amunt o cap
avall o romandre en la mateixa posicio´ en un temps donat. En el Capı´tol 3 presentam
una nova versio´ dels jocs de Parrondo, en els quals consideram una nova probabilitat
de transicio´. Introduı¨m la probabilitat anomenada self-transition, amb la qual el capital
del jugador pot romandre igual despre´s d’haver jugat. Per tant aquesta nova versio´ pot
considerar-se com una evolucio´ natural dels jocs de Parrondo, dels quals els jocs originals
en constitueixen un cas particular.
Despre´s d’introduı¨r aquesta nova versio´ dels jocs, procedim a derivar una relacio´
quantitativa entre els jocs de Parrondo i el model fı´sic del ratchet Brownia`. El treball
original de Parrondo no feia aquesta comparacio´ detallada. Aquesta relacio´ funciona
en ambdo´s sentits: emprant la nostra relacio´ e´s possible obtenir nous jocs partint de
potencials fı´sics molt simples; de forma semblant, e´s possible generar nous models fı´sics
que presenten l’efecte ratchet a partir de la descripcio´ teo`rica d’un joc. El Capı´tol 4 esta`
doncs dedicat a mostrar aquesta relacio´ entre els jocs de Parrondo i el flashing ratchet,
3demostrant que pot ser establerta de forma rigurosa.
Per a ampliar encara me´s l’analogia establerta entre els jocs de Parrondo i el ratchet
Brownia`, analitzam al Capı´tol 5, des del punt de vista de la teoria de la informacio´, la
relacio´ entre el corrent (o guany) dels jocs i l’entropia de la informacio´ (tambe´ coneguda
com a negentropy). Aquesta relacio´, establerta anteriorment per al ratchet Brownia` [37],
presenta un efecte molt similar i per tant reforc¸a l’equivale`ncia entre els dos models.
Un altre punt d’intere`s fa refere`ncia als intercanvis energe`tics en els motors Browni-
ans. Aquesta qu¨estio´ ha estat estudiada durant els darrers anys, i fins i tot podem trobar
en la bibliografia existent diferents definicions per a l’eficie`ncia. A me´s, aquesta qu¨estio´
ha subscitat intere`s per al cas dels jocs de Parrondo [8] ja que no existia una connexio´
clara entre l’energia que s’injecta al sistema, l’energia que se n’obte´ i en consequ¨e`ncia
l’eficie`ncia dels jocs. Per tant el Capı´tol 6 esta` dedicat a un estudi de la relacio´ entre
l’eficie`ncia d’un sistema fı´sic i els jocs de Parrondo. Emprant el formalisme introduı¨t
pre`viament en el Capı´tol 4, desenvolupam un me`tode per avaluar l’eficie`ncia dels jocs
combinant resultats tant de models discrets com de continuus.
Tots els capı´tols anteriors determinen, des de diferents perspectives, la relacio´ com-
pleta que existeix entre els jocs de Parrondo i el model del flashing ratchet. Cal destacar
que en aquests jocs u´nicament hi interve´ un sol jugador. Llavors, el segu¨ent pas a fer
inclou un estudi de jocs amb me´s d’un jugador: e´s a dir, els jocs de Parrondo col.lectius.
Ambdo´s Capı´tols 7 i 8 esta`n dedicats als jocs col.lectius. Per una banda, estudiam al
Capı´tol 7 diversos casos d’un joc col.lectiu introduı¨t per Toral [38], en els quals s’es-
tableix una redistribucio´ de capital entre els jugadors. Obtenim, per a diferents combi-
nacions dels jocs A i B, resultats analı´tics per al guany mitja` d’un sol jugador. D’altra
banda, introduı¨m al Capı´tol 8 una nova versio´ de jocs col.lectius que presenten, a me´s de
l’efecte de Parrondo, una inversio´ de corrent sota determinades circumsta`ncies. Aquesta
nova propietat es caracteritza per obtenir un joc que pot ser guanyador o perdedor d’a-
cord amb la frequ¨e`ncia de canvi entre els diferents jocs, un resultat que no s’observa per
al cas d’un sol jugador. Analitzam en detall aquests nous jocs i explicam qualitativament
el mecanisme que es troba darrera aquesta inversio´ de corrent.
El Capı´tol 9 fa refere`ncia a l’altre tema principal d’estudi d’aquest tesi. Consideram
l’ana`lisi d’un altre tipus de jocs en els quals tamb te´ lloc un resultat parado`gic. Aquests
jocs es coneixen com a truels, i poden considerar-se com a una extensio´ del duel a on hi
participen tres individuus. De forma resumida, l’efecte parado`gic que s’obte´ en aquests
jocs e´s que el jugador me´s fort (o amb me´s aptituds) no necessa`riament guanyara` el
joc, sino´ que en alguns casos el jugador me´s feble posseeix la major probabilitat de
sobreviure.
Aquests jocs varen ser estudiats des del punt de vista de la teoria de jocs [39–42].
En aquest Capı´tol 9 reproduı¨m els resultats existents d’aquest camp en un llenguatge
que, segurament, un fı´sic troba me´s adequats per a un millor enteniment: el dels proces-
sos estoca`stics. Obtenim les probabilitats de supervive`ncia per a cada jugador, aixı´ com
la distribucio´ de guanyadors per a diferentes versions dels jocs analitzats. Tambe´ em-
pram les simulacions dels jocs (un procediment amb ordinador i amb llarga tradicio´ en la
4fı´sica) per tal d’entendre els resultats en aquelles situacions en les quals molts jugadors
competeixen entre ells emprant les regles dels truels. A me´s, estudiam l’efecte d’incloure
una depende`ncia espaial en el sistema i una generalitzacio´ dels truels per a me´s de tres
jugadors.
Finalment, en el Capı´tol 10 extraiem les conclusions sobre el treball presentat, aixı´
com les futures lı´nies de treball que cal seguir.
Pau Amengual
Juliol 2006
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Preface
Since the discovery by the botanist R. Brown in the nineteenth century of the presence
of an erratic movement in small-scale systems, later known as Brownian motion, great
advances occurred in the field of stochastic processes in subsequently years. The unavoid-
able presence of noise (or terms in the movement equations coming from the supression
of microscopic degrees of freedom, which can only be described in a probabilistic man-
ner) in a system was supposed to play a destructive role. Very recently, however, there
have appeared many situations in which noise can lead to a constructive effect. For exam-
ple, phenomena of stochastic resonance [1] shows that noise can enhance the transmis-
sion properties of a system 2. We also find phase transitions induced by noise, where the
presence of noise may induce a nonequilibrium phase transition to a symmetry breaking
state [2].
Another interesting application deals with transport phenomena: noise can be used
in order to obtain directed motion, i.e., one can rectify unbiased fluctuations caused by
thermal environment obtaining a net current in the system. This model is known in the
literature as Brownian motor. Basically it consists on a small-scale system subjected to
thermal fluctuations which are rectified through some sort of asymmetry (either spatial
or temporal) present in the system. This transport effect is known as ratchet effect. De-
pending on the way the asymmetry is introduced we may distinguish betwen different
kinds of Brownian motors. However, our interest is focused on one class of Brownian
motor known as flashing ratchet, characterized by a particle subjected to an asymmetric
potential that is switched on and off either periodically or randomly.
The flashing ratchet served as inspiration to the Spanish physicist Juan M.R. Parrondo
to design a pedagogical example with two coin tossing games A and B where a similar
effect took place. He devised the games in 1996, presenting them in unpublished form
in Torino, Italy [3]. These games, later known as Parrondo games, were both fair games
(or even losing) when played alone, whereas if one combined them either in a periodic
or even random fashion a winning game was obtained. Therefore this example showed
in a simple manner that two dynamics, when combined, do not necessarily give a result
being simply a sum of dynamics. All the contrary, it might turn to be a totally unexpected
2To be more precise, there exists an optimal value of the noise amplitude, reflected by the presence of a
maximum when plotting the signal to noise ratio in terms of noise.
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outcome. The result of a winning game out of two fair/losing games is known in the
literature as Parrondo’s Paradox [4–8].
Since their appearance, these games attracted much interest in other fields, for exam-
ple quantum information theory [9–12], control theory [13, 14], Ising systems [15], pat-
tern formation [16–18], stochastic resonance [19], random walks and diffusions [20–24],
discrete dinamical systems [25–27], economics [28, 29], molecular motors in biol-
ogy [30, 31], biogenesis [32] and population dynamics [33, 34]. They have also been
considered as quasi-birth-death processes [35] and lattice gas automata [36].
However, even though the connection between the flashing ratchet and Parrondo’s
games was patent, there was no precise and quantitative relation between both. There-
fore it is the aim of this thesis to deepen into this connection between Parrondo games
and the flashing ratchet. The thesis is divided into ten Chapters, from which Chapter 1
constitutes a brief introduction to the necessary preliminary concepts needed for a better
understanding of succeeding chapters. We present some basic concepts taken from the-
ory of stochastic processes, as well as others from Markov chain theory and information
theory.
Chapter 2 is devoted to a detailed explanation of the Brownian ratchet. Concretely
we focus on the flashing ratchet, explaining the physical mechanism behind the ratchet
effect. In this Chapter we also explain in detail the original Parrondo’s games as they
were defined, together with a detailed analysis by means of discrete-time Markov chains
leading to the distribution of stationary probabilities as well as the rates of winning of the
games. Besides, we briefly present other versions of Parrondo games present in the liter-
ature, differentiating from the originals on the rules used for selecting the probabilities.
Games A and B appearing in Parrondo’s paradox can be thought of as diffusion pro-
cesses under the action of a external potential. However, they do not have the more
general form of a natural diffusion process, because the capital will always change with
every game played, whereas in the most general diffusion process a particle can either
move up or down or remain in the same position at a given time. In Chapter 3 we present
a new version of Parrondo’s games, where a new transition probability is taken into ac-
count. We introduce a self-transition probability, that is, the capital of the player now can
remain the same after a game played. Thus the significance of this new version is a nat-
ural evolution of Parrondo’s games, from which the original games consitute a particular
case.
After introducing this new version of Parrondo games, we proceed to derive a quanti-
tative relation between Parrondo’s games and the physical model of the Brownian ratchet.
Parrondo’s original work did not make such a detailed comparison. The interest goes both
ways: using our detailed comparison it is possible to derive new games starting from very
simple physical potentials; similarly, it is possible to generate new physical models that
undergo the ratchet effect starting from some game theoretical description. Chapter 4 is
9thus dedicated to present this relation between Parrondo’s games and the flashing ratchet,
showing that it can be established in a rigorous way.
To extend further the analogy between Parrondo games and the Brownian ratchet, we
analyze in Chapter 5, from the point of view of information theory, the relation between
the current (or gain) from the games and the information entropy (also known as negen-
tropy). This relation, already established for the Brownian ratchet [37], presents a similar
effect and hence reinforces the equivalence between both models.
Another point of interest concerns the energetics of Brownian motors. This ques-
tion has been addressed in recent years, finding in the literature different definitions of
efficiency. It has also raised interest in case of Parrondo games [8] as there is no clear
connection between energy input, energy output and consequently the efficiency in the
games. Thus, Chapter 6 is dedicated to a study of the relation between the energetics
of a physical system and Parrondo’s games. Making use of the formalism introduced
previously in Chapter 4, we develop a method for evaluating the efficiency of the games
combining results from both discrete and continuous models.
All previous Chapters determine, from different perspectives, a complete relation
existing between Parrondo’s games and the flashing ratchet. These games are played by
one player only. Therefore, our next step involves a study of a game with more than
one player: i.e. collective Parrondo games. Both Chapters 7 and 8 are dedicated to
collective games. On one hand we study in Chapter 7 various cases from a collective
game introduced by Toral [38], where a redistribution of capital takes place amongst
players. We obtain, for different combinations of games A and B, analytical results for
the average gain of a single player. On the other hand, we introduce in Chapter 8 a
new version of collective games presenting, appart from the Parrondo effect, a current
inversion under certain circumstances. This new feature is characterized by an outcome
that can be winning or losing according to the frequency of change between the differen
games, a result that is not observed in single player games. We analyze in detail these
new games and explain qualitatively the mechanism behind this current inversion.
Chapter 9 is committed to the second main subject of study of the present thesis. It
considers the analysis of another kind of games where, again, a counter-intuitive result
takes place. These are the so–called truel games, and can be thought of as an extension
of a duel played by three individuals. In brief, the paradoxical result appearing in these
games is that the player with the highest performance does not necesarrily win the game,
instead, even the weakest possesses a higher probability of winning in some cases.
These games were studied from the pont of view of game theory [39–42]. In this
Chapter 9 we reproduce the existing results of this field in a language that, hopefully, a
physicist finds more comfortable to understand: that of stochastic processes. We obtain
the survival probabilities of each player, as well as the distribution of winners for the dif-
ferent versions of the games analyzed. We also use simulations of the games (a computer
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procedure with long tradition in physics) in order to understand the actual outcome in
a situation in which many agents compete amongst themselves using the rules of truels.
Furthermore, we study the effect of including spatial dependence in the system and a
generalization of the truels to more than three players.
Finally, in Chapter 10 conclusions about the present work will be drawn, together
with perspectives about future work.
Pau Amengual
July 2006
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Introduction
In the following sections of the present Chapter we introduce some basic concepts that
will be used in foregoing Chapters. First we will present briefly some concepts on the
theory of stochastic processes in Sec. 1.1, Markov processes in Sec. 1.2 and the Fokker-
Planck equation in Sec.1.3. These will be followed by some introductory concepts about
Markov chain theory in Sec.1.4 and finally some concepts on information theory in
Sec. 1.5.
1.1 Stochastic processes
A stochastic process can be thought of as a system that evolves probabilistically in
time, or more explicitly, a system where there exists at least one time–dependent ran-
dom variable. Denoting this stochastic variable as X(t), we can measure its actual value
x1, x2, x3, . . . at different times t1, t2, t3, . . . and so obtain the joint probability density
of the variable X(t)
P (x1, t1;x2, t2;x3, t3; . . .) (1.1)
which denotes the probability that we measured the value x1 at time t1, value x2 at time
t2,. . ., etc.
Using these probability density functions we can also define conditional probability
densities through
P (x1, t1;x2, t2; . . . | y1, τ1; y2, τ2; . . .) = P (x1, t1;x2, t2; . . . ; y1, τ1; y2, τ2; . . .)
P (y1, τ1; y2, τ2; . . .)
,
(1.2)
where it’s been assumed that the times are ordered, i.e., t1 ≥ t2 ≥ t3 ≥ . . . ≥ τ1 ≥ τ2 ≥
. . ..
The simplest stochastic process is that of complete independence
P (x1, t1;x2, t2;x3, t3; . . .) =
∏
i
P (xi, ti) (1.3)
1
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which means that the value of X at time t is completely independent of its values at
previous – or posterior – times.
The next step is to consider processes where the future state of the system depends on
its actual state. This kind of processes are known in the literature as Markov processes.
1.2 Markov processes
This class of processes are characterized by the so called Markov property. A Markov
process can be defined as a stochastic process with the property that for any set of suc-
cessive times, i.e. t1 ≥ t2 ≥ t3 ≥ . . . ≥ τ1 ≥ τ2 ≥ . . ., one has
P (x1, t1;x2, t2; . . . | y1, τ1; y2, τ2; . . .) = P (x1, t1;x2, t2; . . . | y1, τ1). (1.4)
This previous statement means that we can define everything in terms of simple condi-
tional probabilities P (x1, t1 | y1, τ1). For instance, P (x1, t1;x2, t2 | y1, τ1) = P (x1, t1 |
x2, t2; y1, τ1)P (x2, t2 | y1, τ1) and using the Markov property (1.4) we find
P (x1, t1;x2, t2; y1, τ1) = P (x1, t1 | x2, t2)P (x2, t2 | y1, τ1) (1.5)
and for the general case it can be written
P (x1, t1;x2, t2;x3, t3; . . . xn, tn) = P (x1, t1 | x2, t2) P (x2, t2 | x3, t3) . . .
. . . P (xn−1, tn−1 | xn, tn) P (xn, tn) (1.6)
provided that t1 ≥ t2 ≥ t3 ≥ . . . ≥ tn.
There are many processes in nature where this property appears. One of the most
studied processes successfully described using this Markov property is the Brownian
motion, presented in more detail in the next Section.
1.2.1 Brownian motion
The botanist Robert Brown discovered in 1827 that small particles suspended in water
were found to be in a very animated and irregular motion. Initially it was supposed to
represent some manifestation of life, though after some studies this option was rejected,
as the same behavior was also observed in other fine particles suspension –minerals, glass
. . . . The solution to this mysterious movement had to await a few decades, until a sat-
isfactory explanation came through the work of Albert Einstein in 1905 [43]. The same
explanation was independently developed by Smoluchowski [44], who was responsible
for much of the later systematic development and for much of the experimental verifica-
tion of Brownian motion theory.
Einstein’s work had primarily two main premises:
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• The motion of the particles is caused by the exceedingly frequent impacts on the
pollen grain of the incessantly moving molecules of liquid in which it is suspended.
• The motion of these particles can only be described probabilistically in terms of
frequent and statistical independent impacts, due to the erratic and irregular (and
so complicated) movement that the particles carry out.
This process is the best known example of Markov process. We have the picture of a
particle that makes random jumps back and forth over a given set of coordinates, for
instance over the X–axis in one dimension. The jumps may have any length, but the
probability for large jumps falls off rapidly. Moreover, the probability is symmetrical in
space and independent of the starting point.
Hence, we can summarize the basic steps that Einstein took in order to derive his
Brownian motion theory.
The first point to consider is that each individual particle executes a motion which
is totally uncorrelated from the motion of all other particles; it will also be considered
that the displacement of the same particle, but taken at different time intervals, are also
independent processes – as long as these time intervals are not taken too small.
Then a characteristic time interval τ can be introduced, which is small compared to
the observation time intervals, but large enough so that the approximation of independent
successive time intervals τ is correct.
Now we consider n particles suspended in a liquid. In a time interval τ , the x–
coordinate of the particles will increase by an amount ∆, where this quantity may have
different values – either positive or negative – for different particles in the same time
interval. We will also consider that there exists a certain distribution law for ∆, given by
the function φ(∆). The number of particles that will shift their position with an interval
between ∆ and ∆+ d∆ will be given by the expression
dn = nφ(∆) d∆ (1.7)
where ∞∫
−∞
φ(∆)d∆ = 1 (1.8)
The function φ is only distinct from zero for small values of ∆, and it also follows
the property
φ(∆) = φ(−∆) (1.9)
which implies that there exists no preferred direction of movement for the particles.
We can now study how the diffusion coefficient depends on φ. Let P (x, t) be the
number of particles per unit volume at (x, t). We compute the distribution of particles at
time t + τ from the distribution at time t. From the definition of the function φ(∆), we
can obtain the number of particles which at time t + τ are found between the points x
and x+ dx. One obtains
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P (x, t+ τ) =
∞∫
−∞
P (x−∆, t)φ(∆)d∆. (1.10)
But since τ is very small, we can Taylor expand P (x, t+ τ)
P (x, t+ τ) = P (x, t) + τ
∂P
∂t
. (1.11)
Besides, we can also Taylor expand the function P (x−∆, t) in powers of ∆
P (x−∆, t) = P (x, t)−∆∂P (x, t)
∂x
+
∆2
2!
∂2P (x, t)
∂x2
+ . . . (1.12)
Introducing the results from Eq. (1.11,1.12) into the integral Eq. (1.10) we obtain the
following expression
P +
∂P
∂τ
τ = P
∞∫
−∞
φ(∆) d∆− ∂P
∂x
∞∫
−∞
∆φ(∆) d∆+
∂2P
∂x2
∞∫
−∞
∆2
2
φ(∆) d∆. (1.13)
Due to the symmetry property Eq. (1.9), the odd terms of Eq. (1.13) – second term,
fourth term, etc. – vanish, whereas for the remaining terms, that is, first term, third term,
etc. each one is very small compared to the previous one. Introducing Eq. (1.8) in the
last equation, setting
1
τ
∞∫
−∞
∆2
2
φ(∆) d∆ = D, (1.14)
and keeping only the first and third terms on the right hand side,
∂P
∂t
= D
∂2P
∂x2
. (1.15)
We can clearly identify the latter equation as the diffusion equation, and D as the
diffusion coefficient. The solution for an initial condition at t = 0 given by n(x) =
n δ(x) is
P (x, t) =
n√
4πD
e−
x2
4Dt√
t
(1.16)
which is a Gaussian function centered at the origin. Using this result we calculate the
averages
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〈x〉 = 0 (1.17)
〈x2〉 = 2Dt. (1.18)
This result was derived by Einstein assuming a discrete–time assumption, that is ,
that the impacts occurred only at times 0, τ, 2τ, . . . , and both Eqs. (1.15,1.16) are to be
regarded as only approximations, where τ is considered so small that t can be thought as
being continuous.
1.2.2 Langevin’s equation
After Einstein presented his theory about Brownian motion, Langevin [45] presented
another method quite different from Einstein’s work. In brief, his theory can be explained
as follows.
From statistical mechanics it was already known that the mean kinetic energy of a
Brownian particle at equilibrium should reach a value
<
1
2
mv2 >=
1
2
kT (1.19)
where T denotes the absolute temperature, k is the Boltzmann constant, m the mass
and v the velocity of the Brownian particle.
We can distinguish two different forces acting on the particle, namely,
• A viscous drag. Assuming that the expression of the force is analogous to the
macroscopic hydrodynamic equation, for a low Reynolds number we can write
down the following expression for the drag force −6πηadxdt , η being the viscosity
and a the diameter of the particle, assuming it to be spherical.
• A fluctuating force ξ coming from the consideration of the impacts of the fluid
particles upon the Brownian particle. The unique consideration about this force is
that it can be either positive or negative with the same probability. The ensemble
may consist on many particles in the same field, far enough from each other so that
they cannot influence mutually. Or it may also be considered as a unique particle,
where the time intervals between measurements are large enough not to influence
each other.
The stochastic properties of ξ are given regardless of the velocity v of the particle. Its
average vanishes, < ξ >= 0, and its autocorrelation function reads
< ξ(t)ξ(t′) >= δ(t− t′) (1.20)
The latter expression comes from the consideration that successive collisions are un-
correlated and practically instantaneous.
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Writing down Newton’s equation of motion for the particle we get
m
d2x
dt2
= −6πηadx
dt
+ ξ (1.21)
This equation is usually known as Langevin equation. Multiplying Eq. (1.21) by x,
and after a little algebra we obtain
m
2
d2
dt2
(x2)−mv2 = −3πηad(x
2)
dt
+ x ξ (1.22)
where v = dxdt . Averaging over a large number of particles and making use of
Eq. (1.19) we obtain an equation for < x2 >
m
2
d2
dt2
< x2 > +3πηa
d
dt
< x2 >= kT, (1.23)
where the term < xξ > has been set to zero due to the irregularity of the fluctuating
force ξ. This assumption implies that the variation suffered by the x variable can be
considered as independent from the variation that the fluctuating force ξ experiences1
< xξ >=< x >< ξ > (1.24)
The general solution to Eq. (1.23) is
d
dt
< x2 >=
kT
3πηa
+ C e
−6piηat
m (1.25)
where C is an arbitrary constant.
Considering that the exponential in Eq. (1.25) decays very rapidly, we can dismiss
this term and so the solution for the average square distance < x2 > reads
< x2 > − < x20 >=
(
kT
3πηa
)
t (1.26)
Now we can compare Eq. (1.26) with Eq. (1.18) to obtain the following relation
D =
kT
6πηa
= µkT (1.27)
where µ is the mobility of the Brownian particle.
This important result, known as the fluctuation–dissipation theorem, relates a quan-
tity D pertaining to statistically unpredictable dynamical fluctuations to a quantity which
involves deterministic, steady state properties.
1This can be thought as equivalent to the assumption made by Einstein when he considers that for a suf-
ficiently large time interval τ , the displacements ∆ suffered by the Brownian particle within two successive
time intervals are independent.
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1.3 The Fokker–Planck equation
This section aims to be a brief explanation on how to obtain the time evolution of the
probability density function for the system under consideration. Its name comes from the
work of Fokker [46] and Planck [47]. The former studied Brownian motion in a radiation
field and the latter attempted to build a complete theory of fluctuations based on it.
1.3.1 Derivation of the Fokker–Planck equation
If we consider a Markov process, we can write a master equation as
∂P (x, t)
∂t
=
∫ {
W (x | x′)P (x′, t)−W (x′ | x)P (x, t)} dx′ (1.28)
where the term W (x | x′) denotes the transition probability between states x and x′.
P (x, t) denotes the probability of finding the system at position x at time t, and must be
normalized, that is
∞∫
−∞
dxP (x, t) = 1 (1.29)
If x corresponds to a discretized variable, the master equation takes the form
dPn(t)
dt
=
∑
n
{Wnn′Pn′(t)−Wn′nPn(t)} . (1.30)
Written in this form clearly the master equation is a gain–loss equation. The first term
on the right hand side of Eq. (1.30) corresponds to the gain of state n due to transitions
from different states n′ to n, whereas the second term is a loss term due to the transitions
from the state n to other states n′.
Planck derived the Fokker–Planck equation as an approximation to the master equa-
tion (1.28). He expressed the transition probability W (x | x′) as a function of the size r
of the jump and of the starting point
W (x | x′) = W (x′; r), r = x− x′. (1.31)
Then (1.28) can be rewritten in the form
∂P (x, t)
∂t
=
∫
W (x− r; r)P (x− r, t)dr − P (x, t)
∫
W (x;−r)dr (1.32)
At this stage two assumptions are made,
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• Only small jumps occur, i.e., W (x′; r) is a sharply peaked function of r but varies
slowly with x′. Then there will exist some δ > 0 such that
W (x′; r) ≈ 0 for | r |> δ (1.33)
W (x′ +∆x; r) ≈W (x′; r) for | ∆x |< δ. (1.34)
• The second assumption is that the solution P (x, t) also varies slowly with x, mak-
ing possible a Taylor expansion of the term P (x−r, t) in terms of P (x, t) obtaining
∂P (x, t)
∂t
=
∫
W (x; r)P (x, t) dx−
∫
r
∂
∂x
{W (x; r)P (x, t)} dr
+
1
2
∫
r2
∂2
∂x2
{W (x; r)P (x, t)} dr − P (x, t)
∫
W (x;−r)dr. (1.35)
The first and fourth terms on the right hand side of Eq. (1.35) vanish, whereas the
other two remaining terms are named as
F (x) =
∞∫
−∞
rW (x; r)dr (1.36)
D(x) =
∞∫
−∞
r2W (x; r)dr, (1.37)
and they correspond to the first and second jump moments of W (x; r), respectively.
The first jump moment corresponds to the so called drift term –F (x)–, and the second
moment to the diffusion term –D(x) –. Then the final result is
∂P (x, t)
∂t
= − ∂
∂x
[F (x)P (x, t)] +
1
2
∂2
∂x2
[D(x)P (x, t)] (1.38)
In conclusion, we have derived the Fokker–Planck equation starting from the master
equation governing the transitions between different states from the system.
1.3.2 The Fokker–Planck equation in one dimension
For a one dimension we can write the following Fokker–Planck equation – as derived in
the previous section –
∂P (x, t)
∂t
= − ∂
∂x
[F (x, t)P (x, t)] +
1
2
∂2
∂x2
[D(x, t)P (x, t)] . (1.39)
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Here D(x, t) is the diffusion term and F (x, t) is the drift term usually written as
F (x, t) = −∂V (x,t)∂x , introducing a potential function V (x, t). The stochastic process
whose probability density function obeys Eq. (1.39) is equivalent to the stochastic process
described by the Ito stochastic differential equation
x˙ = F (x, t) +
√
D(x, t) ξ(t) (1.40)
where ξ(t) is a gaussian white noise of mean zero and correlation given by <
ξ(t)ξ(t′) >= δ(t− t′).
Defining a probability current J(x, t) as
J(x, t) = F (x, t)P (x, t)− 1
2
∂
∂x
[D(x, t)P (x, t)] (1.41)
Eq. (1.39) can be rewritten in the form of a continuity equation
∂P (x, t)
∂t
+
∂J(x, t)
∂x
= 0 (1.42)
1.3.3 Boundary conditions
The Fokker–Planck equation is a second–order parabolic differential equation, and in
order to find its solution we need an initial condition as well as some boundary conditions
where the variable x is constrained. For a more general case, in more than one dimension,
we can write
∂tP (x, t) = −
∑
i
∂
∂xi
F (x, t)P (x, t) +
1
2
∑
i,j
∂2D(x, t)
∂xi∂xj
(1.43)
which can also be written as a continuity equation
∂P (x, t)
∂t
+
∑
i
∂Ji(x, t)
∂xi
= 0 (1.44)
The previous equation has the form of a local conservation law, and so it can be
rewritten in an integral form. Considering a region R with boundary S we have
∂P (R, t)
∂t
= −
∫
S
dS nˆ(x) · J(x, t) (1.45)
where we have defined the total probability in region R as P (R, t) =
∫
R dxP (x, t),
and nˆ(x) is an outward vector pointing normal to S. Eq. (1.45) indicates that the total loss
of probability in the region R is given by the surface integral of J(x, t) over region R.
The current J(x, t) also has the property that a surface integral over any surface S gives
us the net flow of probability across that surface. Depending on the existing boundary
conditions, we will impose different conditions, such as
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Reflecting barrier In this case there is no flow of probability through surface S, which
can be thought of as the particle not leaving region R. In this case it is required
that
nˆ(x) · J(x, t) = 0, ∀ x ∈ S (1.46)
Absorbing barrier For this case when the particle reaches the boundary, it is removed
from the system. As a consequence, the probability of finding the particle in the
boundary is strictly zero,
P (x, t) = 0,∀x ∈ S (1.47)
Periodic boundary conditions The process takes place in a closed interval [a,b], where
the two end points are identified with each other. This implies the following set of
conditions to be fulfilled
lim
x→b−
P (x + mL, t) = lim
x→a+
P (x + mL, t)
lim
x→b−
J(x + mL, t) = lim
x→a+
J(x + mL, t). (1.48)
where the quantity mL accounts for a displacement in any direction equal to the period-
icity of the system.
1.3.4 Stationary properties
Given a stochastic process X(t), we say that X(t) is a stationary process if X(t) and
the process X(t + t0) have the same statistics for any t0. This property is equivalent to
saying that all joint probability densities satisfy time translation invariance, that is
P (x1, t1;x2, t2; . . . ;xn, tn) = P (x1, t1 + t0;x2, t2 + t0; . . . ;xn, tn + t0) (1.49)
and therefore such probabilities are only functions of the time differences ti − tj . In
the particular case of the one–time probability, it is independent of time t and it can be
written as Ps(x). Furthermore, if the stationary Markov process satisfies
lim
t→∞P (x, t|x0, 0) = Ps(x) (1.50)
then we can construct from the stationary Markov process a nonstationary process whose
limit as time becomes large is the stationary process. It can be defined for t, t′ > t0 by
P (x, t) = Ps(x, t|x0, t0)P (x, t|x′, t′) = Ps(x, t|x′, t′) (1.51)
So if Eq. (1.50) is satisfied, we find that as t → ∞ or t0 → −∞, P (x, t) → Ps(x)
and the rest of probabilities become stationary because the conditional probability is also
stationary. This process is known as a homogeneous process.
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For a homogeneous process, the drift and diffusion terms of the Fokker–Planck
equation are time independent. Then, returning to the 1D case, in the stationary state
∂P (x,t)
∂t = 0 and so P (x, t) = P
s(x) becomes independent of time. From Eq. (1.39) we
have
d
dx
[F (x)P (x)]− 1
2
d2
dx2
[D(x)P (x)] = 0. (1.52)
And using Eq. (1.42) we have dJ(x)dx = 0, or J(x) = J = Constant.
If the process takes place in the interval (a, b), it must be satisfied that J(a) = J(x) =
J(b) = J ; so if one of the boundary conditions is reflecting, it means that both of them
must be reflecting, and then J = 0.
If the boundaries are not reflecting, the condition of constant current requires them to
be periodic. In that case we may use the boundary conditions given by (1.48).
1.3.4.a Zero–current case
If J = 0, Eq. (1.52) can be rewritten as
F (x)P s(x) =
1
2
d
dx
[D(x)P s(x)] (1.53)
with solution
P s(x) =
N
D(x)
e
2
R x
a dx
′ F (x)
D(x) (1.54)
N being a normalization constant ensuring that ∫ ba dxP s(x) = 1.
1.3.4.b Periodic boundary conditions
For the case where we have a non–zero current Eq. (1.52) can be written as
F (x)P s(x)− 1
2
d
dx
[D(x)P s(x)] = J. (1.55)
In this case the current J is completely determined by the boundary conditions
P s(a) = P s(b) (1.56)
J(a) = J(b). (1.57)
For calculating the stationary probability density function P s(x) we can integrate
Eq. (1.55) to obtain
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P s(x) = P s(a)


∫ x
a
dx′
ψ(x′)
D(b)
ψ(b) +
∫ b
x
dx′
ψ(x′)
D(a)
ψ(a)
D(x)
ψ(x)
∫ b
a
dx′
ψ(x′)

 (1.58)
and the current is determined through
J =
[
D(b)
ψ(b)
− D(a)
ψ(a)
]
P s(a)∫ b
a
dx′
ψ(x′)
(1.59)
1.3.5 Particle current
Once the stationary probability density function (1.58) and the probability current (1.59)
are obtained, the next quantity of interest is the particle current < x˙ >, defined as the
ensemble average over the velocities. Its relation with the probability current J(x, t) is
J(x, t) :=< x˙(t)δ(x− x(t)) > (1.60)
from where we derive
< x˙ >=
∞∫
−∞
dxJ(x, t) (1.61)
and using Eq. (1.42) can be written as
< x˙ >=
d
dt
∞∫
−∞
dxxP (x, t). (1.62)
1.4 Markov–chain theory
This section is devoted to a class of Markov processes in discrete–time and discrete space.
We call such processes Markov chains. We may define a Markov chain as a sequenceX0,
X1,. . . of discrete random variables with the property that the conditional distribution
of Xn+1 given X0,X1, . . . ,Xn depends only on the value of Xn but not further on
X0,X1, . . . ,Xn−1; i.e., for any set of values h, j, . . . , k belonging to the discrete state
space,
prob(Xn+1 = k|X0 = h, . . . ,Xn = j) = prob(Xn+1 = k|Xn = j) (1.63)
Thus the conditional probability distribution for Xn depends only on the value of X
at the latest time n− 1.
1.4 Markov–chain theory 13
1.4.1 A two–state Markov chain
We will consider a simple example of a two–state Markov chain. This is the simplest
non–trivial state space. Let’s denote by 1 and 0 the two states of the Markov chain. If
the system is found in state 0, there will be a probability α of a transition to state 1, and
a probability 1 − α of remaining in the same state. Similarly, when the system is found
in state 1, there will be a probability β of a transition to state 0, and 1 − β of remaining
in 1. These probabilities are called transition probabilities, and can be represented by a
transition matrix T as
T =
(
1− α α
β 1− β
)
(1.64)
The matrix element in position (j, k) denotes the conditional probability of a transi-
tion to state k at time n + 1 given that the system is in state j at time n. The transition
probabilities considered here do not depend on time.
Let the column vector Pn = (Pn0 , Pn1 )T denote the probabilities of finding the system
in states 0 or 1 at time n when the initial probabilities of the two states are given by
P0 = (P 00 , P
0
1 )
T
. Consider the system to be in state 0 at time n. This state can be
reached in two mutually exclusive ways: either state 0 was occupied at time n − 1 and
no transition occurred at time n; this event may happened with probability Pn−10 (1−α).
Alternatively, the system could happenned to be in state 1 at time n − 1 followed by a
transition from state 1 to state 0 at time n; this latter event has probability Pn−11 β.Thus
we can obtain the following recurrence relations
Pn0 = (1− α)Pn−10 + βPn−11 (1.65)
Pn1 = αP
n−1
0 + (1− β)Pn−11 (1.66)
(1.67)
which can be put in matrix form as Pn = T · Pn−1, and iterating we obtain
Pn = T2 · Pn−2 = . . . = Tn · P0. (1.68)
Thus, given the initial probabilities P0 and the transition matrix T, we can find the
state occupation probabilities at any time n by means of Eq. (1.68). One question arises
naturally, and it concerns the possibility of whether the system reaches a situation of
statistical equilibrium after a sufficiently long time, where the occupation probabilities
Pn are independent of the initial conditions. If this happens there exists an equilibrium
probability distribution π = (π0, π1) when n→∞ satisfying
π = Tπ −→ (I− T)π = 0 (1.69)
From where it follows through the normalization condition π0 + π1 = 1 that
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π0 =
β
β + α
, π1 =
α
β + α
(1.70)
Therefore, if the initial probability distribution coincides with π, the distribution Pn
is stationary, i.e., it does not change in time.
If we want to find the time dependent probabilities Pn given a set of initial proba-
bilities P0, we need to evaluate the matrix Tn. For this purpose we can use the spectral
representation of T. Let us assume that T has distinct eigenvalues λ1, λ2. Then, we can
find a 2× 2 matrix Q such that
T = Q
(
λ1 0
0 λ2
)
Q−1 (1.71)
where the columns q1, q2 of Q are solutions of the equations Tqi = λiqi. Hence we have
Tn = Q
(
λn1 0
0 λn2
)
Q−1 (1.72)
The eigenvalues of T are the solutions of the equation |T − λI| = 0, from where it
follows the equation (1 − α − λ)(1 − β − λ) − αβ = 0. The solutions are λ1 = 1 and
λ2 = 1 − α − β and λ1 6= λ2 provided that α + β 6= 0. We obtain for matrices Q and
Q−1
Q =
(
1 α
1 −β
)
, Q−1 =
1
α+ β
(
β α
1 −1
)
(1.73)
Thus,
T = Q
(
1 0
0 1− α− β
)
Q−1 (1.74)
Recall that λ2 = 1−α−β is less than one in modulus, unless α+β = 0 or α+β = 2.
For a general time n we have
Tn =
1
α+ β
(
1 α
1 −β
)(
1 0
0 (1− α− β)n
)(
β α
1 −1
)
=
1
α+ β
(
β α
β α
)
+
(1− β − α)n
α+ β
(
α −α
−β β
)
. (1.75)
We can easily identify the first term in Eq. (1.75) as
(
π0 π1
π0 π1
)
, while the second
term tends rapidly to zero with increasing n, as long as |1−α−β| < 1. Thus as n→∞,
Tn →
(
π0 π1
π0 π1
)
(1.76)
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and from Eq. (1.68) we obtain
Pn →
(
π0 π1
π0 π1
)
P0 =
(
π0
π1
)
= π (1.77)
Therefore the limiting state occupation probability exist and are independent of the
initial conditions P0.
1.4.2 General case of a Markov chain
We turn to a more general case in which our Markov chain may be composed of either
a finite or infinite number of states. We have a sequence of discrete random variables
X0,X1, . . . having the property that given the value of Xm for any instant time m, then
for any later time instant m + n the probability distribution of Xm+n is completely
determined and the values of Xm−1,Xm−2, . . . at times earlier than m are irrelevant to
its determination2. Thus, if m1 < m2 < . . . < mr < m < m+ n
prob(Xm+n = k|Xm1 , . . . ,Xmr ,Xm) = prob(Xm+n = k|Xm). (1.78)
Besides, we will consider the case of homogeneous Markov chains, which are char-
acterized by possesing a stationary state when the conditional probability (1.78) depends
only on the time interval n, not on m. For this kind of chains we can define the n–step
transition probabilities
pnjk = prob(Xm+n = k|Xm = j) = prob(Xn = k|X0 = j) (m,n = 1, 2, . . .).
(1.79)
Particularly we are interested in the one-step transition probabilities
p1jk = pjk = prob(Xm+1 = k|Xm = j). (1.80)
Since our system must realize a transition to some state from any state j (in this case
we also include the possibility of a transition to the same state j), we have
∞∑
k=0
pjk = 1. (1.81)
Based on the previous results, a general transition matrix T would read
T =


p00 p01 . . .
p10 p11 . . .
. . .
. . .

 , (1.82)
2i.e., if we have complete knowledge of the present state of the system, we can determine the probability
of any future state without reference to the past.
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and it is known as a stochastic matrix, with the properties that its elements are non-
negative and that its row sums are unity If the Markov chain defining T has a finite
number of states l, then the stochastic matrix T is a lxl square matrix.
Let P0 = {p00, p01, . . .}T denote the column vector for the initial state occupation, and
Pn = {pn0 , pn1 , . . .}T the vector of occupancy probabilities at time n. It can be shown,
using arguments similar to those used for the two-state Markov chain, that
Pn = TPn−1 = . . . = TnP0 (n = 1, 2, . . .). (1.83)
1.4.3 Classification of states
According to their limiting behavior, we can classify the states of a Markov chain. Sup-
pose that initially we are in state j; we call j a recurrent state if the ultimate return to this
state is a certain event, that is, if the probability of returning to state j after some finite
length of time is one. In this case the time of first return will be a random variable called
the recurrence time and the state is called positive-recurrent or null-recurrent according
as the mean recurrence time is finite or infinite respectively. On the other hand, if the
ultimate return to state j has probability less than one the state is called transient. At this
point we define fnjj as the probability that the next occurrence of state j is at time n, i.e.,
f1jj = pjj , and for n > 1
fnjj = prob(Xr 6= j, r = 1, . . . , n− 1;Xn = j|X0 = j). (1.84)
In other words we can say that conditional on state j being occupied initially, fnjj is
the probability that state j is avoided at times 1, 2, . . . , n−1 and entered at time n. Given
that the chain starts in state j the sum
fj =
∞∑
n=1
fnjj (1.85)
is the probability that state j is eventually re-entered. If fj = 1 then state j is re-
current while if fj < 1 state j is transient. Thus, conditional on starting in a tran-
sient state j, there is a positive probability 1 − fj that state j will never be re-entered,
while for a recurrent state re-entrance is a certain event. For a recurrent state, therefore,
{fnjj , n = 1, 2, . . .} is a probability distribution and the mean of this distribution
µj =
∞∑
n=1
nfnjj , (1.86)
is the mean recurrence time.
Similarly, given that the chain starts in state j the sum
fjk =
∞∑
n=1
fnjk (1.87)
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is the probability of ever entering state k, and is known as first passage probability
from state j to state k. If fjk = 1 then
∑∞
n=1 nf
n
jk is the mean first passage time from
state j to state k.
Let us suppose that when the chain starts in state j, subsequent occupations of that
state can only occur at times t, 2t, 3t,. . . where t is an integer greater than 1; choose t to be
the largest integer with this property. Then state j is called periodic with period t and pnjj
vanishes except when n is an integral multiple of t. A state which is not preiodic is called
aperiodic. Essentially it has period 1. An aperiodic state which is positive-recurrent is
called ergodic.
An important property of ergodic systems concerns the existence of a unique row
vector π of limiting occupation probabilities called the equilibrium distribution, which is
formed by the inverse of the mean recurrence times. Thus a finite ergodic system settles
down in the long run to a condition of statistical equilibrium independent of the initial
conditions.
Another important classification can be done regarding the communication between
different states from a Markov chain. State j is said to be accessible from state i if for
some integer n ≥ 0, fnij > 0: i.e., state j is accessible from sate i if there is positive
probability that in a finite number of transitions state j can be reached starting from state
i. Two states i and j, each accessible to the other, are said to communicate. If two states
i and j do not communicate, then either
fnij = 0 ∀n ≥ 0,
or
fnji = 0 ∀n ≥ 0,
(1.88)
or both relations are true. This concept of communication is an equivalence relation.
We can now partition the totality of states into equivalence classes. The states in an
equivalence class are those which communicate with each other. We say that the Markov
chain is irreducible if the equivalence relation induces only one class, i.e., a process is
irreducible if any state communicates with any other.
1.4.4 Existence of stationary distributions for stochastic matrices
The basic theorem that demonstrates the existence of a stationary probability distribution
is the Perron-Frobenius theorem [48]. The basic results of this theorem are:
Given an irreducible matrix A, if every matrix component aij is nonnegative, we
write A ≥ 0. Then
• i) A has a real positive eigenvalue λ1 with the following properties;
• ii) corresponding to λ1 there is an eigenvector x all of whose elements may be
taken as positive, i.e., there exists a vector x > 0 such that
Ax = λ1x; (1.89)
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• iii) if α is any other eigenvalue of A then
|α| ≤ λ1; (1.90)
• iv) λ1 increases when any element of A increases;
• v) λ1 is a simple root of the determinantal equation
|λI− A| = 0. (1.91)
• vi)
λ1 ≤ maxj
(∑
k
ajk
)
, λ1 ≤ maxk

∑
j
ajk

 . (1.92)
If λ1 itself is the only eigenvalue of modulus λ1 then matrix A is said to be primitive.
Besides, note that point (vi) gives an upper bound to λ1 as the largest row sum or largest
column sum of matrix A. Thus, if we are dealing with a stochastic matrix such as T,
we know from the previous theorem that has an eigenvalue 1 since T · 1 = 1, where 1
is a column vector of 1’s. Besides, it follows from (1.90), (1.92) that no eigenvalue can
exceed 1 in modulus.
An important aspect we can extract is that the nature of a finite chain is determined
by the properties of the eigenvalues of T which have unit modulus. Another point is that
the limiting values of transition probabilities are approached exponentially fast, the rate
of approach being determined in general by the eigenvalue of largest modulus less than
unity.
If the finite Markov chain is ergodic then its transition matrix T is irreducible and
primitive, with a simple eigenvalue 1 which exceeds all other eigenvalues in modulus
(conversely, if T is primitive and irreducible then the system is ergodic). According to the
theorem of Perron and Frobenius described above, there is a positive column eigenvector
π = {πj} satisfying Tπ = π and we can normalize this vector so that
∑
πj = 1.
Besides, the system is ergodic and
lim
n→∞ p
n
kk =
1
µk
= πk > 0, (1.93)
the limit approached exponentially fast and uniformly for all j and k. Conversely
if the system is ergodic then T is primitive and irreducible. Thus, given the necessary
conditions for the stochastic matrix, there exists a limiting value for the occupancy prob-
abilities, being that of the stationary probability distribution π.
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1.5 Information Theory
The information theory was introduced in the seminal paper by Shannon [49] in 1948.
Basically this work studies certain problems of the transmission of messages through
channels involving communication systems. These communication systems can be di-
vided in three main categories: discrete, continuous and mixed. By a discrete system it
is meant one where the signal and the message are a sequence of discrete symbols – for
example, the telegraphy. A continuous system is one where the message and the signal
are both continuous, e.g., the television. The last one is the mixed system, where both
discrete and continuous variables appear, for instance the pulse code-modulation (PCM)
for the transmission of speech.
The case of our interest here deals with discrete systems. Basically we can distinguish
three main parts: the information source, the communication channel (through where the
signal is transmitted) and the receiver. Generally, a discrete channel will mean a system
where a sequence of choices from a finite set of elementary symbols α1, . . . , αn can be
transmitted from one point to another.
1.5.1 Discrete and ergodic sources
We can think of the information source as generating the message, symbol by symbol.
The source will choose successively symbols according to certain probabilities depend-
ing, in general, on preceding choices as well as the particular symbols in question.
We may define an ergodic source as a source that generates strings of symbols
α1, α2, . . . with the same statistical properties. Thus the symbols frequencies obtained
from particular sequences will, as the length of the message increase, approach definite
limits independent of the particular sequence.
In some cases a message L that is not homogeneous statistically speaking, can be
considered as composed of pieces of messages coming from various pure ergodic sources
L1, L2, L3, . . . that is
L = Π1 L1 +Π2 L2 +Π3 L3 + . . . (1.94)
where Πi corresponds to the probability of the component source Li.
1.5.1.a Shannon Entropy
For a single source we may define the entropy as
H = −
∑
i
pj log(pj) (1.95)
where pj denotes the probability of emitting a given symbol αj . This quantity was in-
troduced by Shannon for measuring, in some sense, how much lack of information is
produced by such a source. It can also be regarded as a measure of how much “choice”
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is involved in the selection of the symbol emitted by the source or of the uncertainty of
the outcome.
The information entropy represents the average information content of a message.
Some of its most interesting properties are
1. H = 0 if and only if all the pi but one are zero, this one having the value unity.
Thus only when we are certain of the outcome does H vanish. Otherwise H is
positive.
2. For a given n, H is a maximum and equal to log n when all the pi are equal, i.e.:
1
n .
3. Any change toward equalization of the probabilities p1, p2, . . . , pn increases H .
The Shannon entropy gives the minimum transfer rate – bit rate – at which a message
can be transmitted without losing any information content. For instance, we can consider
an information source that emits only two symbols, either 1 or 0 with probability p and
q = 1− p respectively. The corresponding expression for the entropy of the source reads
H = −p log p− q log q = −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p) (1.96)
In Fig. 1.1 we plot the entropy as a function of the probability p of emitting the symbol
1. It can be appreciated how the entropy of the message generated by the source acquires
its maximum when p = 12 , corresponding to the value where both symbols have the same
probability of being emitted, and therefore the uncertainty of the resulting message is
maximum.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
p
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
h Figure 1.1. Plot of the variation
of the entropy of the source when
varying the probability p of emit-
ting symbol 1.
If we now consider a source L, composed itself of a mixture of different sources Li
with probability Πi, the resulting entropy of the system will depend on the entropy of
each individual source in the following way
1.5 Information Theory 21
H =
∑
i
ΠiHi = −
∑
i,j
Πip
j
i log p
j
i (1.97)
where pji denotes the probability of emitting a symbol αj by the source Li.
1.5.1.b Entropy of a message
Given a message composed of a set of symbols α1, α2, . . ., successive approximations of
the actual entropy of the message can be obtained. As a first step, it can be considered that
all the symbols have been emitted by the source with a fixed and independent probability.
Therefore, we can measure the frequencies of all the symbols of the alphabet present in
the message, estimating from them their probabilities using Eq. (1.95).
Next thing to consider are the so–called block entropies. We must calculate the prob-
abilities of words constructed with symbols from the alphabet α1, α2, α3, . . . , αn, and
thereafter obtain their corresponding block entropies
Hn = −
∑
α1,...,αn
p(α1, . . . , αn) log[p(α1, . . . , αn)]. (1.98)
This quantity measures the average amount of information contained in a word of length
n. From Eq. (1.98) we can then evaluate the differential entropy
hn = Hn −Hn−1
= −
∑
α1,...,αn
p(α1, . . . , αn) log[p(αn|α1, . . . , αn−1)], (1.99)
that gives the new information of the n-th symbol if the preceding (n − 1) symbols are
known; p(αn|α1, . . . , αn−1) is the conditional probability for αn being conditioned on
the previous symbols α1, . . . , αn−1. The Shannon entropy is then
h = lim
n→∞hn (1.100)
The latter expression gives the average amount of information per symbol if all correla-
tions are taken into account, and the limit approaches monotonically the actual value of
h from above, i.e., all the hn are upper bounds on h.
For a numerical estimation of Eq. (1.98) we must count the number of times n that
the word α1, . . . , αn is contained in the message, and then obtain its probability with nN ,
where N is the total length of the message.
The actual problem of evaluating the Shannon entropy in this way is that the number
of possible words increases exponentially as the length of the word n increases. In order
to obtain good statistical results when calculating the word probabilities we must have
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a sufficiently long message when evaluating the probabilities of large words3, which in
fact is a considerable inconvenient.
There exist other ways of evaluating the entropy of a message. An interesting algo-
rithm developed by A. Lempel and J. Ziv [50] permits the calculation of the entropy of a
message, and it will be explained in the next section.
1.5.2 Lempel and Ziv algorithm
In 1977, Abraham Lempel and Jakob Ziv created the lossless4 compressor algorithm
LZ77. This algorithm is present in programs such as gzip,arj, etc. It was later mod-
ified by Terry Welch in 1978 becoming the LZW algorithm, and this is the algorithm
commonly found today.
It was originally designed to obtain the algorithmic complexity of a binary string5 [51].
Basically it is a dictionary based or substitutional encoding/decoding algorithm, creating
a dictionary during the process of encoding and decoding of a certain message.
For a useful example of how the algorithm6 works, we will encode/decode the fol-
lowing binary string 10010110100111011100101, of length n = 23.
1.5.2.a Encoding process
First, we will partition the chain into words B1, B2, .. of variable block length –Lempel
& Ziv parsing–
10010110100111011100101 (1.101)
So we obtain the following words: B1 = 1, B2 = 0, B3 = 01, B4 = 011, B5 = 010,
B6 = 0111, B7 = 01110, B8 = 0101.
This words are then coded as (prefix+newbit) =(pointer to the last occurrence, new-
bit): (01) = (0 + 1) = (2, 1), (011) = (01 + 1) = (3, 1), (010) = (01 + 0) = (3, 0),
(0111) = (011 + 1) = (4, 1), (01110) = (0111 + 0) = (6, 0), (0101) = (010 + 1) =
(5, 1). We have then the following pairs
(0, 1) (0, 0) (2, 1) (3, 1) (3, 0) (4, 1) (6, 0) (5, 1) (1.102)
Once the pairs for each Bj are obtained, we replace each pair (i,s) by the integer Ij =
2i+ s.
3the necessary length of the message also increments exponentially with n
4it assures that the original information can be exactly reproduced from the compressed data
5Algorithmic complexity of a binary string is the length in bits of the shortest computer program able to
reproduce the string and to stop afterward
6we will make use of the LZ78 algorithm, which is simpler than its original LZ77
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(0, 1)→ I1 = 20 + 1 = 1 (3, 0)→ I5 = 23 + 0 = 6
(0, 0)→ I2 = 20 + 0 = 0 (4, 1)→ I6 = 24 + 1 = 9
(2, 1)→ I3 = 22 + 1 = 5 (6, 0)→ I7 = 26 + 0 = 12
(3, 1)→ I4 = 23 + 1 = 7 (5, 1)→ I8 = 25 + 1 = 11
(1.103)
Each integer Ij is then expanded to base two, and the binary expansions are padded
with zeroes on the left so that the total length of bits is ⌈log2(2j)⌉, where the brackets ⌈ ⌉
denote the upper integer value of log2(2j). We obtain in this way the strings Wj .
j Ij Binary string ⌈log2(2j)⌉ Wj Binary string
1 1 1 ⌈log2(2)⌉ = 1 W1 1
2 0 0 ⌈log2(4)⌉ = 2 W2 00
3 5 101 ⌈log2(6)⌉ = 3 W3 101
4 7 111 ⌈log2(8)⌉ = 3 W4 111
5 6 110 ⌈log2(10)⌉ = 4 W5 0110
6 9 1001 ⌈log2(12)⌉ = 4 W6 1001
7 12 1100 ⌈log2(14)⌉ = 4 W7 1100
8 11 1011 ⌈log2(16)⌉ = 4 W8 1011
Finally we just need to concatenate the binary words Wj to obtain the encoded string:
1001011110110100111001011. Clearly, the length of the encoded string is not much
shorter than the original in this case, but it must be kept in mind that the algorithm be-
comes optimal as the length of the string increases7
1.5.2.b Decoding process
The decoding process is much simpler than the encoding. We just need to know the size
alphabet of the source that created the string. From the previous section we obtained the
encoded string 1001011110110100111001011 with an alphabet equal to 2.
The first thing to do is to divide the string in blocks of size ⌈log2(2j)⌉ : 1·00·101·111·
0110 ·1001 ·1100 ·1011; then convert these blocks into integer form :1, 0, 5, 7, 6, 9, 12, 11
; we divide by the size alphabet, 2 in this case, and we keep the quotient q and remainder
r, (q, r) : (0, 1), (0, 0), (2, 1), (3, 1), (3, 0), (4, 1), (6, 0), (5, 1).
Finally we convert these pairs into words using the same formalism than in the encod-
ing process, and we join them to obtain the original binary string 10010110100111011100101.
1.5.2.c Properties of the LZ algorithm
An important property of the LZ algorithm is that it relates the compression factor to the
entropy of the compressed string.
7Because the length of the words Bj that will be substituted increases linearly with the binary string,
whereas the length of the words Wj increases logarithmically.
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The compression factor (CF) of strings is the ratio between the compression length c
and the original length n
CF =
c
n
. (1.104)
The optimality ratio γ(n) is defined as the ratio between the compression factor and
the entropy per character h of the source
γ(n) =
CF
h
, (1.105)
it is said that the compression is asymptotically optimal if γ(n)→ 1 as n→∞.
Lempel and Ziv showed that their dictionary–based algorithms LZ77, LZ78 give
asymptotically optimal compression for strings generated by an ergodic stationary pro-
cess, that is, as the length of the file to compress n → ∞ the ratio of the length of the
compressed file with n tends to the entropy per character h.
This algorithm together with the previous definitions explained above will be used in
Sec. 5 for establishing a relation between Parrondo’s games and information theory.
Chapter 2
The Brownian ratchet and
Parrondo’s games
In some physical and biological systems, combining processes may lead to counter-
intuitive dynamics. For example, in control theory, the combination of two unstable
systems can cause them to become stable [52]. In the theory of granular flow, drift can
occur in a counter-intuitive direction [53, 54]. Also the switching between two transient
diffusion processes in random media can form a positive recurrent process [55]. Other
interesting phenomena where physical processes drift in a counter-intuitive direction can
be found (see for example [56–60]). One part of the present chapter will be devoted to
another example where a counter–intuitive result takes place: the flashing ratchet. This
is characterized by directed motion obtained from the random or periodic alternation of
two relaxation potentials acting on a Brownian particle, none of each producing any net
flux.
Parrondo’s paradox [5–7] shows that the combination of two losing games, can give
rise to a winning game. This paradox is a qualitative translation of the physical model of
the flashing ratchet into game-theoretic terms. These games were first devised in 1996
by the Spanish physicist Juan M.R. Parrondo, who presented them in unpublished form
in Torino, Italy [3], as a pedagogical illustration of the flashing ratchet.
The first part of this chapter, Sec. 2.1, will be devoted to the explanation of the Brow-
nian ratchet, also including the original model of the Smoluchowski–Feynman ratchet,
that brought the idea of the ratchet effect; and finally we will focus on a detailed expla-
nation of the flashing ratchet model.
Afterwards, in Sec. 2.2 we present the original Parrondo games as they were de-
signed and explain thoroughly the basics of the so-called Parrondo paradox, unraveling
the mechanism behind it. Furthermore, some other versions of Parrondo games that ap-
peared later on will be also shown at the end of this section.
25
26 Chapter II
2.1 Smoluchowski–Feynman ratchet
Is it possible to obtain useful work out of unbiased random fluctuations? In the case of
macroscopic devices we can find many ways of accomplishing this task, for example a
wind–mill, the self–winding wristwratch, etc. But when dealing with the microscopic
world, this case becomes more subtle. A clear example of this problem was illustrated in
the conference talk by Smoluchowski in Mu¨nster 1912 (and published as a proceedings–
article in [61]) and later popularized and extended in Feynman’s Lectures on Physics [62].
2.1.1 Ratchet and pawl
The ratchet and pawl model consists on an axis with a paddle located at one end, and
a circular saw with a ratchet–like shape on the other end, see Fig. 2.1 for details. This
device is surrounded by a thermal bath at equilibrium at temperature T . If left alone, the
system would perform a rotatory, random, Brownian motion due to the collisions of the
gas molecules with the paddles.
Figure 2.1. Plot of the ratchet and
pawl device.
We can modify this picture by introducing a pawl in order to rectify this random fluc-
tuations. Hence in this way rotations would be favored in one precise direction, allowing
the saw–teeth to rotate clockwise – as depicted in Fig. 2.1 –, whereas it would block the
saw–teeth to rotate in the counter–clock direction. So intuitively it seems that this gadget
would perform a net rotation clockwise, and if a weight is added to the axis it could even
perform some work lifting the weight.
Based on the previous reasoning we could conclude that the device constructed this
way would constitute a perpetuum mobile of the second kind, therefore violating the
second law of thermodynamics. However, this naive expectation is wrong. In spite of the
asymmetry of the device, no preferred motion is possible. The reason is the following:
due to the microscopic size of the machine, not only the paddles are subjected to the
fluctuations due to the collisions with the gas particles, but also the pawl is exposed to
them. These collisions of the particles with the pawl would, occasionally, lift the pawl.
Then the ratchet could rotate counter–clockwise as it would not have any opposing force.
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As a result the ratchet and pawl device would have no preferred direction of rotation.
This Smoluchowski–Feynman’s ratchet and pawl device was introduced as a pedagogic
example of the second law of thermodynamics.
We can modify the previous picture by considering that the gas surrounding the pad-
dles and the gas surrounding the ratchet have different temperatures. In this case an
equilibrium situation no longer exists. This second model was introduced by Feynman
[62], and later revised by Parrondo [63].
A simplified stochastic model known as Brownian ratchet will be presented in the
next section, capturing the essential features of the Smoluchowski–Feynman’s ratchet
and pawl device.
2.1.2 Brownian ratchet
We will consider the motion of a Brownian particle of mass m under the effect of a po-
tential V (x, t) that can be time–dependent, a friction force −ηx˙(t), a force F (t) exerted
by an external agent and a stochastic force
√
D(x, t)ξ(t), where D(x, t) = 2ηkT (x, t) is
the noise strength or noise intensity, proportional to the temperature. Newton’s equation
of motion for this system can be expressed as
mx¨(t) + V ′(x, t) = −ηx˙(t) + F (t) +
√
D(x, t)ξ(t). (2.1)
The terms on the left hand side account for the deterministic, conservative part,
whereas the terms on the right hand side account for the dissipative terms due to the
interaction of the Brownian particle with its environment and the external agent. Usually
the time–dependent external force F (t) is split in two terms, a constant term F and a
time–dependent term y(t), and so it can be written as F (t) = F + y(t).
The potential V (x, t) used in Eq. (2.1) must fulfill the following conditions
• Periodicity. It must be periodic with period L, that is, V (x, t) = V (x + L, t) for
all x and t.
• Asymmetry. This asymmetry can be established in many ways, the simplest con-
sisting on spatial asymmetry, that occurs when for any value of x there exists no
∆x such that V (−x, t) = V (x+∆x, t), in some sense this condition accounts for
some kind of spatial anisotropy. A typical example of an asymmetric potential is
V (x, t) = V0
[
sin
(
2πx
L
)
+
1
4
sin
(
4πx
L
)]
· [1 +W (t)], (2.2)
where the function W (t) represents the time dependence of the potential, if there
is any.
The stochastic force or thermal noise ξ(t) generally is considered to be Gaussian
white noise of zero mean < ξ(t) >= 0 and correlations
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< ξ(t)ξ(s) >= δ(t− s) (2.3)
For the systems we will study, the inertia term mx¨(t) is negligible, and so Eq. (2.1)
can be written as
ηx˙(t) = −V ′(x(t), t) + F + y(t) +
√
D(x, t)ξ(t). (2.4)
The latter equation can be considered as a generalized equation describing the dy-
namics of an overdamped Brownian particle.
2.1.2.a Reduced probability variables
As our interest is focused mainly on transport in periodic systems, we can introduce the
reduced probability density and reduced probability current as
Pˆ (x, t) :=
∞∑
n=−∞
P (x+ nL, t), (2.5)
Jˆ(x, t) :=
∞∑
n=−∞
J(x+ nL, t). (2.6)
And from Eqs. (1.29,1.61) we get
Pˆ (x+ L, t) = Pˆ (x, t), (2.7)
L∫
0
dxPˆ (x, t) = 1, (2.8)
< x˙ > =
L∫
0
dxJˆ(x, t) (2.9)
As P (x, t) is solution of the Fokker–Planck equation (1.39), it follows from the peri-
odic condition introduced above, V (x, t) = V (x+L, t), that P (x+nL, t) is also solution
for any integer value n. Introducing expressions (2.5) and (2.6) into the Fokker–Planck
equation (1.39), it can be rewritten as a continuity equation for the reduced probabilities
∂Pˆ (x, t)
∂t
+
∂Jˆ(x, t)
∂x
= 0, (2.10)
where
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Jˆ(x, t) = F (x, t) Pˆ (x, t)− 1
2
∂
∂x
[D(x, t) Pˆ (x, t)]. (2.11)
Therefore, in order to obtain the particle current is sufficient to solve the Fokker–
Planck equation (1.39) with periodic boundary conditions, together with the initial con-
ditions. Besides, operating with
∫ x0+L
x0
dx x . . . on both sides of Eq. (2.10) we obtain
< x˙ >=
d
dt

 x0+L∫
x0
dxxPˆ (x, t)

+ LJˆ(x0, t), (2.12)
where x0 denotes the initial position of the particle. Essentially, we distinguish two
contributions to the particle current: the first term on the right hand side of Eq. (2.12)
accounts for the motion of the center of mass, and the second term is L times the reduced
probability current Jˆ(x0, t) measured at the reference point x0. If the reduced dynamics
reaches a steady state, characterized by dPˆ (x,t)dt = 0, then the reduced probability current
Jˆ(x0, t) = Jˆ
st becomes independent of x0 and t, and the particle current becomes
< x˙ >= LJˆst. (2.13)
The particle current can also be calculated through the time-averaged velocity of a
single realization x(t) of the stochastic process described by Eq. (2.1), i.e.
< x˙ >= lim
t→∞
x(t)
t
, (2.14)
independent of the initial condition x(0).
2.1.2.b Ratchet effect
The so–called ratchet effect takes place when a given set of conditions are accomplished.
• First, we must have a spatially periodic system.
• Second, there must be some asymmetry in the system, for example spatial asym-
metry.
• Last but not least, the system must be out of equilibrium.
Depending on the way these conditions are accomplished, we may distinguish different
types of ratchets.
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2.1.3 Classes of ratchets
There are two main groups of ratchets that can be derived from Eq. (2.4). The first group
considers those systems where the term y(t) = 0, these are the pulsating ratchets; the
second group considers those where there is no time dependence in the potential V (x, t),
i.e. W (t) = 0, and they are known as tilting ratchets.
2.1.3.a Pulsating ratchets
Within this group, we can also distinguish the following types of ratchets
Fluctuating potential ratchets They are obtained when the time dependence of the po-
tential W (t) is additive, that is V (x, t) = V (x)[1 +W (t)]. This group contains
as a special case the on–off ratchet, also known as flashing ratchet, consisting on
W (t) having only two possible values: 0 (ON state) and −1 (OFF state).
Traveling potential ratchets They have potentials of the form V (x, t) = V (x−W (t)).
2.1.3.b Tilting ratchets
This group is characterized by W (t) = 0, and so the potential is time–independent
V (x, t) = V (x). Within this group we will distinguish three types of ratchets depending
on the time dependence of y(t) in Eq. (2.4)
Fluctuating force ratchets They are obtained when y(t) is a stationary stochastic pro-
cess. It can be another Gaussian white noise, hence we are dealing with an effective
Smoluchowski-Feynman ratchet, or it can be a Gaussian colored noise. The for-
mer case needs a correlated (non-white), Gaussian or non-Gaussian noise (colored
noise) in order to obtain directed transport. The latter case is represented by a
Ornstein–Uhlenbeck noise with an exponentially decaying correlation.
Rocking ratchet It is obtained when y(t) is periodic.
Asymmetrically tilting ratchet We explained before that one essential ingredient for
the ratchet effect was the existence of an asymmetry in the system. If our potential
V (x) is symmetric the source of asymmetry can be introduced through the term
y(t), imposing it to be non–symmetric.
From all these different kinds of ratchets, we will now focus on the flashing ratchet
model and analyze it a little closer.
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2.1.4 The flashing ratchet
This system is characterized by a Brownian particle subjected to a potential that is
switched on and off either periodically or stochastically – depending on the time de-
pendence of the function W (t). This scheme was introduced by Ajdari and Prost [56].
The model can be described through the equation
ηx˙(t) = −V ′(x(t)) [1 +W (t)] +
√
D(x, t)ξ(t), (2.15)
where V (x) is a spatially periodic and asymmetric potential, and usually a potential
such as the one in Eq. (2.2) is used – in Fig. 2.2 we can see a plot of the potential for
the parameters L = 3 and V0 = 1. The function W (t) is restricted to two values 0, −1,
switching on and off the potential, and D(x, t) = 2ηkT (x, t) is the noise strength.
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(x) Figure 2.2. Plot of the asymmetric
potential (2.2) with the parameters
L = 3 and V0 = 1.
The ratchet mechanism (or ratchet effect) can be explained as follows. Imagine a
landscape with a few Brownian particles moving freely. At a given instant, a ratchet–like
potential is switched on: W (t) = 1, and the particles (assuming the thermal energy kT
to be much smaller than the potential amplitude) are eventually confined to one of the
potential wells located at x0, see Fig. 2.3. When the potential is switched off: W (t) =
−1, the particles are subjected only to the thermal noise ξ(t) and start to diffuse.
If we let the particles diffuse for a large enough time interval, a small fraction of
them will reach the vicinity of the next potential well 1 at x0 + L. Repeating this cycle
many times, a net current of particles is obtained 〈x˙〉 > 0. In Fig. 2.4 – left panel –
we see the plot of the net current vs the natural logarithm of the flip rate2 γ for a single
Brownian particle. It can be clearly identified the existence of an optimal switching rate
that produces the maximum current.
1due to the asymmetry in the potential of Fig. 2.3, is more likely that the particles will reach the potential
well located on the right than the one on the left, as the distance is shorter in the former case.
2The flip rate γ accounts for the probability of switching the potential on or off per time unit.
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ON
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OFF
a)
b)
c)
Figure 2.3. Three differ-
ent stages of the on-off cy-
cle for the case of the flash-
ing ratchet. In case a) the
potential is on and the par-
ticles get trapped in a poten-
tial well; in stage b) the po-
tential is off and the parti-
cles spread due to diffusion;
finally, in stage c) some par-
ticles have diffused up to the
vicinity of the next potential
well, and so when the poten-
tial is on again, there are a
certain number of particles
located in the next potential
well. The flux of particles
due to the asymmetry in the
potential in this case is to the
right.
We can modify this picture introducing an external force F acting against the particle.
Even with this opposing force applied on the particle, the ratchet effect is still present for
sufficiently small values of F . We see in Fig. 2.4 – right panel – how the current is
positive and different from zero up to a value of the applied force F = F0, being F0 the
so–called stopping force. It is worth noting that for this case, the particle is doing work
against the external force applied.
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Figure 2.4. Left panel: Plot of the average particle current versus the logarithm of the flip rate. Right
panel: Plot of the average particle current versus the applied external force F .
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2.1.5 A temperature ratchet
A variation of the flashing ratchet, which also may lead to the same result, consists on
the temperature ratchet. In this case the Brownian particles are exposed to an alterna-
tion between a hot and a cold temperature (for instance, we could expose the Brownian
particles to temperatures such that VkThot ≪ 1, and VkTcold ≫ 1), and simultaneously a
ratchet–like potential as the one depicted in Fig. 2.2. Thus, when the particles are ex-
posed to the cold temperature, the particles are pinned at a potential minimum due to the
relatively high amplitude of the potential compared to the low temperature. In a second
stage, when temperature now is increased to Thot, the particles effectively do not feel the
potential and begin to diffuse. Afterwards, when the temperature is cold again, there will
be a certain number of particles that will have diffused up to the vicinity of the potential
well on the right, and on average that number will be greater than those that got to the
vicinity of the potential well on the left. On average, as in the case of the flashing ratchet
model, there will be a net flux of particles to the right (as long as the asymmetry in the
potential is the one depicted in Fig. 2.3).
2.2 A discrete–time flashing ratchet : Parrondo’s games
2.2.1 Description of the games
Parrondo’s two original games are as follows. Game A is a simple coin tossing game,
where a player increases (decreases) his capital in one unit if heads (tails) show up. The
probability of winning is denoted by p and the probability of losing is q = 1− p.
Game B is a capital dependent game, where the probability of winning depends upon
the actual capital of the player, modulo a given integer M . Therefore if the capital is i the
probability of winning pi is taken from the set {p0, p1, . . . , pM−1} as pi = pimodM . In
the original version of game B, the number M is set equal to three and the probability of
winning can take only two values, p1, p2, i.e. game B uses two different coins according
to whether the capital of the player is multiple of three or not. The two games are rep-
resented diagrammatically in Fig. 2.5 using branches to represent wins and losses with
probabilities given by the terms in brackets.
The numerical values corresponding to the original Parrondo’s games [5] are:

p = 12 − ǫ,
p1 =
1
10 − ǫ,
p2 =
3
4 − ǫ,
(2.16)
where ǫ is a small biasing parameter introduced to control the three probabilities. For
a value of ǫ equal to zero, both games are fair games, whereas if ǫ is small and positive
both games are losing. In both cases, the combined game results in a winning game.
Intuitively, we could think of a potential representing games A and B – for the sim-
plest case of ǫ = 0 – through the following reasoning: the winning and losing proba-
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Game A Game B
( Capital divisible by M, otherwise )( p, 1−p )
L
W WL L
W
1( p  , 1−p  )1 ( p  , 1−p  )2 2
Figure 2.5: Probability trees for games A and B.
bilities for game A are independent of the site and equal to 12 . Therefore it would be
equally likely a forward or a backward transition. Then the barriers of the potential that
one would find would be of equal height, as depicted in Fig. 2.6a.
pq pq pq pq
0−2 −1
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1 2
p2 q 2 q 1p2
q 2p1
q 1
p1 q 2p2
q 2 p2
−1−2 0 1 2−3
b)
Figure 2.6. a) Schematic po-
tential related to game A. b)
Schematic potential related to
game B.
For the case of game B, we must take into account the dependence of the winning
probabilities with the current capital of the player. When the capital is multiple of three
the winning probability is very small, i.e. p1 = 110 , this translates into a high potential
barrier between this site and the one located on the right. However, for the sites that
correspond to the capital of the player not being multiple of three the winning probability
is rather high, p2 = 34 , and so the potential barriers must be placed in a way that it is
favored a forward transition than a backward transition. One possible way of depicting
the potential is found in Fig. 2.6b.
In Fig. 2.7 we can see a plot of the average gain for a player that alternates between
games A and B, either periodically or stochastically. For both kind of alternations, it can
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be seen that the resulting game is a winning game. When the player alternates period-
ically between games A and B, it follows a fixed sequence of plays for game A and B.
For example, the sequence [3, 2] implies that the player will play game A three times in
a row, followed by game B two times. The case of random mixing between games is
obtained as follows: the player will decide on each time step if he plays game A or B
with probability γ and 1 − γ respectively3. In Fig. 2.7 we have plotted the random case
for a value of γ = 12 .
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Figure 2.7. Plot of the average
gain over 100 plays of either game
A or B alone – both of them losing
games –, although any combination
of them, either periodic or stochas-
tic results in a winning game. The
notation [a, b] indicates, for the pe-
riodic case, that we play a times
game A, followed by b times game
B. For the random case games A
and B are alternated with a proba-
bility γ = 1
2
.
2.2.2 Theoretical analysis of the games
One way of analyzing these games is through discrete–time Markov chains [64]. Each
value of capital is represented by a state, and the transition probabilities between these
states are determined by the rules of the games. In this section we will analyze the games
A, B and the randomized game AB with this technique in order to obtain the stationary
probability distributions.
2.2.2.a Analysis of game B
Either game A and B can be represented through discrete–time Markov chains. When
playing game B alone, we could represent the evolution of the capital with an infinite
Markov chain as the one depicted in Fig. 2.8. However, this Markov chain can be simpli-
fied inasmuch as there exists a periodicity in the system (we can see how the transition
probabilities repeat each M = 3 states). Thus, game B can be reduced to a Markov chain
with three states 0, 1 and 2 –see Fig. 2.9 for details– representing the value of the capital
modulo three. The transition probabilities between states will be given by the winning
(pi) and losing (qi) probabilities for each state.
3From now on the randomized game will be referred to as game AB.
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p1 p2 p0p0
p1 p2
q1q2 q2 q0q1 q0
3n3n−13n−2 3n+1 3n+2
Figure 2.8. Discrete–time
Markov chain corresponding
to game B.
We are interested in obtaining the probabilities of finding the capital of the player in
each of these states. We can write down a set of equations that describe the evolution
with the number n of games played – which in some sense would be equivalent to the
time– of the probabilities ΠB0 , ΠB1 and ΠB2 of finding the capital of the player in states 0,
1 and 2 respectively. These equations are
ΠB0 (n+ 1) = p2 Π
B
2 (n) + (1− p2) ΠB1 (n), (2.17)
ΠB1 (n+ 1) = p1 Π
B
0 (n) + (1− p2) ΠB2 (n), (2.18)
ΠB2 (n+ 1) = p2 Π
B
1 (n) + (1− p1) ΠB0 (n). (2.19)
We can explain how these evolution
12
0
p2
q1
q2
q2
1p
p2
Figure 2.9. Diagram representing the different
states of game B, as well as the allowed transi-
tions between these states.
equations are obtained through the following
example: imagine that we are in state 1 at
time n+1. We could have got to this state by
two ways: one would be if we were in state
0 at a previous time step n (with probabil-
ity ΠB0 (n)) and we had won with probability
p1; on the other hand, we could have been
in state 2 at time n (with probability ΠB2 (n))
and lost with probability (1− p2).
Eq. (2.18) is obtained through this rea-
soning, and the rest of equations can be ob-
tained following the same procedure.
Defining the column vector ΠB(n) =[
ΠB0 (n),Π
B
1 (n),Π
B
2 (n)
]T
we can rewrite the
previous set of equations in a matrix form as ΠB(n + 1) = TBΠB(n), where we have
defined a transition matrix for game B as
TB =

 0 1− p2 p2p1 0 1− p2
1− p1 p2 0

 . (2.20)
Our objective is to obtain the stationary probabilities, that occurs when the distri-
bution of capital in the states 0, 1 and 2 does not change from one game to the next.
This implies that the distribution of probabilities is independent of the number of games
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played n and invariant under the action of the matrix TB , i.e. ΠB = TBΠB . Matrix TB is
a stochastic matrix as the elements of each column sum up to one, and from Sec. 1.4.4 we
do know that there must be a stationary solution fulfilling the equation (I−TB)ΠB = 0.
The solution for vector ΠB that corresponds to the eigenvalue λ = 1 is
ΠB =
1
D

 1− p2 + p221− p2 + p1p2
1− p1 + p1p2

 , (2.21)
and where D = 3− p1 − 2p2 + 2p1p2 + p22 is a normalization constant. Introducing the
probabilities for game B described in (2.16) when ǫ = 0 we obtain
ΠB =
1
13

 52
6

 . (2.22)
2.2.2.b Analysis for game A
For the simplest case of game A we can make use of the previous result obtained for
game B, as we need only to substitute the winning probabilities p1 and p2 by p. The
result for the stationary probabilities ΠA obtained when ǫ = 0 reads
ΠA =
1
3

 11
1

 , (2.23)
a logical result as all transition probabilities are equal.
2.2.2.c Analysis for the randomized game
Recalling that the randomized game is based on the combination of games A and B with
probability γ and 1−γ respectively, we can define an equivalent set of probabilities p′1, p′2
characterizing this mixed game AB. The transition probabilities thus are
p′1 = γ p+ (1− γ) p1, (2.24)
p′2 = γ p+ (1− γ) p2. (2.25)
In order to solve for the vector of stationary probabilities ΠAB we can introduce the
previous expressions for p′1 and p′2 into Eq. (2.21). For the case of ǫ = 0 and a mixing
probability γ = 12 we obtain
ΠAB =
1
709

 245180
284

 . (2.26)
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2.2.2.d Average winning probabilities
There are different ways of obtaining the average winning probabilities for these games,
or equivalently, the conditions under which the games are losing, fair or winning. One
of them makes use of the stationary probability distribution obtained in previous sections
for games A, B and the randomized game AB. The average winning probability pwin
over all the states is then defined as
pwin =
M−1∑
i
pi Πi. (2.27)
Thus, a game will be fair on average if pwin = 12 , losing if pwin <
1
2 and winning if
pwin >
1
2 . Substituting the set of winning probabilities (2.16) for ǫ = 0 and the stationary
probabilities for games A, B and AB given by Eqs. (2.22),(2.23) and (2.26) respectively,
we obtain
pAwin =
1
2
, (2.28)
pBwin =
1
2
, (2.29)
pABwin = 0.5144. (2.30)
This reflects what has been previously presented, namely, that games A and B are fair
and the combined game AB is winning. For arbitrary values of {p, p1, p2}, we can easily
obtain the set of conditions to be fulfilled in order to reproduce the same effect imposing
that pAwin < 12 (losing game A), pBwin < 12 (losing game B) and pABwin > 12 (winning game
AB),
1− p
p
> 1, (2.31)
(1− p1)(1− p2)2
p1p22
> 1, (2.32)
(1− p′1)(1− p′2)2
p′1p
′2
2
< 1. (2.33)
Perhaps another way of envisioning the appearance of this paradox is by looking
at the parameter space of the winning probabilities {p1, p2}. In Fig. 2.10 we plot the
curve in parameter space {p1, p2} separating the winning –upper part– from the losing
–lower part– region. The point marked as A corresponds to the set of values of a fair
game A (ǫ = 0), whereas the point marked as B corresponds to that of fair game B. The
line joining both points shows the evolution of the winning probabilities {p′1, p′2} of the
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randomized game AB when increasing γ from zero (point A) to one (point B). It can be
seen that due to the local concavity of the losing region, when moving from one point to
another we cross the winning region, i.e., the values obtained by mixing these two sets A
and B give as a result a winning game. Therefore, if we want to reproduce the paradox
for any other two sets of values, we need only two points in the fair/losing region where
the line between them crosses the winning region.
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Winning Region Figure 2.10. Parameter space
{p1, p2} where it is plotted the di-
vision line between a winning and
a losing game. The evolution of
the transition probabilities {p′1, p′2}
when varying the mixing probabil-
ity γ is represented with the red
line. When γ = 0 the probabili-
ties correspond to game A, whereas
for γ = 1 correspond to game B.
Besides, we can also obtain the region in parameter space {p1, p2, p} where the para-
dox occurs. Fig. 2.11 shows the three surfaces Πa, Πb and Πab delimiting the winning
and losing regions either for game A, game B and the randomized game AB (for a mix-
ing probability γ = 12 ) respectively. In case of game A the losing region corresponds to
the lower half of surface Πa, where p < 12 ; for game B the losing volume is located on
the right side of surface Πb, and for the randomized game the winning volume is located
on the upper side of surface AB. Thus the unique region fullfiling all conditions at once
corresponds to the small volume on the front left side of Fig. 2.11, which is also bounded
by the plane p1 = 0.
2.2.2.e Rates of winning
With the stationary probabilities obtained for the games it is possible to find the rate of
winning as a function of the number of games played, r(n). The rate of winning can be
obtained by subtracting the probability of losing from the probability of winning. Thus,
we have
d〈Xn〉
dn
≡ r =
M−1∑
i=0
2 Πi pi − 1. (2.34)
For the simplest case of game A, the rate of winning is rA = 2p− 1. For game B the
corresponding rate of winning is rB = 2 p2− 1+ 2 Π0 (p1− p2). Substituting the set of
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Figure 2.11. Probability space {p1, p2, p} where surfaces ΠA, ΠB and ΠAB delimiting winning and
losing regions are plotted. The region where the paradox is obtained is located on the front left side,
that is, the small triangle bounded also by the p1 = 0 plane.
probabilities (2.16) with ǫ 6= 0 we obtain
rA = 2p− 1 = −2 ǫ, (2.35)
rB =
3(p1p
2
2 − q1q22)
2 + p1p2 + q1q2 − p2q2 = −
6ǫ
(
80ǫ2 − 8ǫ+ 49)
240ǫ2 − 16ǫ+ 169
= −1.74 ǫ+ 0.119ǫ2 − 0.358ǫ3 +O(ǫ4), (2.36)
rAB = −
6(ǫ− 0.01311) (ǫ2 − 0.0369ǫ+ 0.7151)
3ǫ2 − 0.1ǫ+ 2.216
= 0.0254− 1.9368ǫ+ 0.01361ǫ2 − 0.085ǫ3 −O(ǫ4). (2.37)
It can be checked that for values of small and positive values of ǫ both rates of winning
of games A and B are negative, whereas for the randomized game AB is positive.
2.2.2.f Other ways of evaluating the rates of winning
Besides the method described in the previous section, we can also derive the same result
with another approach based on existing results from continuous–time random walks [65]
on the set of integers. In this system we can calculate which is the first passage time
T (i→ i+1) to go from site i to site i+1, considering all transitions shown in Fig.2.12,
through the following expression
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T (i→ i+1) =< τi > pi+[< τi > +T (i→ i+1)]ri+[< τi > +T (i−1→ i+1)]qi.
(2.38)
where < τi > is the average resi-
i−1 i i+1
r
pq i
i
i
Figure 2.12. Diagram corresponding to the al-
lowed transitions from state i to states i+ 1 and
i− 1.
dence time at site i. The first term on the
rhs of the previous equation accounts for
the probability that after a time < τi >
the particle has made a transition to site
i + 1 with probability pi; the second term
accounts for the probability that the particle
after a time < τi > remains in site i with
probability ri and then jumps to i + 1 in a
time T (i→ i+ 1); finally the last term considers the probability that the particle makes
a transition to site i− 1 with probability qi after a time < τi > plus the time it takes for
the particle then to jump to site i+ 1, i.e., T (i− 1→ i+ 1).
After some algebra manipulation, and recalling that T (i− 1→ i+ 1) = T (i− 1→
i) + T (i→ i+ 1), we obtain the following expression
T (i→ i+ 1) = < τi >
pi
+ T (i− 1→ i) qi
pi
. (2.39)
Iterating Eq. (2.39) we can obtain a general expression for the mean first passage time
from site i to site i+ 1 as
T (i→ i+ 1) = < τi >
pi
+
i∑
j=−∞
[
qi
pi
. . .
qj
pj
< τj−1 >
pj−1
]
. (2.40)
and since T (i→ i+n) = T (i→ i+1)+T (i+1→ i+2)+. . .+T (i+n−1→ i+n)
we obtain
T (n0 → n) =
n−1∑
r=n0

< τr >
pr
+
r∑
j=−∞
qr
pr
. . .
qj
pj
< τj−1 >
pj−1

 . (2.41)
Therefore, once we have obtained a general expression for the mean first passage
time considering continuous–time, we can simply particularize it to the discrete–time
case recalling that < τi >= 1 ∀i ,
T (n0 → n) =
n−1∑
r=n0

 1
pr
+
r∑
j=−∞
qr
pr
. . .
qj
pjpj−1

 . (2.42)
From a previous section we know that the Parrondo games can be described through a
Markov chain that eventually is reduced to a three–state Markov chain due to the period-
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icity in the transition probabilities. Thus, we are interested in particularizing the previous
result (2.42) for a periodic system with arbitrary period L, obtaining
T (i→ i+ 1) =
∑L
j=0
∏i
k=i−j+1 qk
∏i−j+L−1
k=i+1 pk∏L
k=1 pk −
∏L
k=1
. (2.43)
Finally we can obtain the general expression for the rate of winning –or equivalently
the velocity– through
r =
L∑L
i=1 T (i→ i+ 1)
=
L
[∏L
k=1 pk −
∏L
k=1
]
∑L
i=1
{∑L
j=0
∏i
k=i−j+1 qk
∏i−j+L−1
k=i+1 pk
} , (2.44)
which after some manipulation leads to the same expression of the current obtained
through discrete–time Markov chain analysis, c.f. Eq. (2.36). Eq. (2.44) has a simple
interpretation if we think of the rate of winning as a velocity, thus it is nothing but a
quotient between a distance (L) and the time it takes to cover it (∑Li Ti). The general
result (2.44) agrees with other studies of one–dimensional hopping models with arbitrary
period L [66].
2.3 Other classes of Parrondo’s games
We have seen in previous sections that Parrondo’s paradox appears when one combines
a simple coin tossing game, either unbiased or negatively biased, with another unbiased
(or negatively biased) game where the coin to be used depends on the actual capital of
the player. Whatever sort of alternation between these games, either stochastically or
randomly, leads to a positively biased game. However, we might wonder if there exist
different games giving a similar effect, without considering the modulo rule introduced
in game B.
Parrondo et al. [4] introduced a new version for game B, where a player uses four
different coins depending on its previous history of wins and losses. On the other hand,
effects of cooperation between players in Parrondo’s games have been considered by
Toral [38,67]. In the following sections we will briefly present the basics of these games.
2.3.1 History dependent games
As already mentioned, Parrondo et al [4] devised a new game B (which we will refer
to as game B’) where the winning probabilities of a player depend on his/her previous
history of wins and losses. Therefore we have two games: game A is identical to the
original game, that is, there is a winning probability p and a losing probability q = 1− p.
For game B’ there are four probabilities {p1, p2, p3, p4} that will be used depending on
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whether the player won or lost in the two previous rounds. If subscript n denotes the
round played we can summarize the probabilities in the following table,
n− 2 n− 1 Winning probability
Loss Loss p1
Loss Win p2
Win Loss p3
Win Win p4
(2.45)
Originally they were assigned the following set of values

p = 12 − ǫ,
p1 =
9
10 − ǫ,
p2 = p3 =
1
4 − ǫ,
p4 =
7
10 − ǫ.
(2.46)
where ǫ accomplishes the same task than in the original games, i.e. when ǫ = 0 both
games are fair and when ǫ > 0 they are losing games; however, any sort of combination
between both (either periodic or stochastic) gives rise to a winning game, see for example
Fig. 2.13.
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Figure 2.13. Plot of the average
gain of a single player versus the
number of plays for Parrondo’s his-
tory dependent games A and B’, as
well as a periodic and a random
combination of them. Simulations
were performed using the probabil-
ities defined in (2.46) together with
ǫ = 0.003.
Furthermore, even when two games like game B’ are combined, we still reproduce
the paradox [68].
2.3.1.a Analysis of the games
These games can also be described through discrete–time Markov chains. For game B’
we may distinguish four different states: {LL,LW,WL,WW}. As a result we obtain
the Markov chain represented in Fig. 2.14.
We can write down a set of evolution equations for the set of probabilities {ΠB′ll ,ΠB
′
lw ,Π
B′
wl ,Π
B′
ww}
as
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Figure 2.14. Diagram representing the differ-
ent states of the history dependent game B’, as
well as the allowed transitions between these
states.
ΠB
′
ll (n+ 1) = (1− p3) ΠB
′
wl(n) + (1− p1) ΠB
′
ll (n), (2.47)
ΠB
′
lw(n+ 1) = p3 Π
B′
wl(n) + p1 Π
B′
ll (n), (2.48)
ΠB
′
wl(n+ 1) = (1− p2) ΠB
′
lw(n) + (1− p4) ΠB
′
ww(n), (2.49)
ΠB
′
ww(n+ 1) = p2 Π
B′
lw(n) + p4 Π
B′
ww(n). (2.50)
Which can be put in matrix form asΠB′(n+1) = TB′ΠB
′
(n), where TB′ accounts
for the transition matrix between these states and is given by
TB′ =


1− p1 0 1− p3 0
p1 0 p3 0
0 1− p2 0 1− p4
0 p2 0 p4

 , (2.51)
andΠB′(n+1) = {ΠB′ll (n+1),ΠB
′
lw(n+1),Π
B′
wl(n+1),Π
B′
ww(n+1)}T is the column
vector of occupancy probabilities for the states. As already explained in Sec. 1.4.4 we
know there exists a stationary probability distribution forΠB′ such that (I−TB′)ΠB′ =
0, and whose solution reads
Π
B′ =
1
D′


(1− p3)(1− p4)
p1(1− p4)
p1(1− p4)
p1p2

 , (2.52)
where D′ = p1p2 + (1 + 2p1 − p3)(1 − p4). Once we have obtained the stationary
probability distribution for game B’ we can easily obtain that of game A and the ran-
domized AB’; the former case would be equivalent to setting pi = p ∀i, whereas for the
second case we would substitute pi by p′i = γ p+ (1− γ) pi for i = 1, . . . , 4.
Using the probabilities for game A and B’ with ǫ = 0, and for the randomized AB’
with γ = 12 , we obtain for the stationary distributions
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ΠA =
1
4


1
1
1
1

 , ΠB′ = 122


5
6
6
5

 , ΠAB′ = 1429


100
112
112
105

 . (2.53)
The average winning probabilities (2.27) are pAwin = pB
′
win =
1
2 , p
AB′
win = 0.512. Thus,
the necessary conditions for the paradox to occur are accomplished, that is, we have two
fair/losing games that when combined give as a result a winning game.
Finally, for arbitrary values {p, p1, p2, p3, p4} the following set of conditions needs
to be fulfilled in order to reproduce the Parrondo effect
1− p
p
> 1,
(1− p3)(1− p4)
p1p2
> 1,
(1− p′3)(1− p′4)
p′1p′2
< 1. (2.54)
2.3.2 Collective games
Once reviewed an alternative group of Parrondo games where the capital dependent rules
of game B have been substituted for history rules, we turn to another sort of Parrondo
games introduced by Toral [38, 67] where the Parrondo effect is also obtained but for a
set of N players (collective games). In one of these games [67], game B is substituted
by another game that depends on the state of a player’s neighbor. We refer to this state
as whether a player has win or lost the previous game. The other version [38] considers
a redistribution of capital between a set of N players. We will now briefly explain both
games.
2.3.2.a Cooperative games
A group of N players with capitals Ci, i = 1, . . . , N are arranged in a circle so that
each player has two neighbors. A player chosen randomly for playing either can play
game A with probability γ or game B with probability 1− γ. These players are labelled
as winners/losers depending on whether they have won/lost the previous round played.
Game A is the same as the original, where a player has a winning probability p and a
losing probability 1 − p. Probabilities for game B depend on the state of the neighbors
i − 1 and i + 1 of player i. In the following table we have summarized the different
combinations available with their corresponding winning probabilities
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player i− 1 player i+ 1 Winning probability
Loser Loser p1
Loser Winner p2
Winner Loser p3
Winner Winner p4
(2.55)
The games are classified according to the behavior of the total capital C(t) =∑
iCi(t). Thus, a winning game is one for which the average value of the total capital
C(t) increases with time, and similarly for losing and fair games. Fig. 2.15 shows the av-
erage gain per player 〈C(t)〉N for the set of probabilities p = 0.5, p1 = 1, p2 = p3 = 0.16,
and p4 = 0.7. We can see how the Parrondo effect is again reproduced: playing ei-
ther game A or B reports no winnings on average, whereas an alternation between both
increases the average capital per player with time.
Figure 2.15. Average capital per
player, 〈C(t)〉
N
versus time t. The
probabilities defining the games
are: p = 0.5, p1 = 1, p2 = p3 =
0.16, p4 = 0.7. These results show
that game A is fair, game B is a los-
ing game, but when games A and B
are combined (AB) or in the [2, 2]
alternation AABBAABB . . ., the
result is a winning game. Results
are shown for N = 50, 100, and
200 players.
2.3.2.b Capital redistribution between players
The other version of collective games [38] substitutes the randomizing effect of game A
by a game that redistributes the capital between the players. Depending on the way the
capital is redistributed we may distinguish different versions for this new game A:
• Game A’: A unit of capital is given to a randomly selected player (with probability
1
N ).
• Game A′′: A unit of capital is given to a nearest neighbor with probabilities that
depend on the capital difference between players p(i → i ± 1) ∝ max[Ci −
Ci± 1, 0], with p(i → i + 1) + p(i → i − 1) = 1 and Ci denotes the current
capital of player i.
These versions of game A are clearly fair, as they only redistribute the capital between
different players, keeping the total amount of capital constant. The mechanism of plays
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Figure 2.16. Average capital per player, 〈C(t)〉/N , versus time, t (in units of games per player) for
different combinations of games A and B. We find the evolution of the capital when players only play
game A (γ = 1), game B (γ = 0) and a combination of both (γ = 1
2
). Upper panel: Combination
of the new game A’ with the original game B with probabilities: p1 = 0.1 − ǫ, p2 = 0.75 − ǫ.
Middle panel: Alternation between the new game A’ and game B’ with probabilities: p1 = 0.9 − ǫ,
p2 = p3 = 0.25 − ǫ, p4 = 0.7 − ǫ, with ǫ = 0.01. Lower panel: Alternation between the game A′′
and game B with probabilities: p1 = 0.9− ǫ, p2 = p3 = 0.25− ǫ, p4 = 0.7− ǫ, with ǫ = 0.01.
These figures have been obtained considering an ensemble of N = 200 players; the results have been
averaged over 10 realizations of the games. In all cases, the initial condition is that of zero capital,
Ci(0) = 0 , ∀i = 1, . . . N .
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can be described as follows: we have a set of N players, and each time step a random
player i is chosen for playing. In one version of these collective games, the player chooses
to play either game A’ or the original capital dependent game B; another version involves
an alternation between game A’ and the history dependent game B’, already explained
in a previous section. A third version includes an alternation between game A′′ and the
capital dependent game B.
Fig. 2.16 shows the evolution of the average capital per player versus time for the
three different versions explained previously. In all cases, the Parrondo effect is again
reproduced, i.e., the resulting game from the combination of any version of game A with
any other game B turns to be a winning game. This result emphasizes the fact that it
is better, collectively speaking, for an individual player to redistribute part of its capital
between other players, in order to increase on average the total amount of capital.
Chapter 3
Parrondo’s games with
self–transition
The aim of this Chapter is to study a new version of Parrondo’s games, where a new
transition probability is taken into account. We introduce a self-transition probability,
that is, now the capital of the player can remain the same after a game played with a
probability that will be denoted by ri, i = 0, . . . ,M − 1 (for simplicity the case of
M = 3 will be considered).
As we will show, the significance of this new version is a natural evolution of Par-
rondo’s games, which will be of particular interest in a succeeding chapter, when the
quantitative relation between Parrondo’s games and the Brownian ratchet is established.
3.1 Analysis of the new Parrondo games with self-transitions
3.1.1 Game A
We start with the new game A, where the probability of winning is p, the probability of
remaining with the same capital will be denoted as r, and the losing probability is given
by q = 1− r − p .
Following the same reasoning as [7] we will calculate the probability fj that the
capital reaches zero in a finite number of plays. Let us assume that initially we have a
given capital of j units. From Markov chain analysis [64] we find
• fj = 1 for all j ≥ 0, and so the game is either fair or losing; or
• fj < 1 for all j > 0, in which case the game can be winning because there is a
certain probability that the capital can grow indefinitely.
We are looking for the set of numbers {fj} that correspond to the minimal non-
negative solution of the equation
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fj = p · fj+1 + r · fj + q · fj−1 , j ≥ 1 (3.1)
with the boundary condition
f0 = 1 . (3.2)
Eq.(3.1) can be put in the following form
fj =
p
1− r · fj+1 +
q
1− r · fj−1 , (3.3)
whose solution, for the initial condition (3.2), is fj = A · [(1−p−rp )j − 1] + 1, where
A is a constant. For the minimal non-negative solution we obtain
fj = min
[
1,
(
1− p− r
p
)j]
. (3.4)
So we can see that the new game A is a winning game for
1− p− r
p
< 1, (3.5)
is a losing game for
1− p− r
p
> 1, (3.6)
and is a fair game for
1− p− r
p
= 1. (3.7)
3.1.2 Game B
We now analyze the new game B. Like game A, we have introduced the probabilities
of a self-transition in each state, that is, if the capital is a multiple of three we have a
probability r1 of remaining in the same state, whereas if the capital is not a multiple of
three then the probability is r2. The rest of the probabilities will follow the same notation
as in the original game B, so we have the following scheme


mod(capital, 3) = 0→ p1, r1, q1
mod(capital, 3) 6= 0→ p2, r2, q2.
(3.8)
Now let gj be the probability that the capital will reach the zeroth state in a finite
number of plays, supposing an initial capital of j units. Again, from Markov chain theory
we have
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• gj = 1 for all j ≥ 0, so game B is either fair or losing; or
• gj < 1 for all j > 0, in which case game B can be winning because there is a
certain probability for the capital to grow indefinitely.
For j ≥ 1, the following set of recurrence equations must be solved:
g3j = p1 · g3j+1 + r1 · g3j + (1− p1 − r1) · g3j−1, j ≥ 1
g3j+1 = p2 · g3j+2 + r2 · g3j+1 + (1− p2 − r2) · g3j , j ≥ 0
g3j+2 = p2 · g3j+3 + r2 · g3j+2 + (1− p2 − r2) · g3j+1, j ≥ 0 .
(3.9)
As in game A, we are looking for the set of numbers {gj} that correspond to the
minimal non-negative solution. Eliminating terms g3j−1, g3j+1 and g3j+2 from (3.9) we
get
[p1p
2
2+(1−p1−r1)(1−p2−r2)2]·g3j = p1p22 ·g3j+3+(1−p1−r1)(1−p2−r2)2 ·g3j−3 .
(3.10)
Considering the same boundary condition as in game A, g0 = 1, the last equation has
a general solution of the form g3j = B ·
[(
(1−p1−r1)(1−p2−r2)2
p1p22
)j − 1]+ 1, where B is
a constant. For the minimal non-negative solution we obtain
g3j = min
[
1,
(
(1− p1 − r1)(1− p2 − r2)2
p1p22
)j]
. (3.11)
It can be verified that the same solution (3.11) will be obtained solving (3.9) for g3j+1
and g3j+2, leading all them to the same condition for the probabilities of the games.
As with game A, game B will be winning if
(1− p1 − r1)(1− p2 − r2)2
p1p22
< 1, (3.12)
losing if
(1− p1 − r1)(1− p2 − r2)2
p1p22
> 1, (3.13)
and fair if
(1− p1 − r1)(1− p2 − r2)2
p1p22
= 1. (3.14)
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3.1.3 Game AB
Now we will turn to the random alternation of games A and B with probability γ. As in
a previous chapter this game will be named as game AB. For this game AB we have the
following (primed) probabilities
• if the capital is a multiple of three{
p′1 = γ · p+ (1− γ) · p1,
r′1 = γ · r + (1− γ) · r1,
(3.15)
• if the capital is not multiple of three{
p′2 = γ · p+ (1− γ) · p2,
r′2 = γ · r + (1− γ) · r2.
(3.16)
The same reasoning as with game B can be made but with the new probabilities p′1,
r′1, p
′
2, r
′
2 instead of p1, r1, p2, r2. Eventually we obtain that game AB will be winning if
(1− p′1 − r′1)(1− p′2 − r′2)2
p′1p
′2
2
< 1, (3.17)
losing if
(1− p′1 − r′1)(1− p′2 − r′2)2
p′1p
′2
2
> 1, (3.18)
and fair if
(1− p′1 − r′1)(1− p′2 − r′2)2
p′1p
′2
2
= 1. (3.19)
The paradox will be present if games A and B are losing, while game AB is winning.
In this framework this means that the conditions (3.6), (3.13) and (3.17) must be satisfied
simultaneously. In order to obtain sets of probabilities fulfilling theses conditions we
have first obtained sets of probabilities yielding fair A and B games but such that AB is
a winning game, and then introducing a small biasing parameter ǫ making game A and
game B losing games, but still keeping a winning AB game. As an example, we give
some sets of probabilities that fulfill these conditions:
(a) p = 920 − ǫ, r = 110 , p1 = 9100 − ǫ, r1 = 110 , p2 = 35 − ǫ, r2 = 15 ,
(b) p = 920 − ǫ, r = 110 , p1 = 5095000 − ǫ, r1 = 110 , p2 = 710 − ǫ, r2 = 120 ,
(c) p = 920 − ǫ, r = 110 , p1 = 325 − ǫ, r1 = 25 , p2 = 35 − ǫ, r2 = 110 ,
(d) p = 14 − ǫ, r = 12 , p1 = 325 − ǫ, r1 = 25 , p2 = 35 − ǫ, r2 = 110 .(3.20)
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3.2 Properties of the Games
3.2.1 Rate of winning
If we consider the capital of a player at play number n, Xn modulo M , we can perform a
discrete-time Markov chain analysis of the games with a state-space {0, 1, . . . ,M − 1}1.
For the case of Parrondo’s games we have M = 3, so the following set of difference
equations for the probability distribution can be obtained:
P0(n+ 1) = p2 · P2(n) + r1 · P0(n) + q2 · P1(n),
P1(n+ 1) = p1 · P0(n) + r2 · P1(n) + q2 · P2(n),
P2(n+ 1) = p2 · P1(n) + r2 · P2(n) + q1 · P0(n),
(3.21)
which can be put in a matrix form as P(n+ 1) = T · P(n), where
T =

 r1 q2 p2p1 r2 q2
q1 p2 r2

 (3.22)
and
P(n) =

 P0(n)P1(n)
P2(n)

 . (3.23)
In the limiting case where n → ∞ the system will tend to a stationary state (c.f.
Sec. 1.4.4) characterized by
Π = T ·Π, (3.24)
where limn→∞P(n) = Π.
Solving (3.24) is equivalent to solving an eigenvalue problem. As we are dealing with
Markov chains and the transition matrix obtained is a stochastic matrix, we know that
there will be an eigenvalue λ = 1 and the rest will be under 1 (see the Perron-Frobenius
theorem in Sec. 1.4.4 for further details). For λ = 1 we obtain the following eigenvector
giving the stationary probability distribution in terms of the games’ probabilities.
Π ≡

 Π0Π1
Π2

 = 1
D

 (1− r2)2 − p2 · (1− p2 − r2)(1− r1)(1− r2)− p2 · (1− p1 − r1)
(1− r1)(1− r2)− p1 · (1− p2 − r2)

 , (3.25)
where D is a normalization constant given by
1As in the original Parrondo games, we can reduce the infinite state Markov chain to an M finite Markov
chain.
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D = (1−r2)2+2(1−r1)(1−r2)−p2(2−p2−r2−r1−p1)−p1(1−p2−r2). (3.26)
The rate of winning at the n–th step, has the general expression
r(n) ≡ E[Xn+1]− E[Xn] =
∞∑
i=−∞
i · [Pi,n+1 − Pi,n] . (3.27)
Using these expressions it is possible to obtain the stationary rate of winning for the
new games introduced in the previous section. The results are, for game A:
rstA = 2p+ r − 1, (3.28)
and for game B
rstB = 2p2 + r2 − 1 + [q2 − p2 + p1 − q1] ·Π0
=
3
D
(p1p
2
2 − (1− p1 − r1)(1− p2 − r2)2), (3.29)
where D is given by (3.26).
It is an easy task to check that when r1 = r2 = 0 we recover the well-known ex-
pressions for the original games obtained in [8]. To obtain the stationary rate for the
randomized game AB we just need to replace in the above expression the probabilities
from (3.15) and (3.16).
Within this context the paradox appears when rstA ≤ 0, rstB ≤ 0 and rstAB > 0. If, for
example, we use the values from (3.20d) and a switching probability γ = 1/2, we obtain
the following stationary rates for game A, game B and the random combination AB:
rstA = −2ǫ,
rstB =
−ǫ (441− 120ǫ+ 1000ǫ2)
231− 40ǫ+ 500ǫ2 , (3.30)
rstAB =
93− 9828ǫ+ 1920ǫ2 − 32000ǫ3
2 (2499− 320ǫ+ 8000ǫ2) .
which yield the desired paradoxical result for small ǫ > 0.
We can also evaluate the stationary rate of winning when both the probability of
winning and the self-transition probability for the games vary with a parameter ǫ as p =
p − ǫ2 and r = r + ǫ, so that normalization is preserved. Using the set of probabilities
derived from (3.20d), namely p = 14 − ǫ2 , r = 12 + ǫ , p1 = 325 − ǫ2 , r1 = 25 + ǫ , p2 =
3
5 − ǫ2 , r2 = 110 + ǫ, the result is:
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rstA = 0,
rstB =
−ǫ (21− 20ǫ)
2 (77− 200ǫ+ 125ǫ2) , (3.31)
rstAB =
31− 164ǫ+ 160ǫ2
2 (833− 2600ǫ+ 2000ǫ2) ,
again a paradoxical result.
A comparison between the expressions for the rates of winning of the original Par-
rondo games [8] and the new games can be done in two ways. The first one consists
in comparing two games with the same probabilities of winning, say original game A
with probabilities p = 12 and q =
1
2 and the new game A with probabilities pnew =
1
2 ,
rnew =
1
4 and qnew =
1
4 . In this case we can think of the ‘old’ probability of losing
q as taking the place of the self-transition probability rnew and the new probability of
losing qnew. In this way we obtain a higher rate of winning in the new game A than in the
original game – remember that the new game A has an extra term r in the rate of winning
compared to the original rate, and this extra term is what gives rise to the higher value.
The same reasoning applies for game B, leading to the same conclusion.
The other possibility could be to compare the two games with the same probability
of losing. In this case, we follow the same reasoning as before, but now we can imagine
the ‘old’ probability of winning as replacing the winning and self-transition probabilities
of the new game. What we now obtain is a lower rate of winning for the new game
compared to the original one. An easy way of checking this is by rewriting (3.28) and
(3.29) as
rstA = p− q, (3.32)
rstB =
3
D
(p1p
2
2 − q1q22).
So for the same value of q but a lower value of p we obtain a lower value for the rates
of game A and B.
We now explore the range of probabilities in which the Parrondo effect takes place.
We restrict ourselves to the case M = 3 and γ = 1/2 used in the previous formulae.
The fact that we have introduced three new probabilities complicates the representa-
tion of the parameter space as we have six variables altogether, two variables {p, r} from
game A and four variables {p1, r1, p2, r2} coming from game B. In order to simplify this
high number of variables, some probabilities must be set so that a representation in three
dimensions will be possible. In our case we will fix the variables {r, r1, r2} so that the
surfaces can be represented in the parameter space {p, p1, p2}.
In Fig. 3.1 we can see the resulting region where the paradox exists for the variables
r = 14 , r1 =
1
8 and r2 =
1
10 . It is possible to show that the volume where the paradox
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Figure 3.1. Parameter space corresponding to the values r = 1
4
, r1 =
1
8
and r2 = 110 . The actual
region where the paradox exists is delimited by the plane p1 = 0 and the triangular region situated at
the frontal face, where all the planes intersect.
takes place, gradually shrinks to zero as the variables r, r1 and r2 increase from zero to
their maximum value of one.
Although it still remains an open question, we have not been able to obtain the equiv-
alent parameter space to Fig. 3.1 with the fixed variables p, p1, p2 and with the parameter
space variables r, r1, r2 instead – it is possible to obtain the planes for games A and B,
but not for the randomized game AB.
3.2.2 Simulations and discussion
We have analyzed the new games A and B, and obtained the conditions in order to repro-
duce the Parrondo effect. We now present some simulations to verify that the paradox is
present for a different range of probabilities – see Fig. 3.2. Some interesting features can
be observed from these graphs. First it can be noticed that the performance of random or
deterministic alternation of the games drastically changes with the parameters.
We use the notation [a, b] to indicate that game A was played a times and game B b
times. The performance of the deterministic alternations [3, 2] and [2, 2] remain close to
one another, as can be seen in Fig. 3.2. However the alternation [4, 4] has a low rate of
winning because as we play each game four times, that causes the dynamics of games
A and B to dominate over the dynamic of alternation, thereby considerably reducing the
gain.
The performance of the random alternation is more variable, obtaining in some cases
a greater gain than in the deterministic cases – see Fig. 3.2c.
In figures (3.3a) and (3.3b) a comparison between the theoretical rates of winning for
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Figure 3.2. Average gain as a function of the number of games played coming from numerical
simulation of Parrondo’s games with different sets of probabilities. The notation [a, b] indicates that
game A was played a times and game B b times. The gains were averaged over 50 000 realizations
of the games. a) Simulation corresponding to the probabilities (3.20a) and ǫ = 1
500
; b) probabilities
(3.20b) and ǫ = 1
200
; c) probabilities (3.20c) and ǫ = 1
200
; d) probabilities (3.20d) and ǫ = 1
200
.
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Figure 3.3. Comparison of the theoretical rates of winning – dashed lines – together with the rates
obtained through simulations – solid lines. All the simulations were obtained by averaging over
50 000 trials and over all possible initial conditions. a) The parameters correspond to the ones used in
equations (3.30). b) The parameters correspond to the ones used in equations (3.31).
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games A, B and AB given by (3.30) and (3.31) and the rates obtained through simulations
is presented. It is worth noting the good agreement between both results.
It is also interesting to analyze the evolution of the average gain obtained from the
random alternation of game A and game B when varying the mixing parameter γ. In
Fig. 3.4 we compare the theoretical curves and the ones obtained through simulations. As
in the original games, the maximum gain obtained for this set of parameters is obtained
for a value around γ ∼ 12 [69]. For other sets of the game probabilities, though, the
optimal γ differs from γ = 12 .
Chapter 4
Relation between Parrondo’s
games and the Brownian
ratchet
Parrondo’s games were originally inspired by the model of the flashing ratchet. How-
ever, no direct relation was ever established between both. In this chapter we address
a quantitative relation between the variables defining a game, i.e., the winning and los-
ing probabilities, and the physical variables defining a Brownian ratchet. Depending on
the game considered, a different formulation will be obtained: it will be shown that the
original Parrondo’s games can be derived from a Langevin equation with additive noise,
and Parrondo’s games with self–transition can be related to a Langevin equation using
multiplicative noise in the sense of Ito.
4.1 Additive noise
The evolution in time of the games can be described through a master equation with
discrete time τ . This time increases by one at every coin toss. If we denote by Pi(τ) the
probability that at time τ the capital of the player is equal to i, we can write a general
master equation as
Pi(τ + 1) = a
i
−1Pi−1(τ) + a
i
0Pi(τ) + a
i
1Pi+1(τ), (4.1)
where ai−1 is the probability of winning when the capital is i − 1, ai1 is the prob-
ability of losing when the capital is i + 1, and, for completeness, we have introduced
ai0 as the probability that the capital i remains unchanged (a possibility not considered
in the original Parrondo games). In accordance with the rules of the game described in
Sec. 2.2, the probabilities {ai−1, ai0, ai1} do not depend on time and they satisfy the nor-
malization condition ai+1−1 +ai0+a
i−1
1 = 1, which ensures the conservation of probability:
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∑+∞
i=−∞ Pi(τ + 1) =
∑+∞
i=−∞ Pi(τ) = 1 if
∑+∞
i=−∞ Pi(0) = 1.
We can rewrite Eq. (4.1) by making use of the normalization condition for the transi-
tion probabilities:
Pi(τ + 1)− Pi(τ) = ai−1Pi−1(τ) + (ai0 − 1)Pi(τ) + ai1Pi+1(τ)
= ai−1Pi−1(τ)− (ai+1−1 + ai−11 )Pi(τ) + ai1Pi+1(τ)
= ai−1Pi−1(τ)− ai+1−1 Pi(τ)− ai−11 Pi(τ) + ai1Pi+1(τ)
= − [Ji+1(τ)− Ji(τ)] . (4.2)
where the current Ji(τ) is given by:
Ji(τ) =
1
2
[FiPi(τ) + Fi−1Pi−1(τ)]− [DiPi(τ)−Di−1Pi−1(τ)] , (4.3)
and Fi = ai+1−1 − ai−11 , Di = 12(ai+1−1 + ai−11 ). This form is a consistent discretization
of the Fokker–Plank equation for a probability P (x, t)
∂P (x, t)
∂t
= −∂J(x, t)
∂x
, (4.4)
with a current
J(x, t) = F (x)P (x, t)− ∂[D(x)P (x, t)]
∂x
, (4.5)
with an arbitrary drift F (x), and diffusion D(x). If ∆t and ∆x are, respectively,
the time and space discretization steps, such that x = i∆x and t = τ∆t, it is clear the
identification
Fi ←→ ∆t
∆x
F (i∆x), Di ←→ ∆t
(∆x)2
D(i∆x). (4.6)
The discrete and continuum probabilities are related by Pi(τ) ↔ P (i∆x, τ∆t)∆x
and the continuum limit can be taken by considering that M = lim
∆t→0,∆x→0
(∆x)2
∆t
is a
finite number. In this case Fi ↔M−1∆xF (i∆x) and Di ↔M−1D(i∆x).
From now on, we restrict ourselves to the case ai0 = 0 (which corresponds to the
original Parrondo’s games). Since pi = ai+1−1 we can rewrite the terms Di, Fi as
Di ≡ D = 1
2
, (4.7)
Fi = −1 + 2pi. (4.8)
and the current Ji(τ) = −(1−pi)Pi(τ)+pi−1Pi−1(τ) is nothing but the probability
flux from i−1 to i. We are interested in solving our system for the stationary case. In this
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regime we know that Pi(τ) ≡ P sti and the current does not depend on site i, acquiring a
constant value Ji ≡ J . The stationary solutions for the probability P sti are found solving
the recurrence relation (4.3) for a constant current J together with the boundary condition
P sti = P
st
i+L:
P sti = Ne
−Vi/D

1− 2J
N
i∑
j=1
eVj/D
1− Fj

 , J = N e−VL/D − 1
2
∑L
j=1
eVj/D
1−Fj
. (4.9)
where N is the normalization constant obtained from
∑L−1
i=0 P
st
i = 1. In these ex-
pressions we have introduced the potential Vi in terms of the probabilities of the games1
Vi = −D
i∑
j=1
ln
[
1 + Fj−1
1− Fj
]
= −D
i∑
j=1
ln
[
pj−1
1− pj
]
, (4.10)
The case of zero current J = 0, implies a periodic potential VL = V0 = 0. This
latter condition leads to
∏L−1
i=0 pi =
∏L−1
i=0 (1− pi) for a fair game, a requirement already
obtained when analyzing the games with discrete–time Markov chains, c.f. Eq. (2.32). In
this case, the stationary solution can be written as the exponential of the potential P sti =
Ne−Vi/D. Note that Eq. (4.10) reduces in the limit ∆x→ 0 to V (x) = −M−1 ∫ F (x)dx
or F (x) = −M ∂V (x)∂x , which is the usual relation between the driftF (x) and the potential
V (x) with a mobility coefficient M .
The inverse problem of obtaining the game probabilities in terms of the potential
requires solving Eq. (4.10) for Fi with the boundary condition F0 = FL 2:
Fi = (−1)ieVi/D

∑Lj=1(−1)j [e−Vj/D − e−Vj−1/D]
(−1)Le(V0−VL)/D − 1 +
i∑
j=1
(−1)j [e−Vj/D − e−Vj−1/D]

 .
(4.11)
These results allow us to obtain the stochastic potential Vi (and hence the current J)
for a given set of probabilities {p0, . . . , pL−1}, using (4.10); as well as the inverse: obtain
the probabilities of the games given a stochastic potential, using (4.11). Note that the
game resulting from the alternation, with probability γ, of a game A with pi = 1/2, ∀i
and a game B defined by the set {p0, . . . , pL−1} has a set of probabilities {p′0, . . . , p′L−1}
with p′i = (1− γ)12 + γpi. For the Fi’s variables, this relation yields F ′i = γFi, and the
related potential V ′ follows from (4.10).
We give now two examples of the application of the above formalism. In the first one
we compute the stochastic potentials of the fair game B and the winning game AB, the
1In this, as well as in other similar expressions, the notation is such that
P0
j=1 = 0. Therefore the
potential is arbitrarily rescaled such that V0 = 0.
2The singularity appearing for a fair game VL = V0 in the case of an even number L might be related to
the lack of ergodicity explicitely shown in [31] for L = 4. In this case additional conditions on the potential
are required for the existence of a fair game, and will be further explained in the next section.
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Figure 4.1. Upper panel: potential Vi obtained from (4.10) for the fair game B defined by p0 =
1/10, p1 = p2 = 3/4. Lower panel: potential for the randomized game AB, with p′0 = 3/10, p′1 =
p′2 = 5/8 resulting from the random alternation of game B with a game A with constant probabilities
pi = p = 1/2, ∀i.
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random combination with probability γ = 1/2 of game B and a game A with constant
probabilities, in the original version of the paradox [5]. The resulting potentials are
shown in Fig. 4.1. Note that the potential for game B takes different values at each point
i mod 3 even though the probabilities were equal for i = 1, 2 mod 3. The resulting
asymmetry in the potential is the required one for the existence of the ratchet effect. On
the other hand, the potential of the combined game AB has a non-zero and negative mean
slope, as it corresponds to a winning game.
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Figure 4.2. Upper panel: Ratchet
potential (2.2) in the case L = 9,
A = 1.3. The dots are the dis-
crete values Vi = V (i) used in
the definition of game B. Lower
panel: discrete values for the poten-
tial V ′i for the combined game AB
obtained by alternating with prob-
ability γ = 1/2 games A and B.
The line is a fit to the empirical
form V ′(x) = −Γx+αV (x) with
Γ = 0.009525, α = 0.4718.
The second application considers as input the potential (2.2), setting the time–
dependent function W (t) = 1, which has been widely used as a prototype for ratch-
ets [70, 71]. Using (4.11) we obtain a set of probabilities {p0, . . . , pL−1} by discretizing
this potential with ∆x = 1, i.e. setting Vi = V (i). Since the potential V (x) is peri-
odic, the resulting game B defined by these probabilities is a fair one and the current J is
therefore zero. Game A, as always is defined by pi = p = 1/2, ∀i. We plot in Fig. 4.2
the potentials for game B and for the randomized game AB, the random combination
with probability γ = 1/2 of games A and B. Note again that the potential V ′i is tilted as
corresponding to a winning game AB. As shown in Fig. 4.3, the current J depends on
the probability γ for the alternation of games A and B.
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Figure 4.3. Current J resulting
from equation (4.9) for game AB
as a function of the probability γ
of alternation of games A and B.
Game B is defined as the discretiza-
tion of the ratchet potential (2.2) in
the case A = 0.4, L = 9. The
maximum gain corresponds to γ =
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4.2 The case of L even
A problem arises when finding the probabilities pi using (4.11) for a periodic poten-
tial (corresponding to a fair game) when the number of points L is even. This is ob-
vious since the periodicity condition VL = V0 gives a zero value for the denominator
(−1)Le2(V0−VL) − 1 in (4.11). In order to be able to find solutions for the probabilities,
the numerator has to vanish as well. This is equivalent to the condition:∑
k
e−2V2k =
∑
k
e−2V2k+1 , (4.12)
which, in terms of the stationary probabilities, becomes:
∑
k
P st2k =
∑
k
P st2k+1. (4.13)
This condition implies that one can have a fair game in the case of an even number
L only if the probability of finding an even value for the capital equals that of finding an
odd value. To our knowledge, this curious property, which emerges naturally from the
relation between the potential and the probabilities, has not been reported previously.
It turns out that one has to be careful when discretizing a periodic potential V (x) in
order to preserve this property. Otherwise, there will be no equivalent Parrondo game
with zero current. The simple identification Vi = V (iλ) might not satisfy this require-
ment, but we have found that a possible solution is to shift the origin of the x-axis, i.e.
setting Vi = V ((i + δ)λ) for a suitable value of δ. For example, in Fig. 4.4 we plot the
difference
d(δ) =
∑
i
e−2V ((2i+δ)λ) −
∑
i
e−2V ((2i+1+δ)λ), (4.14)
4.3 Multiplicative Noise 65
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
d
δ
Figure 4.4. Plot of d(δ) as
given by Eq. (4.14) versus dis-
placement δ. The unique zero
crossing is at δ = −0.068616.
as a function of δ in the case of the potential (2.2) and λ = 1/4 (which corresponds to
L = 4 points per period). We see that there is only one value that accomplishes d(δ) = 0,
namely δ = −0.068616.
Once the proper value of δ is found, it follows from Eq. (4.11) that there are infinitely
many solutions for the probabilities. They can be found by varying, say, p0, such that
for each value of p0 we will get a set of probabilities {p0, . . . , pi, . . . , pL−1}. Solutions
satisfying the additional requirement that pi ∈ [0, 1], ∀i, will exist only for a certain
range of values of p0 ∈ [0.0025, 0.68]. Some of the different solutions are plotted in
Fig. 4.5. Some numerical values are :
• p0 = 0.125, p1 = 0.8167766, p2 = 0.3927740, p3 = 0.7082539
• p0 = 0.25, p1 = 0.6335531,p2 = 0.5289900, p3 = 0.6070749
• p0 = 0.3525, p1 = 0.4833099, p2 = 0.6406871, p3 = 0.5241081
• p0 = 0.50, p1 = 0.2671062, p2 = 0.8014221, p3 = 0.4047168
An additional criterion to choose between the different sets of probabilities is to im-
pose the maximum “smoothness” in the distribution of the pi’s. For instance, one could
minimized the sum
∑L−1
i=0 (pi+1 − pi)2. In our example this criterion yields p0 = 0.3525
and the other values follow from the previous table.
4.3 Multiplicative Noise
We go now a step forward, and calculate how these previous expressions obtained for
the stationary probability, current and the defined potential vary when we consider the
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Figure 4.5. Multiple solutions for
the probabilities pi obtained with
equation (4.10) for a potential like
(2.2) with A = 0.3 , λ = 1
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,
δ = −0.068616 varying the value
of p0. The continuous line corre-
sponds to the “optimal” solution,
p0 = 0.3525 (see the text).
case ai0 6= 0 (which is equivalent to ri 6= 0). As stated previously, considering this term
implies that the player has a certain probability of remaining with the same capital after
a round played.
The drift and diffusion terms now read
Fi = a
i+1
−1 − ai−11 = 2pi + ri − 1, (4.15)
Di =
1
2
(1− ai0) =
1
2
(1− ri). (4.16)
It can be appreciated that both terms, the diffusionDi as well as the drift Fi, may vary
on every site. Using Eq. (4.3) and considering the stationary case Pi(τ) = P sti together
with a constant current Ji = J , we may solve for the probability distribution obtaining
P sti =
J
1
2Fi −Di
−
(
1
2Fi−1 +Di−1
1
2Fi −Di
)
P sti−1. (4.17)
The previous equation can be put in a general form as xi = ai + bixi−1, from which
a solution can be derived solving recursively for xn,
xn =
[
n∏
k=1
bk
]
· x0 +
n∑
j=1
aj ·

 n∏
k=j+1
bk

 . (4.18)
Applying the latter result to the stationary probability we have
P stn =
[
n∏
k=1
Dk−1 + 12Fk−1
Dk − 12Fk
]
· P st0 − J
n∑
j=1
1
Dj − 12Fj

 n∏
k=j+1
Dk−1 + 12Fk−1
Dk − 12Fk

 .
(4.19)
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We can solve for the current J using Eq. (4.17) together with the periodic boundary
condition P stL = P st0
J =
P st0 ·
(∏L
k=1
[ 1
2
Fk−1+Dk−1
Dk− 12Fk
]
− 1
)
∑L
j=1
1
Dj− 12Fj
∏L
k=j+1
[ 1
2
Fk−1+Dk−1
Dk− 12Fk
] . (4.20)
An effective potential can be defined in a similar way to its continuous analog as
Vi = −
i∑
j=1
ln

1 + 12 Fj−1Dj−1
1− 12
Fj
Dj

 = − i∑
j=1
ln

 pj−11−rj−1
1−pj−rj
1−rj

 . (4.21)
It is important to note that, as in the previous case ai0 = 0, the potential must verify
periodic conditions V0 = VL when the set of probabilities define a fair game. It is an easy
task to check that using Eq. (4.21) together with a periodic boundary condition, what we
obtain is the fairness condition for a given set of probabilities defining a Parrondo game
with self–transition (c.f. (3.14)), that is
L∏
k=1
pi =
L∏
k=1
qi =
L∏
k=1
(1− pi − ri). (4.22)
By means of Eq. (4.21) we can obtain the stationary probability (4.19) and current
(4.20) in terms of the defined potential as
P stn = e
−Vn

D0 · P st0
Dn
− J
n∑
j=1
eVj
Dn
(
1− 12
Fj
Dj
)

 , (4.23)
where
J =
P st0
[
D0 −DL · eVL
]
∑L
j=1
eVj„
1− 1
2
Fj
Dj
« . (4.24)
These are the new expressions which, together with Eqs. (4.15) and (4.16) allow us
to obtain the potential, current and stationary probability for a given set of probabilities
{pi, ri, qi} defining a Parrondo game with self–transition. We will now show that the
set of Eqs. (4.21),(4.23),(4.24) can be related in a consistent form with the continuous
solutions corresponding to the Fokker–Planck equation of a process with multiplicative
noise.
Given a Langevin equation with multiplicative noise
x˙ = F [x(t), t] +
√
B[x(t), t] · ξ(t), (4.25)
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interpreted in the sense of Ito, we can obtain its associated Fokker–Planck equation
given by Eq. (4.4) recalling that D(x, t) = 12B(x, t). The general solution for the sta-
tionary probability density function P (x, t) is given by
P st(x) =
e
R xΨ(x)dx
D(x)
·

N − J
x∫
e−
R x′ Ψ(x′′)dx′′dx′

 , (4.26)
where N is a normalization constant and Ψ(x) = F (x)D(x) . Making use of the period-
icity and the normalization condition P (0) = P (L) and
∫ x
0 P (x)dx = 1 we obtain the
following expressions for N and J
N = P (0) ·D(0) J =
P (0) ·
(
D(0)−D(L)e
R L
0 Ψ(x)dx
)
∫ L
0 e
− R x′0 Ψ(x′′)dx′′dx′
. (4.27)
Comparing the discrete equations for the current and stationary probability (4.23-
4.24) with the continuous solutions (4.26-4.27) we have the following equivalences
P st0 ·D0 ≡ P (0) ·D(0), (4.28)
Dj ≡ D(x), (4.29)
eVn ≡ e
R xΨ(x)dx, (4.30)
n∑
j=1
eVj(
1− 12
Fj
Dj
) ≡
x∫
e−
R x′ Ψ(x′′)dx′′dx′. (4.31)
It is clear the identification of the terms in Eqs. (4.28) and (4.29). Now we need to
demonstrate the equivalence given by Eqs. (4.30) and (4.31). If we define a discretised
function as ψj = Fj−1Dj−1 and we use the Taylor expansion up to first order of the logarithm
ln (1 + x) ≈ x we get
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Vn = −
n∑
j=1
ln
(
1 + 12ψj−1
1− 12ψj
)
≈ −1
2
n∑
j=1
(ψj−1 + ψj) =
= −
(
1
2
ψ0 +
n−1∑
k=1
ψk +
1
2
ψn
)
, (4.32)
n∑
j=1
eVj
1− 12ψj
=
n∑
j=1
eVj−ln (1−
1
2
ψj) ≈
n∑
j=1
e−
1
2(
Pj
k=1[ψk−1+ψk]−ψj) =
=
n∑
j=1
e−(
1
2
ψ0+
Pj
k=1 ψk+
1
2
ψj)+ 12ψj . (4.33)
It can be clearly seen that Eq. (4.32) corresponds to the numerical integration of the
function Ψ(x) defined previously, but with a ∆ = 1 (the difference in the sign is due to
the way we have defined our potential). It can be demonstrated that when ∆ 6= 1 both
expressions agree up to first order in ∆,
Vn∆ = −∆
(
1
2
ψ0 +
n−1∑
k=1
ψk +
1
2
ψn
)
. (4.34)
In the case of Eq. (4.33) what we obtain is nearly the Simpson’s numerical integration
method but for an extra term. As in the previous case, when ∆ 6= 1 then we have up to a
first order an extra ∆ term,
n∑
j=1
eVj∆
1− 12ψj∆
≈ ∆ ·
n∑
j=1
e−∆(
1
2
ψ0+
Pj
k=1 ψk∆+
1
2
ψj∆)+ 12∆ψj∆ . (4.35)
So when ∆ → 0 the contribution of the extra term can be neglected as compared to
that of the sum.
We can also perform the inverse process, that is, to obtain the set of probabilities
{pi, ri, qi} for a given potential Vi. If we define An = 12 FnDn =
pn−qn
pn+qn
, we need only to
solve Eq. (4.21) for An obtaining
An = (−1)n · eVn

∑Lj=1(−1)j(e−Vj − e−Vj−1)
(−1)L · eV0−VL − 1 +
n∑
j=1
(−1)j · (e−Vj − e−Vj−1)

 .
(4.36)
Once these values are obtained, we must solve for the probabilities together with the
normalization condition pi + ri + qi = 1. Since we have a free parameter in the set of
solutions, we can fix the ri values on every site and the rest of parameters can be obtained
through
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pi =
1
2(1 +Ai)(1− ri), (4.37)
qi =
1
2(1−Ai)(1− ri). (4.38)
In this way what we have is a method for inverting an effective potential, fixing a
parameter that in our case is the diffusion in every site (remember that the parameter ri is
related to the diffusion coefficient by Eq. (4.16) or is also equivalent to the temperature).
The fact that we can obtain different sets of probabilities, both describing different
dynamics but coming from the same potential V (x), it is not surprising. We need only
to remember that a system with multiplicative noise is equivalent, in the sense that both
possess the same stationary probability distribution, to another system with additive noise
x˙ = F (x) +D(x) · ξ(t) −→ x˙ = F¯ (x) + ξ(t), (4.39)
but with a renormalized drift term F¯ (x) given by F¯ (x) = −∂V¯∂x , where F (x) = −∂V∂x
and V¯ =
∫ F (x)
D(x)dx+ lnD(x).
Chapter 5
Parrondo’s games and
Information theory
Recently, Arizmendi et. al [37] quantified the transfer of information – negentropy –
between a Brownian particle and the nonequilibrium source of fluctuations acting on it.
These authors coded the particle motion of a flashing ratchet into a string of 0’s and 1’s ac-
cording to whether the particle had moved to the left or to the right respectively, and then
compressed the resulting binary file using the Lempel and Ziv algorithm (see Sec. 1.5.2
for details). They obtained in this way an estimation of the entropy per character h as
the ratio between the lengths of the compressed and the original file, for a sufficiently
large file length. They applied this method to estimate the entropy per character of the
ergodic source for different values of the flipping rate, with the result that there exists a
close relation between the current in the ratchet and the net transfer of information in the
system. The aim of the present Chapter is to apply this technique to the discrete–time
and space version of the Brownian ratchet, i.e., Parrondo’s games.
5.1 Parrondo’s games and Information Theory
Some previous works in the literature have related Parrondo’s games and information
theory. Pearce [72] considers the relation between the entropy and the fairness of the
games, and the region of the parameter space where the entropy of game A is greater than
that of B and the randomized game AB. Harmer et. al [73] study the relation between the
fairness of games A and B and the entropy rates considering two approaches. The first
one calculates the entropy rates not taking into account the correlations present on game
B, finding a good agreement between the region of maximum entropy rates and the region
of fairness. The second approach introduces these correlations, obtaining lower entropy
rates and no significant relation between fairness and entropy rates for game B.
The goal of this chapter is to relate the current or gain in Parrondo’s games with the
variation of information entropy of the binary file generated using techniques similar to
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those in [37]. In the next section we will present numerical results coming from sim-
ulations of different versions of Parrondo’s games: in the cooperative games [38, 67],
one considers an ensemble of interacting players; in the history dependent games [4,68],
the probabilities of winning depend on the history of previous results of wins and loses;
finally, in the games with self–transition (c.f. Chapter 3), there is a non–zero probability
ri that the capital remains unchanged (not winning or losing) in a given toss of the coins.
Finally, we offer in Sec. 5.3, a theoretical analysis that helps to understand the behavior
observed in the simulations.
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Figure 5.1. Comparison of the
average gain per game (solid line)
with the entropy difference ∆h
(symbols) as a function of the
switching rate γ, for several values
of the delay time δt, as shown in the
legend, and the following versions
of the Parrondo’s games: Upper
panel: Original Parrondo’s combi-
nation of games A and B with prob-
abilities: p = 1
2
, p0 =
1
10
and
p1 =
3
4
. Lower panel: Parrondo’s
combination of games A and B in-
cluding self–transitions. The values
for the probabilities are: p = 9
20
,
r = 1
10
, p0 =
3
25
, r0 =
2
5
, p1 =
3
5
and r1 = 110 .
5.2 Simulation results
We have performed numerical simulations of the different versions of the games. In every
case, the evolution of the capital of the player has been converted to a string of bits where
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bit 0 (resp., 1) corresponds to a decrease (resp., increase) of the capital after δt plays of
the games. It will be shown that the delay time δt between capital measurements is a
relevant parameter.
An estimation of the entropy per character h, is obtained as the compression ratio
obtained with the gzip (v. 1.3) program, that implements the Lempel and Ziv algorithm
(although it has been stressed by some authors that this is not the best compressing al-
gorithm one can find in the literature). The simplicity in the use of this algorithm (as
it is already implemented “for free” in many operating systems) is an added value, as it
will become apparent in the following when we consider strings of symbols generated by
more than one ergodic source. As suggested in [37], we expect that the negentropy, −h,
which accounts for the known information about the system, is related in some way with
the average gain in the games.
In the upper panel of Fig. 5.1 we compare the average gain in the randomized game
AB with the value of the entropy difference ∆h = h(γ = 0) − h(γ) as a function of
the probability γ and for different delay times δt. We find indeed a qualitative agreement
between the increase in the gain and the decrease in entropy as the γ parameter is varied.
This decrease in the entropy of the system implies that there exists an increase in the
amount of known information about the system. Notice that the compression rate depends
on δt, and that the γ value for which there is the maximum decrease in entropy agrees
with the value for the maximum gain in the games. This agreement is similar to the one
observed when applying this technique to the Brownian flashing ratchet [37].
Similar results are obtained in other versions of Parrondo’s games. For instance, in
the lower panel of Fig. 5.1 we compare the average gain and the entropy difference in the
games with self–transition [74]. Again in this case the maximum gain coincides with the
γ value for the minimum entropy per character for all values of δt.
Finally, in Fig. 5.2 we present the comparison in the case of the history dependent
games [4] (upper panel), and cooperative games [67] (lower panel), showing all of them
the same features as in previous cases. We may conclude from these results that there
exists, as it happens for the Brownian ratchet, a close relation between the entropy and the
average gain. In the next section we will develop a simple argument that helps explaining
this relation.
5.3 Theoretical analysis
As stressed in Sec. 5.1, the entropy per character of a text produced by an ergodic source
is1 H = −∑i pi · log(pi), where pi denotes the probability that the source will emit
a given symbol αi, and the sum is taken over all possible symbols that the source can
emit. For instance, if we consider game A as a source of two symbols, 0 (losing) and 1
(winning) , the Shannon entropy according as a function of the probability p of emitting
symbol 1 (i.e. the probability of winning) is given by Eq. (1.96). In Fig. 5.3 we compare
1Units are taken such that all logarithms are base 2.
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Figure 5.2. Same as Fig. 5.1 in
other versions of Parrondo’s games:
Upper panel: History dependent
games, alternating between two
games with probabilities: p1 = 910 ,
p2 = p3 =
1
4
, p4 =
7
10
; q1 = 25 ,
q2 = q3 =
3
5
and q4 = 25 .
Lower panel: Cooperative Par-
rondo’s games with probabilities:
p = 1
2
, p1 = 1, p2 = p3 =
16
100
,
p4 =
7
10
and N = 150 players
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this expression with the compression factor h obtained using the gzip algorithm. As
shown in this figure for the case of a single source, the compression factor of the gzip
algorithm does give a good approximation to the Shannon entropy.
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Figure 5.3. Comparison between
the theoretical value obtained for
the Shannon entropy – solid line
– with the numerical values – cir-
cles – obtained with the gzip al-
gorithm for a single source emitting
two symbols with probability p.
From now on, we restrict our analysis to the case of the original Parrondo’s paradox
combining games A and B, as explained in Sec. 2.2. For the combined game AB we
must distinguish two states, that is, when the capital is multiple of three and when it is
not. Therefore, we can think of the randomized game AB as originated by two sources
depending on whether the capital is multiple of 3 or not. The probability of emitting
symbol 1 when using the first source will be denoted by q0, whereas the same probability
will be q1 when using the second source.
Let us first consider the case δt = 1, i.e. we store the capital after each single play
of the games. According to the expression (1.97) for the entropy of a mixed source, the
Shannon entropy for the combined game AB is:
H = −Π0[q0 log(q0) + (1− q0) log(1− q0)]− (1−Π0)[q1 log(q1) + (1− q1) log(1− q1)],
(5.1)
being Π0 the stationary probability than in a given time the capital is a multiple of 3.
From the Markov chain analysis in Sec. 2.2.2 we know that the stationary probability Π0
is given by
Π0 =
1− q1 + q21
3− q0 − 2q1 + 2q0q1 + q21
. (5.2)
In Fig. 5.4 we compare the Shannon entropy H given by the previous formula with
the numerical compression factor h as a function of the probability γ of mixing games A
and B. Although certainly not as good as in the case of a single game, in this case, the
gzip compression factor gives a reasonable approximation to the Shannon entropy of the
combined game AB. It is worth noting that in this case of δt = 1 the entropy increases
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with γ, corresponding to a decrease of the information known about the system. In order
to relate the entropy difference with the current gain, we need to consider larger values
for δt.
0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1
γ
-1
-0,9
-0,8
-0,7
-
h
Figure 5.4. Plot of Shannon negen-
tropy (solid line) for the combina-
tion game AB according to expres-
sion (5.1), together with the numer-
ical values (circles) obtained with
the compression factor of the gzip
algorithm in the case when δt = 1
step.
For δt ≫ 1 the system gradually loses its memory about its previous state. Therefore,
the different measures are statistically independent and they can be considered as gener-
ated by a single ergodic source. For this single source, the probability of winning after
one single play of the games is pw = Π0 q0 + (1 − Π0) q1. However, we are interested
in calculating the winning probability p> after δt plays. In order to have a larger capital
after δt plays it is necessary that the number of wins overcomes the number of losses in
single game plays. The distribution of the number of wins follows a binomial distribution
and the probability p> is given by:
p> =
δt
2∑
k=0
(
δt
k
)
· pδt−kw · (1− pw)k. (5.3)
The corresponding Shannon entropy for this single source is:
H = −p> · log(p>)− (1− p>) · log(1− p>). (5.4)
We compare in Fig. 5.5 the Shannon entropy coming from this formula and the one
obtained by the compression ratio of the gzip program for two different values of δt =
500, 1000. In both cases, there is a reasonable agreement between both results. Moreover,
as shown in Figs. 5.1 and 5.2 the entropy follows closely the average gain of the combined
games.
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Figure 5.5. Plot of Shannon en-
tropy difference ∆h = h(γ =
0) − h(γ) according to formulas
(5.4) and (5.3) for δt = 500 (solid
line) and δt = 1000 (dashed line)
together with the numerical curves
obtained with the compression ratio
of the gzip algorithm for the same
values of δt = 500 (circles) and
δt = 1000 (squares).
Chapter 6
Efficiency of discrete–time
ratchets
Since the field of Brownian ratchets acquired its importance, there have been numerous
studies on the energetics of these microscopic devices [70, 75–77]. However, finding
the ratchet efficiency in the discrete case uptil now has been an outstanding open prob-
lem. We have shown earlier in Chapter 4 the connection established between the Fokker-
Planck equation associated to a Brownian ratchet, and the master equation describing
Parrondo’s games. Therefore, Parrondo’s games can be considered as being a discrete–
time and discrete–space version of the continuous flashing ratchet model [56, 78].
While this approach gives much insight and allows straightforward development of
games starting from suitable potentials, finding the correct formalism for describing the
efficiency of the discrete ratchet and relating it back to the continuous case, has been
problematic [8].
It is the aim of this Chapter to deepen this relationship in order to calculate the effi-
ciency of the games. We develop an efficient method for obtaining the stationary proba-
bilities and probability current for a discrete–time and space ratchet in terms of a poten-
tial function. We combine the new methods presented herein together with known results
from ratchet theory in order to calculate the efficiency of the discrete ratchet. This allows
to gain new insight into the games behavior by quantifying the relation between the gain
and the dissimilarity between games A and B.
The Chapter is organized as follows: in Sec. 6.1 we present our theoretical model,
followed in Sec. 6.2 of the calculation of the efficiency.
79
80 Chapter VI
6.1 Theoretical model
6.1.1 Continuous model
We consider the following version of the flashing ratchet: let x(t) represent the position
of a Brownian particle whose dynamics can be described through the Langevin equation
x˙(t) = −V ′(x) · ζ(t) + f +D(x) · ξ(t), (6.1)
where
1. ξ(t) accounts for white noise,
2. ζ(t) is a form of dichotomous noise that switches on (state B, ζ(t) = 1) and off
(state A, ζ(t) = 0) the potential V (x),
3. f is a constant external force acting on the particle
4. D(x) is the diffusion function.
If V (x) is periodic V (x + L) = V (x), then the individual dynamics corresponding
to the off and on states both yield 〈x(t)〉 = 0 (for f = 0). However, it is known that if the
potential has a certain degree of spatial asymmetry, the combined dynamics can rectify
the white noise fluctuations obtaining directed motion, 〈x(t)〉 6= 0, this is the case of
the flashing ratchet. Without loss of generality, we will consider V (x) to be of the form
given by Eq. (2.2) but setting W (t) = 0, that is,
V (x) = V0
[
sin
(
2πx
L
)
+
1
4
sin
(
4πx
L
)]
, (6.2)
although other similar potentials can perform the same task.
It can be demonstrated that the previous Langevin equation is equivalent to a set of
Fokker-Planck equations describing the transitions of the particle between states A and
B [56, 78] as:
∂PA(x, t)
∂t
= −∂JA(x, t)
∂x
− ωA→BPA(x, t) + ωB→APB(x, t), (6.3)
∂PB(x, t)
∂t
= −∂JB(x, t)
∂x
− ωB→APB(x, t) + ωA→BPA(x, t), (6.4)
where PA(x, t) (resp. PB(x, t)) denotes the probability of finding the particle in state
A (resp. B) at a given position x and time t. The ωα→β term accounts for the transi-
tion rate between states α and β. The probability currents JA and JB are given by the
expressions
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JA(x, t) = f PA(x, t)− ∂[D(x)PA(x, t)]
∂x
,
JB(x, t) = [f − V ′(x)]PB(x, t)− ∂[D(x)PB(x, t)]
∂x
. (6.5)
In this model, once attained the stationary regime we have PA(x, t) = PA(x) and
PB(x, t) = PB(x); the total current in this regime is constant [79] and given by J =
JA(x) + JB(x).
6.1.2 Discrete model
Based on the previous model, we can elaborate a set of equations describing the evolution
of the capital when alternating between games A and B, namely, they would be equivalent
to the set (6.3),(6.4) but for discrete time and space. The set of master equations are
PAi (τ + 1) = (1− γA→B)[pAi−1PAi−1(τ) + rAi PAi (τ) + qAi+1PAi+1(τ)]+
γB→A[pBi−1P
B
i−1(τ) + r
B
i P
B
i (τ) + q
B
i+1P
B
i+1(τ)], (6.6)
PBi (τ + 1) = (1− γB→A)[pBi−1PBi−1(τ) + rBi PBi (τ) + qBi+1PBi+1(τ)]+
γA→B[pAi−1P
A
i−1(τ) + r
A
i P
A
i (τ) + q
A
i+1P
A
i+1(τ)], (6.7)
where PAi (τ) is the probability that the player plays game A with a capital i at time
τ ; pAi , r
A
i and qAi are the probabilities of winning, drawing and losing, respectively, when
playing game A with a capital i, and a similar notation for game B. They satisfy the
normalization condition pAi + rAi + qAi = 1. This notation generalizes the original games
for which the self–transition probabilities are rAi = rBi = 0. Note that the probabilities
pAi , r
A
i , q
A
i , p
B
i , r
B
i and qBi repeat periodically pAi+L = pAi , etc. with periodicity L.
For the original Parrondo games we know that period L = 3 and the winning proba-
bilities are given by pAi = 12−ε, pB0 = 110−ε, pB1 = pB2 = 34−ε. Finally, γα→β accounts
for the transition probability between state α and β. The particular case considered in the
original games in which the probability of playing game A and B is γ and 1− γ, respec-
tively, independently of the previously played game, implies that γAB = 1−γBA = 1−γ.
Then, following the approach of Chapter 4, it is possible to rewrite Eqs. (6.3),(6.4) in
the Fokker-Planck form as
PAi (τ+1)− PAi (τ) = −
[
JAi+1(τ)− JAi (τ)
]− γA→BPAi (τ)+ γB→APBi (τ), (6.8)
PBi (τ+1)− PBi (τ) = −
[
JBi+1(τ)− JBi (τ)
]
+ γA→BPAi (τ)− γB→APBi (τ), (6.9)
with a current JAi (τ)= 12 [FAi PAi (τ)+FAi−1PAi−1(τ)]−[DAi PAi (τ)−DAi−1PAi−1(τ)], where FAi =
pAi − qAi , DAi = 12(1 − rAi ), and similarly for JBi (τ). This form stresses the similarity
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of the continuum and discrete descriptions (compare with Eqs. (6.3)-(6.5)) and it is easy
to show that the currents are also given by the net flux between consecutive states, i.e.,
JAi (τ) = p
A
i · PAi (τ)− qAi+1 · PAi+1(τ) and JBi (τ) = pBi · PBi (τ)− qBi+1 · PBi+1(τ).
In general, it is not possible to solve the previous equations to obtain the probabilities
PA,Bi (τ) as a function of the set of probabilities p
A,B
i , r
A,B
i , q
A,B
i and γα→β , even in the
steady state where the left-hand-sides of (6.8) and (6.9) vanish. A remarkable exception
is that of the case γAB = 1− γBA = 1− γ discussed above. In this case it turns out that
the total probability Pi(τ) = PAi (τ) + PBi (τ) satisfies a master equation
Pi(τ + 1) = pi−1Pi−1(τ) + riPi(τ) + qi+1Pi+1(τ), (6.10)
where pi = λpAi + (1 − λ)pBi , ri = λrAi + (1 − λ)rBi and qi = λqAi + (1 − λ)qBi .
Furthermore, it is possible to show that the steady state solutions satisfy PAi = γPi and
PBi = (1 − γ)Pi. This result allows us to find an analytic solution to Eqs. (6.6),(6.7)
for PAi and PBi in the stationary regime. The solution is based upon on the correspond-
ing expression derived from Eq. (6.10) in the periodic steady-state regime for Pi (see
Chapter 4 for further details)
Pi = e
−Vi

D0 · P0
Di
− J
i∑
j=1
eVj
Di
(
1− 12
Fj
Dj
)

 , (6.11)
where Fi = γFAi + (1 − γ)FBi , Di = γDAi + (1 − γ)DBi and the value of P0 has
to be found using the normalization condition
∑L−1
i=0 Pi = 1. The potential Vi is given
by Eq. (4.21), and the total current J can be obtained from Eq. (4.24) and coincides with
the net flux between states i and i + 1, J = pi Pi − qi+1 Pi+1. Notice that although
J = JAi + J
B
i is a constant independent of i in the steady state, it can not be assured that
JAi and JBi are constant as well. Finally, the average gain is obtained by multiplying the
current by the periodicity of the system, i.e. G = JL.
In Fig. 6.1 we have plotted the stationary probabilities PAi , PBi for the case L = 3.
We can see the agreement between the stationary probability distribution Πi obtained
through the analysis with discrete–time Markov chains (c.f. 2.21) and their corresponding
equivalents PAi + PBi obtained with the current method.
Let us remark that in the case of playing a single game, either game A or B (corre-
sponding formally to setting γ = 1 or γ = 0, respectively) it is possible to obtain the
corresponding steady state solutions in term of potential functions V Ai and V Bi , defined
as in Eq.(4.21) but using the corresponding probabilities (pAi , qAi , rAi ) or (pBi , qBi , rBi )
instead of (pi, qi, ri).
So far, we have introduced a method that allows the calculation of the stationary
properties, such as the probabilities PAi , PBi and Pi, and the currents JAi , JBi and J .
We turn now to the problem of evaluating efficiency for our discrete–time system. This
has been problematic [8] because there was no clear way of evaluating the energy input
or energy output of the system when dealing only with probabilities defining the games.
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Figure 6.1. Plot of the station-
ary probabilities for games A and
B versus the mixing probability γ.
The inset shows that the sum of
both probabilities PAB(i) = PAi +
PBi agrees with the expressions ob-
tained for the stationary probabili-
tiesΠi obtained for the mixed game
AB through Markov chain analysis.
With the formalism introduced earlier, a direct relation can be established between these
games and the physical model of the ratchets so as to obtain an estimation of the efficiency
for the discrete–time case.
6.2 Efficiency
Let us now evaluate the efficiency of our system. We will use the definition of the ef-
ficiency as the ratio η = Eout/Ein, and we will provide with suitable definitions for the
energy output, Eout, and input, Ein, of the system.
Let us begin by Ein, defined as the energy that must be supplied to the system for
switching between the two potentials. In order to evaluate this energy input in our sys-
tem we need potential functions related to each of the two games. Therefore, if we are
dealing with probabilities defining our games A and B, we will make use of Eq. (4.21)
for obtaining the potential for each game.
The energy input can be calculated theoretically by means of a probability flux
balance. In the stationary regime, the net flux from a given game, say game A, and state
i, towards the other game B and the same state i can be calculated through the difference
equation JA→Bi = JAi−1− JAi . Clearly the net current JA→Bi equals the opposite current
from game B to game A, that is, JA→Bi = −JB→Ai , where JB→Ai = JBi−i − JBi (see
Fig.6.2). Therefore the input energy can now be obtained as Ein =
∑L−1
i=0 J
A→B
i · (V Bi −
V Ai ).
For the energy output, we will use the definition introduced in [80], where Eout is
defined as the minimum energy input Ein required to accomplish the same task as the
engine. The novelty of this definition is that it permits the evaluation of the efficiency for
a Brownian particle even in the absence of an external load f (it includes in the evaluation
of the power output the work done by the Brownian particle against the friction force).
This leads to Eout = fv + Γv2, being v the mean velocity of the Brownian particle and
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Γ the friction coefficient. In our system Γ has been rescaled to 1 and the mean velocity
corresponds to the average gain G. We thus obtain Eout = fJL+J2L2 as the expression
to be used for determining the energy output of our system. Once the expressions for the
energy input and energy output of the system have been obtained, we can compute the
efficiency for both fair and biased games.
In the case of fair games, ǫ = 0
JAi−1
JAi
JABi
JBi
JBi−1
JBAi
i i
GAME A GAME B
Figure 6.2. Diagram showing the net probability cur-
rent JAB from game A to game B.
leads to f = 0 and Eout = J2L2.
We consider first the original Parrondo
games as defined before. The results
are shown in Fig.6.3 where we plot the
energy input, energy output and the ef-
ficiency for those games, as a function
of the mixing probability γ. Notice
that the efficiency attains its maximum
value, η = 0.011, at γ = 0.362 ap-
proximately, as seen in Fig. 6.3(c).
We consider now still fair games
A and B, but now the probabilities
pAi and pBi are obtained from suitable
ratchet potentials V A(x) and V B(x). In particular we choose a flat potential V A(x) = 0
while V B(x) is given by Eq. (6.2) with L = 5 and V0 = 0.35. For the fair games con-
sidered here, the force is f = 0. The probabilities pAi and pBi are obtained by inverting
Eq. (4.21) (recall the trivial result pAi = 1/2). The results are displayed in Fig. 6.4. No-
tice that the the maximum value for the efficiency η = 3.554 × 10−3 is obtained when
γ = 0.358.
In these two cases of fair games the system possesses a low efficiency mainly because
it works in an irreversible manner, far from its equilibrium state. It is worth remarking
that the magnitude obtained for the efficiency agrees with other studies for the on-off
ratchets [81, 82].
Now we turn to biased games and study the dependence of the efficiency on the
parameter f . Given a set of probabilities pi defining a game it is possible to compute f
as the average slope, (VL − V0)/L, of the associated potential Vi given by Eq. (4.21).
Applying this method to games A and B of the original Parrondo paradox, it is possible
to relate f to the biasing parameter ǫ. However, the average slope, fA, resulting from
game A is different from the slope fB resulting from game B. Since we want to study the
effect that a common force f has on the efficiency, we have chosen a different approach:
we first compute the potentials V Ai and V Bi using the unbiased probabilities pAi and
pBi with ǫ = 0, then we modify the potentials by tilting them with a common slope,
V ′Ai = V Ai − fi and V ′Bi = V Bi − fi, and then compute the probabilities of the biased
game p′Ai and p′
B
i using the inverse of Eq. (4.21). The energy input, output and efficiency
are then computed using the above defined formalism with the potentials V ′Ai and V ′
B
i .
6.2 Efficiency 85
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1γ
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
E i
n
a)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1γ
0
1×10-4
2×10-4
3×10-4
4×10-4
5×10-4
6×10-4
7×10-4
E o
u
t
b)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1γ
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
0.012
η
c)
Figure 6.3. In these figures,
we consider the original Parrondo
games defined by a period L = 3
and the following set of probabili-
ties pAi = 12 − ε, p
B
0 =
1
10
− ε,
pB1 = p
B
2 =
3
4
− ε in the fair
case ǫ = 0. Using the analogy ex-
plained in the text, we have com-
puted the energy input (a) and en-
ergy output (b) as a function of the
mixing probability γ. The maxi-
mum energy input is at γ ≈ 0.479,
close to the case of maximum alter-
nation between the games, whereas
the maximum for the energy out-
put (or the maximum gain G) is lo-
cated at γ ≈ 0.415. The efficiency
η = Ein/Eout is displayed in panel
(c). Its maximum value η = 0.011
occurs at γ ≈ 0.362.
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Figure 6.4. We plot the energy in-
put (a), energy output (b) and effi-
ciency (c) versus the mixing prob-
ability γ in the case of fair games
whose probabilities have been ob-
tained from ratchet potentials (see
the main text for the values of the
parameters). The maximum energy
input is at γ ≈ 0.481, whereas the
maximum for the energy output is
at γ ≈ 0.413. The maximum value
for the efficiency η = 3.554×10−3
occurs for γ ≈ 0.358.
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Figure 6.5. Plot of the efficiency
versus the external load f for dif-
ferent values of the probability γ
for the original Parrondo’s games.
From top to bottom γ = 0.4, 0.2,
0.6 and 0.8. The highest values
for the efficiency are attained for
γ = 0.4, a value close to the γ of
maximum current.
The results are shown in Fig. 6.5 where we plot the efficiency for the original Parrondo’s
games as a function of the external forcing f for different values of the mixing probability
γ. Two features can be highlighted. On one hand it can be appreciated that the efficiency
attains a maximum value for f 6= 0, corresponding to a lower value for the current than
in the case of null forcing. This effect has also been found in other models, for example
in [81, 82]. On the other hand, we also find a non–monotonic dependence of the position
of the maxima for the efficiency depending on the probability γ [81, 82].
Chapter 7
Collective games
This Chapter will be devoted to the development of a theoretical analysis for a collective
game which considers the redistribution of capital between players. These collective
games, already described in Sec. 2.3.2, are based on the alternation between a game
A and game B. In [38] different games B are used, however, we will restrict ourselves
to the case were game B is the original Parrondo game whose probabilities depend on
the capital of the player. Game A is basically a mechanism of redistribution of capital
between players. Two versions are used in [38]: the first one considers a redistribution
of capital to a randomly selected player; the second considers a redistribution of capital
to a neighboring player with probabilities that do depend explicitly on the capital of the
players.
In Sec. 7.1 we present the analysis when alternating between the original game B
and the new game A′, consisting on a redistribution of capital to a randomly selected
player; Sec. 7.2 considers the alternation of the capital dependent game B with another
game A′′ with constant probabilities. Finally, we analyze the alternation of game B
with a version of game A′′ where the probabilities depend on the capital of the players
in Sec.7.3, although this dependence will be slightly different in order to facilitate the
analysis.
7.1 Distribution of capital to a randomly selected player
Let us denote by P (c1,c2,...,cN ;τ) the probability that at a given time τ player 1 has a
capital c1, player 2 capital c2,. . . and so on. This probability density function must fullfill
the normalization condition
∑
c1,c2,...,cN
P (c1,c2,...,cN ;τ) = 1. (7.1)
The marginal probability for a single player j is obtained simply by carrying out the
summation over all players but j, i.e.,
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P (cj ;τ) =
∑
c1
∑
c2
. . .
∑
cj−1
∑
cj+1
. . .
∑
cN
P (c1,c2,...,cN ;τ) (7.2)
We can write down an evolution equation for the probability density functionP (c1,c2,...,cN ;τ)
for a set of N players alternating between game A′ with probability γ and game B with
probability 1− γ. The equation is given by
P (c1,c2,...,cN ;τ+1) =
γ
N
N∑
j=1
N∑
j′=1
j′ 6=j
1
(N − 1)P (c1,...,cj+1,...,cj′−1,...,cN ;τ)+
+
(
1− γ
N
) N∑
j=1
[a
cj
−1P (c1,...,cj−1,cN ;τ)+ a
cj
0 P (c1,...,cN ;τ)+ a
cj
1 P (c1,...,cj+1,cN ;τ)].
(7.3)
The rhs of Eq. (7.3) is composed of the following terms:
• The first term accounts for the evolution of the capital when game A′ (capital re-
distribution) is played; with the term γ denoting the probability of playing game
A′, and 1N being the probability of choosing player j. Inside the summation we
find the term 1N−1 indicating the probability for player j
′ of being chosen. The
term P (c1,...,cj+1,...,cj′−1,...,cN ;τ) inside the summation accounts for the probability
at time τ of finding player j with capital cj + 1 and player j′ with capital cj′ − 1.
Both summations for j and j′ are done in order to consider all possible combina-
tions between the players.
• The second term accounts for the evolution when the selected player plays game
B instead of game A′. The term 1−γN includes the probability of playing game B
times the probability of choosing player j. The term in brackets corresponds to
the master equation when player j plays game B alone (we are following the same
notation as the one used in Chapter 4).
By means of property (7.2) and after some algebra, we can derive the master equation
corresponding to the evolution of the probability for a single player j with capital cj at
time τ (all the details are explicitly given in Appendix A.1) as
P (cj ;τ) =
1− γ
N
[a
cj
−1P (cj−1;τ)+ a
cj
0 P (cj ;τ)+ a
cj
1 P (cj+1;τ)]+
+
γ
N
[P (cj+1;τ)+ P (cj−1;τ)] +
N − (1 + γ)
N
P (cj ;τ). (7.4)
It can easily be checked that the latter equation fulfills the normalization condition
for a single player
∑
cj
P (cj ,τ) = 1. Rewritting Eq. (7.4) as a continuity equation we
obtain the following expression
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P (cj ,τ+1)−P (cj ,τ) = 1− γ
N
[a
cj
−1P (cj−1,τ)− (acj−11 + acj+1−1 )P (cj ,τ)+ acj1 P (cj+1,τ)]+
+
γ
N
[P (cj+1,τ)− 2P (cj ,τ)+ P (cj−1,τ)]. (7.5)
From now on we drop the index j, as we are dealing only with one player, and the
capital of player j will be denoted instead by i, thus P (cj ,τ) ≡ Pi(τ).
As we have seen, we have been able to obtain the equation governing the evolution
of the probability Pi(τ) for a single player. Taking a closer look to Eq. (7.5) we can
conclude that the effect of game A′ of a diffusion of capital from player j to another
randomly chosen player j′ is equivalent, from the point of view of a single player j, to a
diffusion of capital of that player only. Therefore, we may define a current Ji as
Ji =
(
1− γ
N
)
[ai−1Pi−1(τ)− ai−11 Pi(τ)] +
γ
N
[Pi−1(τ)− Pi(τ)]. (7.6)
Assuming that the system eventually attains a stationary state, we can solve Eq. (7.6)
for Pi(τ), assuming a constant current Ji = J ∀i and Pi(τ) = Pi, obtaining
Pn =
n∏
k=1
Ak · P0 −
n∑
j=1
J
(1− γ)aj−11 + γ
n∏
k=j+1
Ak, (7.7)
where Ak =
(1−γ)ak−1+γ
(1−γ)ak−11 +γ
. The constants P0 and J are obtained from the periodicity1
Pn = Pn+L and normalization condition
∑L−1
k=0 Pk = 1. The current J reads
J =
P0
[∏L
k=1Ak − 1
]
∑L
j=1
QL
k=j+1Ak
(1−γ)ak−11 +γ
, (7.8)
and
P0 =
1∑L
n=1
∏n
k=1Ak −
QL
k=1 Ak−1PL
j′=1
QL
k=j′+1
Ak
(1−γ)a
j′−1
1 +γ
(∑L
n=1
∑n
j′=1
QL
k=j′+1 Ak
(1−γ)aj′−11 +γ
) . (7.9)
In Fig. 7.1 we plot the current J of a single player in terms of the mixing probability
γ between games A′ and B. We check this result with numerical values obtained through
simulation with N = 1000 players.
1As players alternate between the original Parrondo game B and the new game A, we can consider, as
in the analysis of the original games, that the system is periodic with periodicity L (where L is given by
periodicity of game B).
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Figure 7.1. Plot of the theoretical
– continuous line – and numerical
current – circles – J versus the mix-
ing probability γ for a single player.
The probabilities used for game B
are that of the original Parrondo
game B: p0 = 110 , p1 = p2 =
3
4
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7.2 Redistribution of capital to a nearest neighbor with con-
stant probabilities
In this section we present a collective Parrondo game obtained from the alternation of
the original Parrondo game B with a new diffusing game A′′. However, in this case
the diffusion of capital of game A′′ takes place only to nearest neighbors. We consider
a general case where with probability pr player j will give a coin to its neighbor j + 1
located on the right, and with probability pl the coin will be given to the neighbor j−1 on
the left. Then, the general master equation describing the time evolution of the probability
density function P (c1,c2,...,cN ;τ+1) when a set of N players alternate between game A′′
with probability γ and game B with probability 1− γ is given by
P (c1,...,cN ;τ+1) =
γ
N
N∑
j′=1
[
plP (c1,..cj′−1−1,cj′+1,..cN ;τ)+ prP (c1,..cj′+1,cj′+1−1,..cN ;τ)
]
+
+
1− γ
N
N∑
j=1
[a
cj
−1P (c1,..,cj−1,..,cN ;τ)+ a
cj
0 P (c1,...,cN ;τ)+ a
cj
1 P (c1,..,cj+1,..,cN ;τ)]. (7.10)
All details of the calculation can be found in Appendix A.2. As a result we obtain the
same equation for a single player as the one obtained previously, c.f. Eq. (7.5).
An interesting case appears when pl = pr = 12 . It corresponds to a random distri-
bution of capital amongst nearest neighbors. For this case the master equation obtained
is
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P (c1,..,cN ;τ+1) =
1− γ
N
N∑
j=1
[
a
cj
−1P (c1,..,cj−1,..,cN ;τ)+ a
cj
0 P (c1,..,cN ;τ)+
+a
cj
1 P (c1,..,cj+1,..,cN ;τ)
]
+
γ
2N
N∑
j=1
[
P (c1,..,cj−1−1,cj+1,..,cN ;τ)+P (c1,..,cj+1,cj+1−1,..,cN ;τ)
]
.
(7.11)
Which, after some manipulation, can be written in a continuity form as
P (c1,..,cN ;τ+1)− P (c1,..,cN ;τ) =
=
1− γ
N
N∑
j=1
[
a
cj
−1P (c1,..,cj−1,..,cN ;τ)− (acj−11 + acj+1−1 )P (c1,..,cj ,..,cN ;τ)+
+ a
cj
1 P (c1,..,cj+1,..,cN ;τ)
]
+
γ
2N
N∑
j=1
[
P (c1,..,cj−1−1,cj+1,..,cN ;τ)− 2P (c1,..,cN ;τ)+
+ P (c1,..,cj+1,cj+1−1,..,cN ;τ)
]
. (7.12)
We already know from a previous chapter –c.f. Chapter 4– that the term correspond-
ing to game B is equivalent, in the continuous form, to a ratchet potential acting on the
Brownian particle. Therefore, we next proceed to find the equivalent model in the con-
tinuous form to that of game A′′.
Let us consider only game A′′, thus we may set γ = 1 in Eq. (7.12) which leads to
the following equation
P (c1,..,cN ;τ+1)− P (c1,..,cN ;τ) = 1
2N
N∑
j=1
[
P (c1,..,cj−1−1,cj+1,..,cN ;τ)− 2P (c1,..,cN ;τ)+
+ P (c1,..,cj+1,cj+1−1,..,cN ;τ)
]
(7.13)
We may introduce the step-operators [83] E and E−1, which are defined by its effect
on an arbitrary function f(n)
Ef(n) = f(n+ 1), E−1f(n) = f(n− 1), (7.14)
and that can be expanded in a Taylor series as
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E = 1 + ∂∂x +
1
2
∂2
∂x2
+ 13!
∂3
∂x3
+ . . . ,
E−1 = 1− ∂∂x + 12 ∂
2
∂x2
− 13! ∂
3
∂x3
+ . . . .
(7.15)
Then, rewritting Eq. (7.13) using the previous operators we obtain
P (c1,..,cN ;τ+1)− P (c1,..,cN ;τ) = 1
2N
N∑
j=1
[
(E−1j−1Ej + EjE
−1
j+1 − 2)P (c1,..,cN ;τ)
]
=
=
−1
2N
N∑
j=1
[
∇j+1 − 2∆j +∇j−1 +∆j(∇j−1 +∇j+1)
]
P (c1,..,cN ;τ) =
=
1
2N
N∑
j=1
[
2(∆j −∇j)−∆j(∇j−1 +∇j+1)
]
P (c1,..,cN ;τ). (7.16)
Where we have defined the terms ∆j and ∇j so that they can be directly related
to an expansion with partial derivatives as ∆j = Ej − 1 = ∂∂x + 12 ∂
2
∂x2
+ . . ., and
∇j = 1− E−1j = ∂∂x − 12 ∂
2
∂x2
+ . . ..
Regarding the l.h.s of the previous equation as the discretization of a time derivative
∂P (c1,...,cN ;τ)
∂τ , and substituting on the r.h.s the terms ∆j and∇j by their partial derivatives
expansions, to a first approximation, we obtain
∂P (c1,..,cN ;τ)
∂τ
=
−1
2N
N∑
j=1
{∂2P (c1,..,cN ;τ)
∂cj−1∂cj
−2∂
2P (c1,...,cN ;τ)
∂c2j
+
∂2P (c1,..,cN ;τ)
∂cj∂cj+1
}
. (7.17)
This equation can be compared to the general Fokker–Planck equation for more than
one dimension [83]
∂P (c1,..,cN ;τ)
∂τ
= −
N∑
j=1
∂F (c1,..,cN ;τ)P (c1,..,cN ;τ)
∂ci
+
1
2
N∑
i,j=1
∂2Bij(c1,..,cN ;τ)P (c1,..,cN ;τ)
∂ci∂cj
(7.18)
With the result that for game A′′ there is no drift, i.e., the term F (c1,...,cN ;τ) = 0, and
the diffusion matrix Bij(c1,...,cN ;τ) is given by
B =
1
N


2 −1 0 0 . . . 0 −1
−1 2 −1 0 . . . 0
0 −1 2 −1 0 . . . 0
. ..
.
−1 0 . . . 0 −1 2


(7.19)
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The diffusion matrix is related to the diffusion coefficients dij of the Langevin equa-
tion x˙i = fi({x}) + dij({x})ξi through Bij = ddT =
∑
k dikdjk. This set of equations
has an infinite set of solutions due to the symmetry property of Bij = Bji. Therefore, we
must choose the appropriate solution for this system, which to our consideration might
be
d =
1√
N


1 −1 0 0 . . . 0 0
0 1 −1 0 . . . 0
0 0 1 −1 0 . . . 0
. ..
.
−1 0 . . . 0 0 1


(7.20)
Then, the equivalent set of Langevin equations would be given by
x˙1 =
1√
N
(ξ1 − ξ2),
x˙2 =
1√
N
(ξ2 − ξ3),
·
· (7.21)
x˙N =
1√
N
(ξN − ξ1).
This set of equations clearly preserves normalization as 〈∑i x˙i〉 = 0. They could
also be rewritten in the form x˙1 = η1√N , x˙2 =
η2√
N
, ... x˙N =
ηN√
N
, with the properties:
〈ηiηi+1〉 = −1 and 〈η2i 〉 = 2.
Finally, the complete solution would consider the inclusion of a drift term coming
from game B, which as stated previously it consisted on a ratchet–like potential. In
Fig. 7.2 we plot the average current for a set of N = 40 Brownian particles alternating
between a state characterized by Eqs. (7.21) and a state with a ratchet–like potential. The
ratchet effect is obtained as expected, and the curve presents (as in the single particle
case) an optimum flip-rate value for which the system attains a maximum current.
7.3 Distribution of capital with capital dependent probabili-
ties
In this section we derive the equation when the probabilities for game A′′ depend ex-
plicitely on the actual value of the capital of the players. However, as stated previously,
we will make use of a set of probabilities slightly different from those defined in [38]. In
order to facilitate our analysis, the following probabilities for game A′′ will be used
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Figure 7.2. Plot of the average
current per particle in terms of the
natural logarithm of the flip rate
when they are subjected to a state
where a ratchet–like potential –c.f.
Fig. (2.3)– is acting, and another
state characterized by Eqs. (7.21).
The number of particles is N = 40,
and the results have been obtained
averaging over 1000 realizations.
pj,j+1 =
cj−1
cj+1 + cj−1
pj,j−1 =
cj+1
cj+1 + cj−1
(7.22)
where pj,j+1 denotes the probability that player j gives away one unit of capital to
player j + 1, and pj,j−1 is the probability that player j − 1 receives the coin instead.
Clearly, these probabilities fulfill the normalization condition pj,j+1 + pj,j−1 = 1. and
the way they are defined – i.e., the probability of player j + 1 receiving a coin from
player j being proportional to the capital of player j− 1 – accomplishes the same task as
those defined in [38], that is, those players with less capital possess a higher probability
of receiving the coin than those with higher amounts of capital. The only inconvenient is
that the capital of the players must remain positive in order to avoid negative values for
the probabilities.
The master equation for this game is given by
P (c1,..,cN ;τ+1) =
γ
N
N∑
j′=1
N∑
j′′=1
pj′,j′′P (c1,..,cj′+1,..,cj′′−1,..,cN ;τ)+
+
(1− γ)
N
N∑
j′=1
[a
c′j
−1P (c1,..,cj′−1,..,cN ;τ)+ a
cj′
0 P (c1,..,cN ;τ)+ a
cj′
1 P (c1,..,cj′+1,..,cN ;τ)]
(7.23)
where the term pj′,j′′ denotes the probability that player j′ gives a unit of capital to
player j′′. We are interested, as in previous cases, in obtaining the stationary probability
distribution for a single player. Therefore, we must perform the sum (7.2) in Eq. (7.23) in
order to obtain the single player distribution P (cj ; τ). A comparison between Eqs. (7.23)
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and (7.3) yields that the sum ∑c1,..,cj−1,cj+1,..,cN of the term corresponding to game B
gives as a result Eq. (A.6).
The most difficult part comes from gameA′′. The second term on the rhs of Eq. (7.23)
must be developed in terms of j′ and then perform the sum
∑
c1,..,cj−1,cj+1,..,cN
. The
calculations are shown in Appendix A.3. Nevertheless, the main result is that again,
even though the probabilities of diffusing capital depend explicitly on the capital of the
players, the equation we obtain for the probability density function for a single player
agrees with the previous results, that is, Eq. (7.4).
Chapter 8
Reversals of chance in
collective games
Cooperative versions of the games, played by a set of N players, have been studied
previously. As already explained in Sec. 2.3.2, ref. [67] considers a set of N players
arranged in a ring such that at each round a player is chosen randomly to play either
game A or B. The original game A is combined with a new game B, for which the
winning probability depends on the state (winner/loser) of the nearest neighbors of the
selected player. A player is said to be a winner (loser) if he has won (lost) his last game.
In [38], Toral considers again a set of N players, but game A is replaced by another game
based on a redistribution of capital. When combining this new game with the original
game B, the paradox is reproduced.
In this Chapter we present a new version of collective games with new paradoxical
features when they are combined. Besides reproducing the Parrondo effect, where a
winning game is obtained from the alternation of two fair games, another feature appears:
the games show under certain circumstances a current inversion when varying γ. In
other words, the value of the mixing probability γ determines whether you end up with
a winning or a losing game AB. As shown in [15], it is not possible to obtain a current
inversion in a single player set–up using the standard rules of the original games when
game A is state independent. For the collective games considered here, we are able to
obtain a current inversion even if one of the games used (game A) uses no information
at all about the present state of the system. And so this current inversion is a collective
genuine effect, without a corresponding analog in the single player game.
The chapter is organized as follows: in Sec. 8.1 we present the games in detail as
well as a theoretical analysis by means of discrete–time Markov chain theory, obtaining
analytical expressions for the stationary probabilities for a finite number of players; we
also provide some qualitative insight into this new current inversion effect. Finally, in
Sec. 8.2 we offer a qualitative picture of the impossibility of a current inversion using the
original games.
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8.1 The games
The games will be played by a set of N players. In each round, a player is selected
randomly for playing. Then, with probabilities γ and 1 − γ respectively game A or B is
played. Game A is the original game in which the selected player wins or loses one coin
with probability pA and 1−pA respectively. The winning probabilities in game B depend
on the collective state of all players. Again, as in [67], a player is said to be a winner or
a loser when he has won or lost respectively his last game. More precisely, the winning
probability can have three possible values, determined by the actual number of winners i
within the total number of players N , in the following way
pBi ≡ probability to win in game B =


p1B if i >
2N
3 ,
p2B if
N
3 ≤ i ≤ 2N3 ,
p3B if i <
N
3 .
(8.1)
.........
r0 r r1 Np
q
0
1
p p1
2q
N−1
Nq
...
... ...
σ σ σ0 1 N
Figure 8.1. Different states and
allowed transitions for N players.
The arrows indicate the state of
each player being a winner (arrow
up) or a loser (arrow down).
8.1.1 Analysis of the games
The main quantity of interest is the average gain of the collection of N players when
playing the stochastic game AB. Since the winning probability of game B only depend
on the total number of winners, it is sufficient to describe the games using a set of N +1
different states {σ0, σ1, . . . , σN}. A state σi is the configuration where i players are
labeled as winner and N − i as loser. Transitions between the states will be determined
by the forward transition probability pi, the backward transition probability qi, and the
probability for remaining in the same state ri, see Fig. 8.1.
Denoting as Pi(t) the probability of finding the system in state σi at the t–th round
played, we can write the equation governing its time evolution as
Pi(t+ 1) = pi−1Pi−1(t) + riPi(t) + qi+1Pi+1(t), (8.2)
with 0 ≤ i ≤ N and where the transition probabilities are given by
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pi =
N − i
N
[
γ pA + (1− γ) pBi
]
, (8.3)
ri =
2i−N
N
[
γ pA + (1− γ) pBi
]
+
N − i
N
, (8.4)
qi =
i
N
[
γ (1− pA) + (1− γ) (1− pBi )
]
. (8.5)
These transition probabilities have been obtained through the following reasoning: if
we recall that in state i there are N − i losers and i winners, the only way that we can go
forward to state i + 1 is by choosing a player labelled as a loser – with probability N−iN
– and that player winning the game. So if there is a probability γ of playing game A and
a probability 1 − γ of playing game B, the combined winning probability will be given
by γ pA + (1− γ) pBi . Considering these two contributions, the forward transition (8.3)
from state i to state i + 1 is obtained. The transition probabilities ri and qi follow from
the same reasoning.
The set of transition probabilities (pi, qi, ri) must satisfy the normalization condition
pi + ri + qi = 1, which implies for the probabilities Pi(t) that
∑N
i=0 Pi(t) = 1, as long
as
∑N
i=0 Pi(t = 0) = 1.
This system of N + 1 equations can be solved in the stationary state, where the
probabilities no longer depend on time Pi(t) = P sti . In this case Eq. (8.2) can be rewritten
as
(pi + qi)P
st
i = pi−1P
st
i−1 + qi+1P
st
i+1. (8.6)
Considering that the system is bounded by states 0 and N we have
p0P
st
0 = q1P
st
1 ,
(p1 + q1)P
st
1 = p0P
st
0 + q2P
st
2 ,
(p2 + q2)P
st
2 = p1P
st
1 + q3P
st
3 ,
...
(pi + qi)P
st
i = pi−1P
st
i−1 + qi+1P
st
i+1,
...
(pN−1 + qN−1)P stN−1 = pN−2P
st
N−2 + qNP
st
N ,
qNP
st
N = pN−1P
st
N−1. (8.7)
Writing the previous set of equations in terms of the stationary probability at the
origin P0 we get
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P st1 =
p0
q1
P st0 ,
P st2 =
p1
q2
P st1 =
p0p1
q1q2
P st0 ,
P st3 =
p2
q3
P st2 =
p0p1p2
q1q2q3
P st0 ,
. . .
P stN =
pN−1
qN
P stN−1 =
p0p1p2 . . . pN−1
q1q2q3 . . . qN
P st0 . (8.8)
Note that these solutions entail the detailed balance property between two neighbor-
ing states piP sti = qi+1P sti+1. This is due to the reflecting boundary conditions at i = 0
and i = N . Through the normalization condition
∑N
i=0 P
st
i = 1 we may obtain P st0 .
Thus, the general solution can be written as
P sti =
1
Z
p0 p1 · · · pi−1 qi+1 qi+2 · · · qN , (8.9)
or equivalently,
P0 =
1
Z
q1q2q3 . . . qN
P1 =
1
Z
p0 q2q3 . . . qN
P2 =
1
Z
p0p1 q3q4 . . . qN
P3 =
1
Z
p0p1p2 q4q5 . . . qN
. . .
PN =
1
Z
p0p1p2 . . . pN−1 (8.10)
where Z is the normalization factor. Once the stationary probabilities are calculated,
we can obtain the average winning probability over all states for the stochastic combina-
tion AB (mixing probability γ) from
pABwin =
N∑
i=0
[
γ pA + (1− γ) pBi
]
P sti . (8.11)
The average gain can then easily be evaluated through the expression JAB = 2pABwin −
1.
The properties of the separate games A and B can be obtained by replacing in the
previous expressions γ by 1 or 0 respectively.
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Figure 8.2. a)Plot of the cur-
rent versus the mixing probabil-
ity γ between games A and B for
N = 4 with probabilities pA = 1
2
,
p1B = 0.79, p
2
B = 0.65 and p3B =
0.15. b) Plot of the current versus
the mixing probability γ between
games A and B for N = 3 with
probabilities pA = 1
2
, p1B = 0.686,
p2B = 0.423 and p3B = 0.8.
N p2B
2 p
1
B−1
p1B−p3B−1
.
3 (p
1
B−1)(p3B+1)+
√
(p1B−2)(p1B−1)p3B(p3B+1)
(p1B+p
3
B−1)
4 (p
1
B−1)2(p3B+1)
1+p3B+(p
1
B−2)(p1B+p1Bp3B−(p3B)2)
5
[
1− p3B
p1B−1
√
5+2p1B(p
1
B−3)
1+2p3B(1+p
3
B)
]−1
Table 8.1: Condition on p2B in order that game B is fair for N = 2, . . . , 5.
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8.1.1.a The Parrondo effect
We know that the Parrondo effect appears when from the combination of two fair games,
we obtain a winning game. Clearly, game A is fair for pA = 1/2. For game B the set of
values {p1B, p2B, p3B} giving a fair game is more difficult to determine because it depends
on the total number of players N . The conditions on p2B for a fair game B have been
found analytically by a symbolic manipulation program up to N < 13. In Table 8.1
we find listed the conditions of fairness for p2B up to N = 5. When playing only game
B (γ = 0), the following symmetry in the stationary distribution can be deduced from
Eq.(8.9)
P
st,{p1B ,p2B ,p3B}
i = P
st,{1−p3B ,1−p2B ,1−p1B}
N−i . (8.12)
This property implies that pABwin is unaffected by the parameter transformation: {p1B, p2B, p3B} →
{1−p3B, 1−p2B, 1−p1B}. It also means that for the parameter set {p1B, p2B = 1/2, 1−p1B},
the stationary probability distribution is symmetric over the states, i.e. P sti = P stN−i.
Therefore, when combining this with game A, i.e., alternating two games with symmet-
ric probability distributions, always yields a fair game, independent of the values of γ,
N and p1B . To see the Parrondo effect, we need another, non-trivial, parameter set which
yields a fair game B. For example, for N = 4 we obtain a fair game B when p1B = 0.79,
p2B = 0.65 and p3B = 0.15. The stochastic combination with game A reproduces the
desired Parrondo effect, see Fig. 8.2.a .
8.1.2 Results
8.1.2.a Two players
For N = 2 players, there are 3 different states. Fig. 8.3.a shows the regions in parameter
space {γ, p1B, p3B} where the mixing (0 < γ < 1) between games A and B results in a
fair, winning or losing game. Note that p2B is fixed by the condition to have a fair game
B, see Table 8.1. Besides the case p1B = 1 − p3B , valid for any number of players, also
p1B = p
3
B results in a fair game for N = 2, independent of the alternation probability
γ. From Eq. (8.9), one can deduce that p1B = p3B and p1B = 1 − p3B imply a symmetric
distribution P sti over the states, i.e. P st0 = P st2 . As mentioned before, this property
prohibits any net current in the system. For all other values of p1B and p3B the Parrondo
effect appears, that is, game AB is either a winning or a losing game, cf. Fig. 8.3.a.
8.1.2.b Three players
Fig. 8.3.b shows for N = 3 the surfaces in parameter space {γ, p1B, p3B} where AB is a
fair game. Besides the plane p1B = 1− p3B , there is a second, curved surface with values
of γ different from 0 and 1 which results in JAB = 0. This curved surface is not uniform
in γ and is therefore the collection of points of flux reversal between a winning and losing
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Figure 8.3. a) N = 2. The
regions in parameter space
for for which pABwin = 0.5,
0.499 and 0.501, indicating
the regions where AB is fair
(blue), losing (red) and win-
ning (green) respectively. The
blue diagonal planes show the
situations p1B = 1 − p3B and
p1B = p
3
B , for which AB is
fair, independent of γ. b)N =
3. The regions in parame-
ter space for which the mix-
ing (0 < γ < 1) between
game A and B results in a fair
game. Besides the trivial di-
agonal plane, there is a curved
plane – not uniform in γ – for
which JAB = 0.
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game AB. This implies that, depending on the value of γ we can either have a winning
game or a losing game by alternating between two fair games. For example, in Fig. 8.2.b
we have plotted the current JAB vs. γ for the set of probabilities pA = 12 , p
1
B = 0.686,
p2B = 0.423 and p3B = 0.8. For low values of γ the resulting game is a losing game,
whereas for high values of γ the game turns to be a winning game, cf. Fig 8.2.b. In both
regions there exists an optimal value for γ giving a maximum current. We can provide
a qualitative picture that may help understanding the mechanism by which the current
inversion phenomenon takes place.
When playing exclusively game B (γ = 0), the stationary distribution P sti is not
homogeneous. This is reflected by the fact that the central states {σ1, σ2} have a higher
occupancy probability (P sti ) than the boundary states {σ0, σ3}. On the other hand, if we
look to the winning probability, it is higher in the latter set of states rather than in the
former one (p1B, p3B > p2B).
Indeed, the central states can be labelled as losing states, as when combining game B
with game A for any 0 ≤ γ < 1, the average losing probability pli = γ(1 − pA) + (1 −
γ)(1 − pBi ) < 12 , i.e., it is more likely on average for a player to lose money rather than
to win when being in one of these states. On the other hand, for the boundary states the
contrary is true: it is more likely to win money rather than to lose for any 0 ≤ γ < 1, so
we can refer to them as winning sites, i.e., pwi = γpA + (1− γ)pBi > 12 .
When combining game B with A, the resulting game will be fair, losing or winning
depending on the net balance between the occupancy probabilities and the average win-
ning probability on each set of central and boundary states. For low γ values (playing
game B more often), the high occupancy probability of {σ1, σ2} is the dominant part, and
due to the low winning probability on these sites the resulting game is a losing game. On
the contrary, for higher γ values (playing game A more often), the winning probability on
the boundary sites {σ0, σ3} is high enough to compensate their low occupancy, resulting
in a winning game.
8.1.2.c N players
For a general number of players, we have not been able to find the analytical expressions
for a fair game B. Nevertheless, we will show numerically that the results for N = 3
are representative for any N . This is illustrated by Fig. 8.4, where the parameter space
{p2B, p3B} giving a fair game B is shown, corresponding to a fixed p1B = 0.4 and different
values of N . As shown, the different curves seem to converge to a limiting curve as N
increases. Note that all curves intersect at the trivial point {p1B = 0.4, p2B = 0.5, p3B =
0.6}.
We can also obtain the parameter space where the current inversion takes place, for
different values of N . For clarity reasons we show in Fig. 8.5 only a vertical slice corre-
sponding to a fixed γ = 0.4, and different values of N . Again, the regions for which a
flux inversion exists, doesn’t seem to depend much on N . The only exception is N = 4,
for which the curve bends in the other direction. This is a consequence of the fact that
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Figure 8.4. Plot of the parameter space {p2B , p3B} for a fixed p1B = 0.4 that gives a fair game B
for different values of N = 3, 10, 30, 50, 100, 200 and 300. As it can be seen, the curves seem to
converge to a limiting curve as N increases.
for N = 4 there exists only one state (namely σ2) where the probability p2B is used. This
is confirmed by our findings when we modify the definition of game B such that there is
for any N only one state where p2B is used. The fact that all curves of inversion points are
symmetric upon reflection about the plane p1B = 1− p3B is a consequence of the property
of Eq. (8.12).
8.2 Parrondo’s games and the current inversion
As stated previously and shown in [15], the effect of a current inversion when varying the
mixing probability γ is not possible when combining the original game B with a state in-
dependent type game A. One way of understanding the reason is through the quantitative
relation established in Chapter 4 between the Brownian ratchet and Parrondo’s games. It
was shown that a fair or unfair paradoxical game corresponds to a periodic or tilted po-
tential respectively in the model of a Brownian ratchet. Thus, the question now reduces
to explain why there is no current inversion in the flashing ratchet model when varying
the rate of alternation between the potentials.
In the flashing ratchet model, the appearance of a flux when alternating between a flat
and an asymmetric potential is due to a rectification process. From Fig. 2.3 we see that
the asymmetry present in the ratchet potential will always favor a rightward movement
of the Brownian particles. Thus, whatever the rate of alternation between states ON
(asymmetric potential) and OFF (diffusive state), the induced current will always be
unidirectional. It is clear then that no current inversion may take place under this scheme
unless some other parameters rather than the flip rate are varied.
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Figure 8.5. Plot of the points in parameter space {p1B , p3B} where (for γ = 0.4 fixed) AB is a fair
game. Results for different values of the total number of players N = 3, 4, 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50 are
shown. The diagonal line shows the common plane p1B = 1− p3B , that corresponds to a fair game B
for any number of players N .
Chapter 9
Truels and N–uels
In this Chapter we present a detailed analysis using Markov chain theory of some versions
of truel games in which three players try to eliminate each other in a series of one-to-one
competitions, using the rules of the game. These games were first studied by Kilgour [42]
from the point of view of game theory. Our treatment reproduces the expressions for the
winning probability of each player, including the equilibrium points. Furthermore we
give expressions for the distribution of winners in a truel competition. In Section 9.1 we
introduce some basic concepts on game theory and the main notions of truel games in
Sec 9.2. In Sec. 9.3, and in order to introduce the general methods in an simpler context,
we present a detailed analysis for the case of duels. Afterwards, Sec. 9.4 is devoted
to the analysis of the strategies –9.4.1– in the random –Sec. 9.4.2– and sequential –
Sec. 9.4.3– versions of truels, together with an analysis of the opinion model in Sec. 9.4.4.
In Sec. 9.4.5 we present the distribution of winners when playing the truel games as well
as the opinion model. We study the effect of introducing spatial dependence in these
models in Sec. 9.4.6, and finally truels are generalized to more than three players in
Sec. 9.5. Most of the details of the calculations are left for Appendices B and C, showing
here only the main results.
9.1 Introduction
Making a decision is not an easy task, and it turns to be even more difficult when more
than one person is involved, with the result depending of all decisions taken. Besides,
in everyday life we encounter many situations in which we are posed with dilemmas
appearing from the confrontation of our own interests with that of other individuals or the
society surrounding us. Thus we are frequently required to take decisions, with outcomes
that not necessarily are those one expected a priori. Does exist a rational way of behaving
in those situations?
A formal answer to this question was not found until the mid 40’s, when the math-
ematician J. von Neumann (1903-1957) published in collaboration with the Princeton
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economist Oskar Morgenstern the book Theory of games and economic behavior [84].
In this book von Neumann establishes the foundations of what was later coined as game
theory. He realized that saloon games (like poker,. . . ) raised simple dilemmas that could
encounter analogous conflicts in economy, politics, everyday life or even war situations.
Following the words of the authors, a game is a conflictive situation where one has to
take a decision knowing that others also take decisions, and the outcome of the conflict
is determined, in some way, from all decisions taken.
Strictly speaking, game theory can be considered as a formal study of conflict and
cooperation, a branch of mathematical analysis developed to study decision making in
conflict situations. They appear when two or more decision makers having different
objectives act on the same system or share the same resources. The main purpose of game
theory is to consider situations where instead of agents making decisions as reactions to
exogenous prices, their decisions are strategic reactions to other agents actions. The goal
for all agents is always trying to obtain the maximum payoff, which can be understood
as a quantity reflecting the desirability of an outcome to a player, for whatever reason.
The expected payoff incorporates the player’s attitude towards risk. These agents (or
decision makers) can either be individuals, groups, firms, or any combination of these. In
game theory, games have always been a metaphor for more serious interactions in human
society.
We may distinguish between cooperative game theory and non-cooperative game
theory. The former case investigates coalitional games, characterized by a high-level
description, specifying only what payoffs each potential group, or coalition, can obtain
by the cooperation of its members. The latter case is concerned with the analysis of
strategic choices. The details of the ordering and timing of players’ choices are essential
to establish the outcome of the non-cooperative games.
von Neumann solved non-cooperative games in the case of pure rivalries, i.e., two
person zero-sum games, in which one person’s gain is another’s loss, so the payoffs al-
ways sum to zero. In 1950, John Forbes Nash [85] demonstrated that finite games have
always an equilibrium point, at which all players choose actions which are best for them
given the opponents’ choices. This proposal applied to a much wider class of games with-
out restrictions on the payoff structure or the number of players [86,87]. The idea of Nash
equilibrium 1 is that a set of strategies, one for each player, would be stable if nobody had
a unilateral incentive to deviate from the strategy they have adopted. This equilibrium
notion supposed a key concept of non–cooperative game theory, revolutioning the use of
game theory in economics, and has been object of analysis since then. It was later de-
veloped by Harsanyi [88], who extended the Nash equilibrium to a larger class of games
of incomplete information, where a player making a decision cannot always observe all
previous decisions neither know other players’ preferences.
Since the pioneering work of von Neumann and Morgenstern, game theory has de-
1We will return later in this Chapter to the concept of Nash equilibria, explaining it in more detail in
Sec. 9.4.2.
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veloped considerably and has found many applications in numerous fields such as eco-
nomics, social science, political science and evolutionary biology. In the following Sec-
tions we will present a detailed study of a non-cooperative game known as truel, offering
an alternative analysis more adequate to the physics community to that conducted by
Kilgour [42] in the field of game theory.
9.2 Introduction: truel games
A truel game can be considered as the extension of a duel played by three individuals.
These players, which will be named as A, B and C, possess different markmanships, that
is, the probability of hitting a chosen target. Markmanships will be denoted as a, b and c
for players A, B and C respectively. Without loss of generality we will assume throughout
this Chapter that the players are labeled such that a > b > c. In this game all players
share the same goal: to eliminate all the opponents. The game ends when there is only
one survivor left, the winner of the game. The mechanics of the truel can be described
by the following steps:
1. Each round – or time-step –, one of the truelists is chosen for playing.
2. He then decides who will be his target and, with a certain probability – the mark-
manship – he does achieve the goal of eliminating that opponent from the game.
3. Whatever the result obtained by the player, steps one and two are repeated again
until there is only one survivor.
Based on the rules used for selecting the players, we may distinguish between three
main types of truels:
• Random truel. Each round one of the remaining players is chosen randomly with
equal probability.
• Sequential truel. In this case there exists an established firing order, which will be
followed throughout the whole game. We allow players with worst markmanship
to shoot firstly, followed then by players with better markmanship. According to
the notation introduced earlier, the firing order in the sequential truel is C–B–A.
• Simultaneous truel. In this truel all players shoot at the same time.
A paradoxical or counter–intuitive result appears in this game, as the “truelist” with
the highest markmanship does not necessarily possess the highest survival probability.
This paradoxical result was already mentioned in the early literature on truels [42]. These
games were formally introduced for the first time by Kinnaird in 1946 [89], although the
name truel was coined later by Shubik [90] in the 1960s.
We find in the literature other models similar to the truel game that present also coun-
terintuitive results, like for instance the rock–scissors–paper game. This game has been
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applied to some convective instabilities in rotating fluids [91], as well as to population
dynamics [92, 93]. It consists on a system with three species interacting with each other
in such a way that they create a competitive loop (recall that in the rock–scissors–paper
game a rock beats a pair of scissors, scissors beat a sheet of paper and paper beats a rock).
The paradoxical effect in this model is that the least competitive species might be the one
with the largest population and, when there are oscillations in a finite population, to be
the least likely to die out. This game has also been applied to a voter model [94, 95]
obtaining again a paradoxical result, namely, an initial damage and suppression of one
candidate may later lead to an enhancement of the same candidate.
Different versions of the truels vary on the number of tries (or “bullets”) available
to each player, on whether they are allowed to “pass”, i.e. missing the shoot on pur-
pose (“shooting into the air”), on the number of rounds being finite or infinite, etc. All
these modifications lead to games with different outcomes [39–41]. Besides, they can
be further extended through the introduction of coalitions between the truelists, that is,
the appearance of cooperations between different players so that they can set a common
target (these games are known as cooperative truels [96]), in such a way that they can
obtain greater benefits from that coalition improving their own survival probability. We
will restrict ourselves to the case of unlimited ammunition, and the game will continue
until there is only one player left (so that there is no upper limit in the number of rounds);
besides, players are also allowed to lose their turn by shooting into the air, a possibility
that turns out to be useful in some particular cases.
The strategy of each player consists in choosing the appropriate target when it is his
turn to shoot. Rational players will use the strategy that maximizes their own probability
of winning (considered as the payoff) and hence the ensemble of players will chose the
strategy given by the Nash equilibrium point. In a series of seminal papers [39–41],
Kilgour has analyzed the games and determined the equilibrium points under a variety of
conditions.
In this Chapter, we analyze the games from the point of view of Markov chain theory.
Besides being able to reproduce some of the results by Kilgour, we obtain the probability
distribution for the winners of the games. We restrict our study to the case in which there
is an infinite number of bullets and consider two different versions of the truel: random
and fixed sequential choosing of the shooting player.
Furthermore, we consider a variation of the game in which instead of eliminating the
competitors from the game, the objective is to convince them on a topic, making the truel
suitable for a model of opinion formation.
9.3 The duels
In this simpler game we consider two players, A and B, with markmanships a and b
respectively, such that a > b. We will consider the random duel in which the person
to shoot next is randomly selected with equal probability between the two players, as
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well as the sequential version in which the bad player, B, starts shooting and then they
alternate fires. In any case, the game continues until there is only one survivor. If we take
the model as an opinion model, the game continues until one player has convinced the
other and hence both share the same opinion. Clearly, in a duel it makes no sense for a
player to lose his opportunity to eliminate the opponent by shooting into the air and the
only meaningful strategy is to shoot into the other player.
An analytical study done with Markov chains for both the random duel and the opin-
ion model shows that both models can be described through the same Markov chain with
three states (see Appendix B.1 for further details). If we denote the survival (or convinc-
ing) probabilities of players A and B as πA and πB respectively we have
πA =
a
a+ b
, πB =
b
a+ b
, (9.1)
a result that indicates that the higher the markmanship of a given player, the higher the
survival (convincing) probability in the random duel (opinion model).
Turning to the case of the sequential duel, this game can be described with a Markov
chain with four states. The analytical expressions obtained for the survival probabilities
are
πA =
a
1− (1− a)(1− b) , πB =
b(1− a)
1− (1− a)(1− b) , (9.2)
A closer study of Eqs. (9.2) shows that even though the worst player B starts shooting
first, he achieves a higher survival probability than A only when
b > a1+a . Thus, in the sequential duel the unfavorable situation of player B having a
lower markmanship than A is partially compensated by being the one shooting in first
place.
9.4 The truels
9.4.1 Strategies in truels
If a third individual comes into play, the previous situation of a duel is no longer simple.
Now every player in the truel must consider all possible actions that other opponents
may take and their corresponding outcomes. In this case, we must consider strategies
and make use of some concepts of game theory. For concreteness, and without loss of
generality, we consider that the third player C has the lowest marksmanship, c, such that
a > b > c.
It turns out that strategies followed by the players are a key point in determining
the winner of the truel. As explained previously, all players in the truel share the same
goal: to be the only one surviving the truel.This can be explicitly imposed through the
inclusion of a “payoff”, a concept introduced in game theory and that corresponds to
some sort of reward the player receives for achieving the goal. In order to maximize
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their payoff, players have to chose strategies that maximize their survival probability.
When the three players are still in the game, a player has three possible strategies: two
correspond to choosing one of the two opponents and the third strategy is to shoot into
the air (or missing the shot on purpose). If one of the three players has been removed
from the game, we are in a duel situation and, as discussed before, the only strategy is to
aim at the remaining opponent. We also assume that strategies adopted by the players are
non–cooperative, in the sense that alliances or pacts between them are not allowed.
9.4.2 Random firing
Let us first fix the notation. We denote by PAB , PAC and PA∅ the probability of player
A shooting into player B, C, or into the air, respectively, with equivalent definitions for
players B and C. These probabilities verify PAB + PAC + PA∅ = 1. We will consider
only “pure” strategies, namely, only one of these three probabilities is taken equal to
1 and the other two equal to 02. Finally, we denote by π(a; b, c) the probability that
player with marksmanship a wins the game when playing against other two players with
marksmanships b and c. This definition implies π(a; b, c) = π(a; c, b) and π(a; b, c) +
π(b; a, c) + π(c; a, b) = 1. Recall that we use the convention a > b > c.
The corresponding Markov chain for this game is composed of 7 different states
labeled as ABC, AB, AC, BC, A, B, C according to the players remaining in the game.
Three of these states, A, B and C are absorbent states. The details of the calculation for
the winning probabilities as well as a diagram of the allowed transitions between states
are shown in Appendix B.2. We now discuss the results in different cases.
Let us first imagine that players do not adopt any thought strategy and each one
shoots randomly to any of the other two players. Clearly, this is equivalent to setting
PAB = PAC = PBA = PBC = PCA = PCB = 1/2. The winning probabilities in this
case are:
π(a; b, c) =
a
a+ b+ c
, π(b; a, c) =
b
a+ b+ c
, π(c; a, b) =
c
a+ b+ c
, (9.3)
a result indicating that the player with the higher marksmanship possesses the higher
probability of winning. Identical result is obtained if players include shooting in the air
as one of their equally likely possibilities.
It is conceivable, though, that players will not decide the targets randomly, but will
use some strategy in order to maximize their winning probability. As explained pre-
viously, completely rational players will choose strategies that are best responses (i.e.
strategies that are utility–maximizing) to the strategies used by the other players. This
defines an equilibrium point when all players are better off keeping their actual strat-
egy than changing to another one. Accordingly, this equilibrium point can be defined
2Another possibility that we do not consider in this game is the“mixed” strategy, which consists on taking
two or more of the probabilities strictly greater than 0.
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as the set of probabilities Pαβ (with α =A,B,C and β =A,B,C,∅) such that the win-
ning probabilities have a local maximum. This idea, that is nothing but the concept of
Nash equilibria introduced earlier, is clarified with the following example: in Table 9.1
we present the different survival –or winning– probabilities πA, πB and πC of players
A, B and C respectively for different strategies adopted by the players when they play
the random truel. These values are calculated considering that player A has 100% of
effectiveness (a = 1), player B has 80% (b = 0.8) and player C 50% (c = 0.5).
Let us start by looking in Table 9.1 at the set of strategies given by {C,C,B}, which
consists on player A aiming at player C, player B aiming at player C and player C aiming
at player B. In this case we can see how the player with the highest survival probability is
A with a 58% percentage of winning, followed by player B with 34.8% percentage and
finally player C with a very low percentage of 7.2%. If player C analyzes this situation,
he concludes that if players A and B adopt these strategies in the game, it is better for
him to change his own strategy and instead of aiming to B, set as a new target player A.
Reasoning in this way, he increases his survival probability up to a 8.5%.
A B C πA πB πC
C C B 0.58 0.348 0.072
C C A 0.434 0.481 0.085
C A B 0.386 0.407 0.207
C A A 0.2415 0.541 0.2175
B C B 0.628 0.155 0.217
B C A 0.483 0.288 0.229
B A B 0.4348 0.214 0.3512
B A A 0.29 0.348 0.362
Table 9.1. Table corresponding to the survival probabilities πA, πB and πC of players A, B and C
respectively, for the different set of strategies adopted in the case of the random truel. Player A has
100% of effectiveness, player B an 80% and player C a 50%.
Once we are found in the set {C,C,A}, we can follow the same reasoning but for
player B, and see that it is better for him to change his strategy –aiming at player C–
setting as a new target player A (increasing πB from 48.1% to 54.1%). This leads us
to the set {C,A,A}. Now it is the turn of player A who decides to change strategy and
set B as a new target thus leading the the set BAA where πA has indeed increased from
24.2% to 29.0%.
Executing the same procedure for the rest of strategies, we see that all lead to the
same strategy set: {B,A,A}. This is the unique Nash equilibrium point of the random
truel, meaning that no player improves his survival probability by changing his strategy,
as long as the rest of players keep theirs. Therefore, this set corresponds to a local maxi-
mum of all survival probabilities of the players. Besides, when all players use their ’best’
strategy {B,A,A} we are lead to the paradoxical result that the player with the worst
marksmanship can become the player with the highest winning probability. This some-
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what surprising result can be easily understood if one realizes that players set as primary
target either player A or B, leaving player C as the last option and therefore increasing
his winning expectation.
The strategy {B,A,A} is known [40, 42] as the strongest opponent strategy, as all
players aim at the opponent with the highest markmanship. For the random truel it is the
equilibrium point whatever markmanships a, b and c, as long as the condition a > b > c
is fulfilled (in Appendix C.1 is shown the demonstration for arbitrary values a, b and c).
Using this strategy, the winning probabilities for the random truel are
π(a; b, c) =
a2
(a+ c)(a+ b+ c)
,
π(b; a, c) =
b
a+ b+ c
, (9.4)
π(c; a, b) =
c(c+ 2a)
(a+ c)(a+ b+ c)
.
This set can be obtained from Eqs. (C.1) from Appendix C with PAB = PCA =
PBA = 1 and PAC = PA∅ = PBC = PB∅ = PCB = PC∅ = 0.
In Fig. 9.1 we plot by colour code the region in parameter space in which each player
possesses the highest survival probability when playing the random truel, varying mark-
manships b and c and keeping a fixed and equal to 1. It can be appreciated that the
region of player A is larger than the ones for B and C. In this figure, markmanship a
has been set to its highest possible value 1, because other values a 6= 1 can be related
through the scaling relations π(a; b, c) = π(1; b/a, c/a), π(b; a, c) = π(b/a; 1, c/a),
π(c; a, b) = π(c/a; 1, b/a).
9.4.3 Sequential firing
In this version of the truel there is an established order of firing. The players will shoot
in increasing value of their marksmanship, i.e., if a > b > c the first player to shoot
will be player C, followed by player B and the last to shoot is player A. The sequence
repeats until only one player remains. Again, we have left for Appendix B.3 the details of
the calculation of the winning probabilities. In Appendix C.2 we reproduce the analysis
of the optimal strategies which agrees with that obtained by Kilgour [40]. The main
result is that there are two equilibrium points depending on the value of the function
g(a, b, c) = a2(1− b)2(1− c)− b2c−a b (1− b c): if g(a, b, c) > 0 the equilibrium point
is the strongest opponent strategy PAB = PBA = PCA = 1, while for g(a, b, c) < 0 it
turns out that the equilibrium point strategy is PAB = PBA = PC∅ = 1, where the worst
player C is better off by shooting into the air and hoping that the second best player B
succeeds in eliminating the best player A from the game. Player C would use the next
turn to try to eliminate the remaining player, becoming the winner of the truel.
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Figure 9.1. Diagram b vs c setting a = 1 where it is plotted with color codes which is the player
with the highest survival probability for the case of the random truel and using the optimal strategy,
as given by Eq. (9.4). Black color corresponds to the region where player A has the highest winning
probability, red color corresponds to player B having the highest winning probability and finally the
green color corresponds to player C being the player with the highest survival probability.
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Figure 9.2. Same as Fig. 9.1 in the case that players play sequentially in increasing order of their
marksmanship.
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The winning probabilities for this case, assuming a > b > c, are given by
π(a; b, c) =
(1− c)(1− b)a2
[c(1− a) + a][b(1− a) + a] ,
π(b; a, c) =
(1− c)b2
(c(1− b) + b)(b(1− a) + a) ,
π(c; a, b) =
c[bc+ a[b(2 + b(−1 + c)− 3c) + c]]
[c+ a(1− c)][b+ a(1− b)][a+ b(1− a)] , (9.5)
if g(a, b, c) > 0, and
π(a; b, c) =
a2(1− b)(1− c)2
[a+ (1− a)c][a+ b(1− a) + c(1− a)(1− b)] ,
π(b; a, c) =
b
(
b(1− c)2 + c)
[b+ (1− b)c][a+ b(1− a) + c(1− a)(1− b)] ,
π(c; a, b) =
ac(1−b)(1−c)
a+c(1−a) +
c(b+c(1−2b))
b+c(1−b)
[a+ b(1− a) + c(1− a)(1− b)] , (9.6)
if g(a, b, c) < 0. Again, as in the case of random firing, the paradoxical result appears
that the player with the smallest marksmanship has the largest probability to win the
game.
Due to the imposed firing order (C-B-A), player A is the last one to shoot. Therefore,
the a priori advantageous situation given by a high marksmanship is partially lost. This
is reflected in Fig. 9.2, since the region where player A is the favorite has decreased
considerably compared to that of Fig. 9.1. In fact, the a priori worst player C is the
favorite in a larger number of occasions. We explained previously that there were two
equilibrium points in the sequential truel, {B,A,A} and {B,A, ∅}. The last one is the
relevant in the small green region located in the black region seen in Fig. 9.2.
9.4.4 Opinion model
We reinterpret the truel as a game in which three people holding different opinions, A, B
and C, on a topic, aim to convince each other in a series of one-to-one discussions. The
marksmanship a (resp. b, c) are now interpreted as the probabilities that player holding
opinion A (resp. B or C) have of convincing another player of adopting this opinion. The
main difference with the previous games is that the number of players present is always
constant and equal to three, a fact that will strongly conditionate the results.
The states belonging to the Markov chain for this model are ABC, AAB, ABB, AAC,
ACC, BBC, BCC, AAA, BBB and CCC. As in previous cases, we have left the analysis
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of the convincing probabilities for Appendix B.4. We consider only the random case in
which the person that tries to convince another one is chosen randomly amongst the three
players.
The study of equilibrium points (c.f. App. C.3) reveals the existence of a unique
equilibrium point corresponding again to the strongest opponent strategy, in which each
player tries to convince the opponent with the highest marksmanship. The probabilities
of a final consensus opinion being A, B or C, assuming a > b > c are given by
π(a; b, c) =
a2
[
2cb2 + a
(
(a+ b)2 + 2(a+ 2b)c
)]
(a+ b)2(a+ c)2(a+ b+ c)
,
π(b; a, c) =
b2(b+ 3c)
(b+ c)2(a+ b+ c)
,
π(c; a, b) =
c2
[
c3 + 3(a+ b)c2 + a(a+ 8b)c+ ab(3a+ b)
]
(a+ c)2(b+ c)2(a+ b+ c)
, (9.7)
respectively. Notice that, as before, they satisfy the scaling relations π(a; b, c) =
π(1; b/a, c/a), π(b; a, c) = π(b/a; 1, c/a), π(c; a, b) = π(c/a; 1, b/a). As in previous
cases, we have plotted in Fig. 9.3 in colour code the opinion with the highest probability
of becoming majority. In this case opinion A becomes majority nearly for all values
of b and c. Only for a small region opinion C can become the majority opinion. This
overwhelming dominion of A can be understood if we recall that the total number of
players always remains the same throughout the game. Only the opinions held by the
players change. So, once opinion A convinces either a player with opinion B or a player
with opinion C, it is very likely that it will eventually become the majority opinion due
to its high convincing probability.
9.4.5 Distribution of winners
Imagine that we set up a league scheme: everybody plays against everybody else. Sets
of three players are chosen randomly amongst a population whose marksmanship are
uniformly distributed in the interval (0, 1). The distribution of winners is characterized
by a probability density function, f(x), such that f(x)dx is the proportion of winners
whose marksmanship lies in the interval (x, x+ dx). This distribution is obtained as:
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Figure 9.3: Same as Fig.9.1 for the convincing opinion model.
f(x) =
∫
da db dc [π(a; b, c) δa + π(b; a, c) δb + π(c; a, b) δc] =
=
∫
db dc π(x; b, c) +
∫
da dc π(x; a, c) +
∫
da db π(c; a, b) =
= 3
1∫
0
db
1∫
0
dc π(x; b, c). (9.8)
where δi accounts for the Dirac delta δ(x− i).
We may also consider a variation of the competition in which the winner of one game
keeps on playing against other two randomly chosen players. The resulting distribution
of players, f¯(x), can be computed as the steady state solution of the recursion equation:
f¯(x, t+ 1) =
∫
da db dc [π(a; b, c) δa + π(b; a, c) δb + π(c; a, b) δc] f¯(a, t)
= f¯(x, t)
∫
db dc π(x; b, c) +
∫
da dc π(x; a, c)f¯(a, t) +
∫
da db π(c; a, b)f¯(a, t),
(9.9)
performing the variable change a→ b in the second integral, and
{
a→ b
b→ c in the
third one we obtain
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f¯(x) =
1
3
f¯(x)f(x) + 2
1∫
0
db
1∫
0
dc π(x; b, c)f¯(b) (9.10)
For the case of the random truel, with players using the random strategy whose
winning probabilities are given by Eq. (9.3), the distribution of winners is f(x) =
3x [x lnx− 2(1 + x) ln(1 + x) + (2 + x) ln(2 + x)]. In Fig. 9.4 we observe that the
function f(x) attains its maximum at x = 1 indicating that the best marksmanship play-
ers are the ones which win in more occasions. For the same strategy set, the distribution
of winners if the winner keeps on playing is 3 f¯(x) = 2x.
If, on the other hand, players adopt the equilibrium point strategy, Eq. (9.4), the
resulting f(x) has been plotted in Fig. 9.5. Notice that, despite the paradoxical result
mentioned before, the distribution of winners still has it maximum at x = 1, indicating
that the best marksmanship players are nevertheless the ones who win in more occasions.
In the same figure, we have also plotted the distribution f¯(x) of the competition in which
the winner of a game keeps on playing. In this case, the integral relation Eq. (9.10) has
been solved numerically.
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Figure 9.4. Distribution function f(x) for the winners of truels of randomly chosen triplets (solid
line) in the case of players using random strategies, Eq. (9.3); distribution f¯(x) of winners in the case
where the winner of a truel remains in the competition (dashed line).
In Fig. 9.6 we plot the distribution of winners f(x) and f¯(x) in a competition where
players play the sequential truel. As before, the solid line corresponds to the former truel
competition and the discontinuous line corresponds to the competition where the winner
of the truel goes on playing. Notice that now the distribution of winners f(x) has a
3The result is more general: if π(a; b, c) = G(a)/[G(a)+G(b)+G(c)], for an arbitrary function G(x),
the solution is f¯(x) = G(x)/
R 1
0
G(y)dy.
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Figure 9.5. Similar to Fig.(9.4) in the case of the competition where players use the rational strategy
of the equilibrium point given by Eq.(9.4).
maximum at x ≈ 0.57. This result reflects the counter–intuitive result obtained earlier,
and is that players who perform better on average are not those with higher markmanship,
instead, are those with intermediate values.
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Figure 9.6. Same as Fig.9.4 in the case that players play sequentially in increasing order of their
marksmanship. Notice that now both distributions of winners present maxima for x < 1 indicating
that the best a priori players do not win the game in the majority of the cases.
Similarly to other versions, we plot in Fig. 9.7 the distribution of winning opinions,
f(x) and f¯(x). As in the case of the random truel, we can observe how the player most
favored on average is the one with the highest markmanship available.
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Figure 9.7: Same as Fig.9.4 for the convincing opinion model.
9.4.6 Truels with spatial dependence
A natural step forward in the truels would involve the introduction of a spatial structure
in the system. This reflects the fact that players do not interact with any other player,
but only with those which are closer in some sense. Although one could devise some
sort of social network of interaction [97, 98], we consider here a simple two dimensional
lattice. In this case we have a set of N individuals arranged in a grid, each surrounded
by four nearest neighbor links. The lattice is initialized by putting randomly on each
site one player of groups A, B or C in the respective proportions xA, xB and xC , (xA +
xB + xC = 1) and respective marksmanships a, b and c. An important ingredient of this
generalization is that players never shoot to a person of the same group.
The rules of the random collective truel are as follows:
1. One of the remaining players is chosen at random.
2. The chosen player selects randomly two players amongst the occupied neighbors
sites and the three of them play a random truel. The losers of the truel are elimi-
nated from the system. If the chosen player has only one neighbor, the two of them
will play a duel with the loser being removed from the system. If no neighbors are
left, the player will walk to a randomly chosen neighbor site.
3. Steps 1 and 2 are repeated until all the survivors belong to the same group.
In step 2, it is possible that some of the chosen players belong to the same group.
In this case, they observe strictly the rule of no shooting between members of the same
group. Accordingly, it could happen that there is more than one survivor of that game. In
any event, players use the strongest–opponent strategy. If, for example, the three players
in a truel belong to groups A, A and B, the two A players will aim at B, while B will aim
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to one of the two A (again chosen at random). The outcome of that particular situation
could be either player B eliminating both A players or player B being eliminated by the
two players A. Since the analytical treatment appears rather difficult, we present now the
results coming from a direct numerical simulation of the aforementioned rules. We use
throughout this section the values a = 1, b = 0.8, c = 0.5 for the marksmanships.
In Fig. 9.8 we show some snapshots concerning different stages of a simulation car-
ried out for the random truel. The initial population proportion was xA = 0.3, xB = 0.3
and xC = 0.4. We can see how in early stages of the run, populations B and C diminish
considerably whereas group A resists and eventually becomes the winner of the collective
truel.
In this collective truel, the group that will survive at the end depends, for a fixed
values of the marksmanships, on the initial proportions of players. This dependence is
summarized in Fig. 9.9, where we plot in a color code the group that has the highest
winning probability as a functions of the initial proportions.
Figure 9.8. Snapshots corresponding to different stages of a simulation carried out for the random
truel with initial proportions xA = 0.3 (black colour), xB = 0.3 (red colour) and xC = 0.4 (green
colour). The total number of players is N = 2500 arranged in a two–dimensional grid.
It is easy to modify step 2 by considering the rule of the sequential truel by which
players shoot in inverse order to their marksmanship. A typical realization is shown in
Fig. 9.10. In this occasion the winning group is the weakest one, group C. This survival
of the weakest effect is also present in the diagram of Fig. 9.11, as now groups B and C
have increased the region in parameter space where they win the truel, compared to the
diagram of the random truel in Fig.9.9.
It is possible to distinguish two different regimes in the dynamics. Almost all truel
competitions take place during the first steps where a large fraction of the population
is removed. At the end of this first regime, the largest remaining population is the one
that possesses the higher survival probability when playing a single truel and the system
presents many empty sites. Later, in a second regime, players start to diffuse to neighbor-
ing sites increasing the appearance of duel encounters. Consequently, the evolution will
result from a balance between the population favored by the existence of duels (the one
with the highest marksmanship), and the one favored by possessing a high proportion of
the remaining population.
Finally, in Fig. 9.12 we show some snapshots of a simulation carried out for the
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Figure 9.9. Diagram where it is shown the winning group in colour code (black colour corresponds
to group A, red to group B and green to group C) in terms of initial proportions xA, xB and xC , for a
set of N = 400 players arranged in a two–dimensional grid and playing the random truel. The results
are obtained after averaging over 10000 realizations.
Figure 9.10. Snapshots corresponding to different stages of a simulation carried out for the sequential
truel with an initial population of xA = 0.3 (black colour), xB = 0.3 (red colour) and xC = 0.4
(green colour) for a set of N = 2500 players arranged in a spatial two–dimensional grid.
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Figure 9.11. Diagram where it is shown the winning group in colour code (black colour corresponds
to group A, red to group B and green to group c) in terms of the initial proportions xA, xB and xC ,
for a set of N = 400 players arranged in a two–dimensional grid that play the sequential truel. The
probabilities have been obtained averaging over 100000 realizations.
case of the opinion model. As it happened in the three players case, the total number of
players remains constant troughout the simulation, only the opinions held by the players
may vary. For the set of marksmanships chosen a = 1, b = 0.8 and c = 0.5 we
find that the opinion most likely to become majority opinion is always the one with
highest marksmanship, A. This occurs even for very small initial proportion xA and it is
a reflection of the large region in parameter space where A becomes the favorite opinion,
as it was shown in Fig. 9.3.
Figure 9.12. Snapshots corresponding to different stages of a simulation of the opinion model, carried
out with an initial population of xA = 0.3 (black colour) , xB = 0.3 (red colour) and xC = 0.4 (green
colour) for a set of N = 2500 players arranged in a spatial two–dimensional grid.
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9.5 Generalization to N players : N–uels
We have shown for three players the existence of an interesting and a priori counter–
intuitive result where the player with the highest markmanship does not win the truel in
all cases. But, what happens if there are more than three players? For a general case
of N players, it is rather difficult to obtain exact analytic expressions. Already for a
low number of individuals the expressions obtained increase very rapidly in complexity.
However, we can make use of numerical simulations in order to obtain the distribution of
winners for a number of players N > 3. We will also restrict our analysis to the random
case.
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Figure 9.13. Histogram of the
classified corresponding to the ran-
dom truel for N = 4 players.
In Fig. 9.13 we show a histogram corresponding to the classification obtained when
the game is played by 4 players. The fourth classified would correspond to the distribu-
tion of players eliminated from the game in first place, the third classified would be the
one eliminated in second place and so on. The distribution of the fourth classified shows
that individuals eliminated firstly in the game are those with higher markmanships. In-
deed, the maximum is located at x = 1, indicating then that the better you are the higher
the probability of being eliminated first. Another aspect we can extract from this figure
has to deal with the distribution of first and second classifieds: these curves correspond to
the case where there are only two players left in the game, i.e., to a duel. Therefore, it is
more likely in this situation that players with lower markmanships are eliminated firstly
rather than those with higher markmanships (that is the reason why the curve for the sec-
ond classified presents a maximum in the origin). It is worth mentioning that already for
4 players the histogram associated to the first classified – i.e., the winner of the 4–uel –
presents a maximum for a value of x < 1. This result implies that the best performing
player does not correspond anymore to the player with the highest markmanship, as it
happened when N = 3. Indeed, the optimum value is located in x ∼ 0.49.
For greater values of N , we can develop a simple theory that helps us to understand
the distribution. The mechanics of this collective game is quite simple: we start from a
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Figure 9.14. Left panel: Distribution of the first, second and third classifieds corresponding to the
random truel for N = 30 players. The solid line corresponds to the numerical values, and circles
correspond to the theoretical calculation. Right panel: Distribution ranging from the 3rd classified
(left side) to the 30th (right side).
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set of N players whose markmanship is uniformly distributed between (0, 1). Then, each
time step one player is chosen randomly, and then he aims to the remaining player with
the highest markmanship. This process continues until there is only one survivor left.
A similar distribution can be obtained if we consider a set of N numbers a1, . . . , aN
uniformly distributed in the interval (0, 1). As the probability density function describ-
ing each number aj is equal to 1 we have f(a1, . . . , aN ) = 1. If we classify them in
increasing value such that a1 < a2 < . . . < aN , we need to consider all different ways
of ordering these terms through the inclusion of a factorial term in the probability density
function and consequently f(a1, . . . , aN ) = N !. Thus, if we consider that these numbers
are being suppressed in decreasing order, that is, greater numbers are eliminated first, we
can calculate the distribution of terms aj occupying the j-th place in the classification as
fj(a) =
a∫
0
da1
a∫
a1
da2 · ·
a∫
aj−2
daj−1
1∫
a
daj+1
1∫
aj+1
daj+2 · ·
1∫
aN−1
daNf(a1, .., aN )
= N !
a∫
0
da1
a∫
a1
da2 · ·
a∫
aj−2
daj−1
1∫
a
daj+1
1∫
aj+1
daj+2 · ·
1∫
aN−1
daN . (9.11)
The first set of integrals
∫ a
0 da1 . . .
∫ a
aj−2
daj−1 gives as a result a
j−1
(j−1)! ; on the
other hand, the second set
∫ 1
a daj+1 . . .
∫ 1
aN−1
daN gives (1−a)
N−j
(N−j)! . Joining both results
Eq. (9.11) yields
fj(a) = N !
aj−1(1− a)N−j
(j − 1)!(N − j)! =
aj−1(1− a)N−j
B(j,N − j + 1) (9.12)
where B(j,N − j + 1) accounts for the binomial coefficient. In Fig. 9.14 we have
plotted the distributions corresponding to different classifieds, obtained for a set of N =
30 players. We compare the results obtained through numerical simulations –solid line–
with the theoretical description explained above –circles–. We can deduce from the right
panel in Fig. 9.14 that the theoretical description works rather well with the classifieds
ranging from the third up to the last one, the thirtieth. However, we can see from the right
panel from Fig. 9.14 that it does not work quite well for the first and second classifieds.
This is so because our approach considers that players are eliminated according to their
markmanship: the higher is the markmanship of a player, the higher the probability of
being suppressed from the game. But when there are two players left in the game, we
know from duel analysis carried out in Sec. 9.3 that the opposite is true for this case:
players with low markmanship are those with higher probability of being eliminated.
This is the reason why our approach does not provide a good description of the first and
second classifieds.
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Our next step would be then the survey for different values of N . Fig. 9.15 shows
the histogram of the winners of a N–uel when varying N . It can be clearly seen that for
values of N ≥ 4 the optimum/maximum value of the distribution is indeed progressively
enhanced and shifted towards zero when N is increased.
Chapter 10
Conclusions
This thesis has considered two kinds of paradoxical games: Parrondo’s games and truels.
We now summarize the main original results as well as outlining some of the perspectives
for future work.
We have introduced in Chapter 3 a new version of Parrondo’s games including the
self–transition probability. The original Parrondo games are then a special case with
self-transition probabilities set to zero. Discrete–time Markov chain analysis have been
performed for these new games, showing that Parrondo’s paradox still occurs if the ap-
propriate conditions are fulfilled. New expressions for the rates of winning have been
obtained, with the result that under certain conditions a higher rate of winning than in
the original games can be obtained. We have also studied the region of parameter space
where the paradox exists with the self–transition variables, concluding that the parameter
space of the original games is a limiting case of maximum volume – as the self-transition
probabilities increase in value the volume shrinks to zero. However, despite this decrease
in volume, the rates of winning that can be obtained are higher than in the original games.
One of the main results of the thesis concerns the quantitative relation established
between Parrondo’s games and the Brownian ratchet in Chapter 4. We have been able to
write the master equation describing the Parrondo’s games as a consistent discretization
of the formalism of the Fokker–Planck equation for an overdamped Brownian particle.
In this way we can relate the probabilities of the games {p0, . . . , pL−1} to the dynami-
cal potential V (x). Our approach yields a periodic potential for a fair game and a tilted
potential for an unfair game, with positive slope for losing games and negative for win-
ning games. The resulting expressions, in the limit ∆x → 0 could be used to obtain the
effective potential for a flashing ratchet as well as its current. This relation also works
in two ways: we can obtain the physical potential corresponding to a set of probabilities
defining a Parrondo game, as well as the current and its stationary probability distribu-
tion. Inversely, the probabilities corresponding to a given physical potential can also be
obtained. Our relations work both in cases of additive and multiplicative noise, showing
that the former case is equivalent to the original Parrondo’s games, whereas the latter
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corresponds to Parrondo’s games with self–transition probability already introduced in
Chapter 3.
With the relations introduced for the cases of additive and multiplicative noise, we
have now a precise and of general validity connection between individual Brownian
ratchets and single Parrondo’s games. This work confirms Parrondo’s original intuition
based on a flashing ratchet is correct with rigour.
Besides, the similarity between the original Parrondo’s games and the flashing ratchet
is further extended to the field of information theory. In Chapter 5 we have quantified
the amount of transfer of information (negentropy) for the original Parrondo’s games
as well as other versions. The relation between the gain in the games and the entropy
difference follows a similar behavior for every version of the games analyzed, showing
its robustness, and it is the equivalent of the result obtained in the case of the Brownian
ratchets. In the case of the original Parrondo’s paradox mixing two games, A and B,
we have obtained analytically an estimation of the entropy considering that the capital
originates from a combination of two ergodic sources, reflecting the different winning
probabilities when the capital is a multiple of three or not. We have shown that the
entropy behaves very differently for low and high values of the delay parameter δt: while
for δt = 1 there is a monotonic dependence on the switching parameter γ, the relation
between the gain and the current is only apparent for large values of δt.
In Chapter 6 we have rewritten the master equations describing the alternation be-
tween two Parrondo games A and B with different transition probabilities γAB , γBA as
a conveniently discretized set of Fokker–Planck equations for a Brownian particle. In
the particular case γAB + γBA = 1, we have obtained analytical expressions for the sta-
tionary probabilities in terms of the potential function already developed in Chapter 4.
Using this analogy we have been able to provide suitable definitions for the energy input,
energy output, average gain and efficiency of the Parrondo games. The efficiency quan-
tifies the relationship between the gain of the games (the energy output Eout is directly
related to the current J) and a convenient measure of the difference between the probabil-
ities defining the games (given by their difference in the potentials). We have evaluated
the efficiency for biased and unbiased games and studied its dependence on the mixing
probability γ, showing that it shares many qualitative features with the continuous model
of a flashing Brownian ratchet. Our results provide a framework for comparing different
Parrondian or discrete-time ratchets, and should provide a basis for the search of higher
efficiency discrete systems.
Once a quantitative connection between Parrondo’s games and a Brownian particle
has been established in the case of a single player, we turn our attention to the case of
collective games.
Chapter 7 has been devoted to a theoretical analysis of the collective games intro-
duced in ref. [38]. We have analyzed the alternation of the original capital dependent
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game B with different versions of game A, in which a redistribution of capital takes place
amongst the players. It has been shown that for all cases it is possible to find an equation
describing the evolution (on average) of capital for a single player, and surprisingly, this
equation turns to be the same for all cases studied. Besides, for the case of random dif-
fusion to nearest neighbors it has been possible to find, in a first approximation, a direct
relation with a set of N coupled Brownian particles. This coupling was present in the
noise terms, conserving on average the mean value of the position, as it occurs with the
discrete model.
In Chapter 8 we have presented a new type of collective Parrondo games. They
present, besides the Parrondo effect, a current inversion when varying the alternation
probability γ between the two games A and B. The novelty introduced in these games lies
on the fact that the current inversion appears from the combination of a collective game
– i.e., game B – and a totally unbiased, state independent, game A. Analytical expres-
sions for the games have been obtained for a finite number of players using discrete–time
Markov chain techniques. We have also been able to explain qualitatively the reason of
this current inversion.
In the last Chapter 9 we have performed a detailed analysis of the truels, using the
methods of Markov chain theory. Hence, we have been able to reproduce in a language
which is more familiar to the Physics community most of the results of the original analy-
sis by Kilgour [40]. In particular, we have obtained the survival probabilities for every
truel game and for arbitrary values of markmanships a, b and c, as well as their equi-
librium points. Besides computing the optimal rational strategy, we have focused on
computing the distribution of winners in a truel competition. We have shown that in the
random case, the distribution of winners still has its maximum at the highest possible
marksmanship x = 1, despite the fact that in some cases players with a lower marks-
manship have a higher probability of winning the game. In the sequential firing case, a
player performs better on average if he has intermediate values of the markmanship. This
is reflected in the fact that the distribution of winners has a maximum at x < 1.
We have reinterpreted the random truel as an opinion model, obtaining its equilibrium
points and the distribution of winners. As it happened in the random truel, the distribution
of winners presents a maximum at x = 1, indicating that on average the opinion most
likely to become majority is that with the highest convincing probability.
We have also analyzed the effect of including a spatial dependence in the random
and sequential truels, as well as the opinion model. We distinguish two regimes in the
dynamics: one being characterized by truel competitions, and a second characterized by
duel competitions due to the diffusion of players to neighboring sites in the grid. The
winning population will result from a balance between these two regimes.
Finally, we have shown the effect of generalizing the random truel to more than three
players. In this case, already for 4 players we highlight the appearance of an optimum
value for the markmanship which is lower than one, a similar effect as in the sequential
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truel but in this case it appears due to an increase of the number of players. Further-
more, as N is increased, this optimal value shifts towards lower and lower values of the
markmanship.
10.1 Perspectives and future work
Once a complete relation has been established between the physical model of the flashing
ratchet and Parrondo games for a single player, we should focus our future work on
the establishment of a similar relation between collective games and collective models
of Brownian particles. As in the single case, it would be desirable to obtain a relation
between the probabilities defining the collective game and the drift and diffusion matrices
defining a multivariate Fokker-Planck equation. Furthermore, we could also obtain an
effective potential yielding an unbiased potential for fair games and biased for unfair
games, as it occurs for the single player case. This connection should be as general as
possible, so that it can be applied to a wider range of collective games.
Concerning the collective games introduced in Chapter 8, it remains as an open ques-
tion the possible implications of these findings in the field of the Brownian ratchet, as
well as the possibility of finding a physical model equivalent to this collective game.
Regarding truel games, our next step would involve a deeper study of the dynamics
of these games in terms of the spatial grid used. Small-world or even scale-free networks
could be introduced in the model so as to analyze the effect of different topologies on the
final population comparing the results obtained for the two-dimensional grid.
Furthermore, it would be worth studying a generalization of the sequential truel to
a number of players greater than three. It seems reasonable to consider either for the
random truel and the opinion model that the unique equilibrium point is given by the
strongest opponent strategy. However, for the sequential truel the situation turns to be far
different. This case entails a greater complexity in determining its equilibrium points, as
the number of strategies feasible is quite large.
An interesting extension for truel games would be that of including a dynamics based
on selection and evolution. We could allow strategies to evolve, in the sense that players
would modify their own strategy if they contemplate the possibility of improving their
own payoff. Hence we could study the evolution of the strategies adopted by the players
and check whether they tend to a fixed set. On the other hand, we could also allow the
fitness –markmanship– of the players to change/evolve over time, therefore studying the
dynamics of the system under this scheme.
Appendix A
Collective Parrondo games with
redistribution of capital
A.1 Distribution to a randomly selected player
Our starting point is the general master equation (7.3) which we reproduce here
P (c1,..,cN ;τ+1) =
N∑
j=1
N∑
j′=1
j′ 6=j
γ
N(N − 1)P (c1,..,cj+1,..,cj′−1,..,cN ;τ)+
+
1− γ
N
N∑
j=1
[
a
cj
−1P (c1,..,cj−1,..,cN ;τ)+ a
cj
0 P (c1,..,cN ;τ)+ a
cj
1 P (c1,..,cj+1,..,cN ;τ)
]
. (A.1)
From Eq. (A.1) we can obtain the probability density function for a single player j,
i.e., P (cj ;τ), performing the following sum
P (cj ;τ+1) =
∑
c1,..cj−1,cj+1,..cN
P (c1,..,cN ;τ+1). (A.2)
For simplicity we will calculate separately the two contributions of Eq. (A.1) to this
sum, the first one being that of game A′, and the second being that of game B. Let us
first calculate the sum for game A′
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γ
N(N − 1)
∑
c1..cj−1,cj+1..cN
[
N∑
j′=1
N∑
j′′=1
j′′ 6=j′
P (c1,..,cj′+1,..,cj′′−1,..,cN ;τ)
]
=
=
γ
N(N − 1)
∑
c1..cj−1,cj+1..cN
[
N∑
j′′=1
j′′ 6=j
P (c1,..,cj+1,..,cj′′−1,..,cN ;τ)+
+
N∑
j′=1
j′ 6=j
P (c1,..,cj′+1,..,cj−1,..,cN ;τ)+
N∑
j′=1
j′ 6=j
N∑
j′′=1
j′′ 6=j,j′
P (c1,..,cj′+1,..,cj′′−1,..,cN ;τ)
]
. (A.3)
Carrying out the sum
∑
c1,...,cj−1,cj+1,...cN
we obtain
γ
N(N − 1)


N∑
j′′=1
j′′ 6=j
P (cj+1;τ)+
N∑
j′=1
j′ 6=j
P (cj−1;τ)+
N∑
j′=1
j′ 6=j
N∑
j′′=1
j′′ 6=j,j′
P (cj ;τ)

 =
=
γ
N(N − 1)
[
(N − 1)P (cj+1;τ)+ (N − 1)P (cj−1;τ)+ (N − 2)(N − 1)P (cj ;τ)
]
=
=
γ
N
[P (cj+1;τ)+ (N − 2)P (cj ;τ)+ P (cj−1;τ)] . (A.4)
We now proceed with the second term of Eq. (A.1), that of game B 1
∑
c1..,cj−1,cj+1,..cN
N∑
j′=1
[
a
cj′
−1P (c1,..,cj′−1,..,cN ;τ)+ a
cj′
0 P (c1,..,cN ;τ)+
+a
cj′
1 P (c1,..,cj′+1,..,cN ;τ)
]
=
∑
c1..,cj−1,cj+1,..cN
[
a
cj
−1P (c1,..,cj−1,..,cN ;τ)+ a
cj
0 P (c1,..,cN ;τ)+
+ a
cj
1 P (c1,..,cj+1,..,cN ;τ)+
N∑
j′=1
j′ 6=j
(a
cj′
−1P (c1,..,cj′−1,..,cN ;τ)+ a
cj′
0 P (c1,..,cN ;τ)+
1For simplicity we will omit the coefficient 1−γ
N
until the final result for game B is obtained.
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+ a
cj′
1 P (c1,..,cj′+1,..,cN ;τ))
]
=
[
a
cj
−1P (cj−1;τ)+ a
cj
0 P (cj ;τ)+ a
cj
1 P (cj+1;τ)+
+
N∑
j′=1
j′ 6=j
∑
cj′
(a
cj′
−1P (cj ,cj′−1;τ)+ a
cj′
0 P (cj ,cj′ ;τ)+ a
cj′
1 P (cj ,cj′+1;τ))
]
. (A.5)
By means of normalization condition acj′+1−1 +a
cj′
0 +a
cj′−1
1 = 1, the previous expres-
sion can be simplified obtaining

acj−1P (cj−1;τ)+ acj0 P (cj ;τ)+ acj1 P (cj+1;τ)+
N∑
j′=1
j′ 6=j
∑
cj′
P (cj ,cj′ ;τ)

 =
=
1− γ
N
[
a
cj
−1P (cj−1;τ)+ a
cj
0 P (cj ;τ)+ a
cj
1 P (cj+1;τ)+ (N − 1)P (cj ;τ)
]
.
(A.6)
Finally, adding both results (A.4) and (A.6) we obtain the final expression for the
evolution of the probability for a single player j with capital cj
P (cj ;τ+1) =
1− γ
N
[
a
cj
−1P (cj−1;τ)+ a
cj
0 P (cj ;τ)+ a
cj
1 P (cj+1;τ)
]
+
+
γ
N
[
P (cj+1;τ)+ P (cj−1;τ)
]
+
N − (1 + γ)
N
P (cj ;τ) (A.7)
A.2 Distribution to nearest neighbor with constant probabilities
In this section we calculate the equation for a single player j when alternating between
the original Parrondo gameB and another version of the redistributing gameA′′, in which
there are different probabilities pr and pl of giving a coin to neighbor j + 1 on the right
and to j − 1 on the left respectively. The master equation describing the evolution of
P (c1,c2,..,cN ;τ+1) of all N players is given by Eq. (7.10), that is
P (c1,..,cN ;τ+1) =
γ
N
N∑
j′=1
[
pl P (c1,..,cj′−1−1,cj′+1,..,cN ;τ)+ pr P (c1,..,cj′+1,cj′+1−1,..,cN ;τ)
]
+
+
1− γ
N
N∑
j=1
[
a
cj
−1P (c1,..,cj−1,cN ;τ)+ a
cj
0 P (c1,..,cj ,cN ;τ)+ a
cj
1 P (c1,..,cj+1,cN ;τ)
]
.
(A.8)
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Again, the sum
∑
c1..cj−1,cj+1,..,cN must be performed on the previous equation in
order to obtain the single probability density function. As already calculated in the pre-
vious section, the result of the sum for the term corresponding to game B is given by
Eq. (A.6); therefore, we need only to calculate that of game A′′, thus we have 2
∑
c1,..,cj−1,cj+1,..cN
N∑
j′=1
[
pl P (c1,..,cj′−1−1,cj′+1,..,cN ;τ)+pr P (c1,..,cj′+1,cj′+1−1,..,cN ;τ)
]
=
=
∑
c1,..,cj−1,cj+1,..,cN
[
pl P (c1,..,cj−1−1,cj+1,..,cN ;τ)+ pr P (c1,..,cj+1,cj+1−1,..,cN ;τ)+
+ pl P (c1,..,cj−1,cj+1+1,..,cN ;τ)+ pr P (c1,..,cj+1+1,cj+2−1,..,cN ;τ)+
+ pl P (c1,..,cj−2−1,cj−1+1,..,cN ;τ)+ pr P (c1,..,cj−1+1,cj−1,..,cN ;τ)+
N∑
j′=1
j′ 6=j,j±1
(pl P (c1,..,cj′−1−1,cj′+1,..,cN ;τ)+ pr P (c1,..,cj′+1,cj′+1−1,..,cN ;τ))
]
=
=

P (cj+1;τ)+ P (cj−1;τ)+ P (cj ;τ)+
N∑
j′=1
j′ 6=j,j±1
[pl P (cj ;τ)+ pr P (cj ;τ)]

 =
=
γ
N
[
P (cj+1;τ)+ P (cj−1;τ)+ (N − 2)P (cj ;τ)
]
. (A.9)
Again, the result obtained for game A′′ when the capital is redistributed to nearest
neighbors agrees with that of random distribution of capital between players. It is re-
markable though that the final result does not depend on the actual probabilities pl and
pr. Therefore, joining results from Eqs. (A.6) and (A.9) we obtain the same equation
governing the evolution of P (cj ;τ) for a single player j, namely, Eq. (A.7).
A.3 Distribution to nearest neighbor with capital dependent
probabilities
This section will be dedicated to the derivation of the equation for the evolution of the
probability for a single player j, when alternating between a new version of game A′′ in
which the probabilities do depend on the capital of the neighbors, and the original game
B. Our starting point is the master equation for the total probability P (c1,··· ,cN ;τ+1), i.e.,
Eq. (7.23),
2Again, we omit the coefficient γ
N
until the final result for game A′′ is obtained.
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P (c1,..,cN ;τ+1) =
γ
N
N∑
j′,j′′=1
[
pj′,j′′P (c1,..,cj′+1,..,cj′′−1,..,cN ;τ)
]
+
+
1− γ
N
N∑
j′=1
[
a
c′j
−1P (c1,..,cj′−1,..,cN ;τ)+ a
cj′
0 P (c1,..,cN ;τ)+ a
cj′
1 P (c1,..,cj′+1,..,cN ;τ)
]
,
(A.10)
where, as in previous cases, game A′′ is played with probability γ and game B with
probability 1− γ.
We must perform the sum
∑
c1..,cj−1,cj+1,..cN in Eq. (A.10) in order to obtain the
single distribution P (cj ;τ). However, from a previous calculation we already know the
result corresponding to the term of game B, c.f. Eq. (A.6). Therefore, we need only to
calculate the remaining sum, that corresponding to game A′′, 3
∑
c1..cj−1,cj+1..cN
N∑
j′,j′′=1
pj′,j′′P (c1,..,cj′+1,..,cj′′−1,..,cN ;τ) =
=
∑
c1..cj−1,cj+1..cN
N∑
j′=1
[
pj′,j′−1P (c1,..,cj′−1−1,cj′+1,..,cN ;τ)+
+pj′,j′+1P (c1,..,cj′+1,cj′+1−1,..,cN ;τ)
]
=
∑
c1..cj−1,cj+1..cN
[pj,j−1P (c1,..cj−1−1,cj+1..,cN ;τ)+
+ pj,j+1P (c1,..cj+1,cj+1−1..,cN ;τ)+ pj+1,j P (c1,..,cj−1,cj+1+1,..,cN ;τ)+
+ pj+1,j+2 P (c1,..,cj+1−1,cj+2−1,..,cN ;τ)+ pj−1,j−2 P (c1,..,cj−2−1,cj−1+1,..,cN ;τ)+
+ pj−1,j P (c1,..,cj−1+1,cj−1,..,cN ;τ)+
N∑
j′=1
j′ 6=j
j′ 6=j−1,j+1
[pj′,j′−1 P (c1,..,cj′−1−1,cj′+1,..,cN ;τ)+
+ pj′,j′+1 P (c1,..,cj′+1,cj′+1−1,..,cN ;τ)] =
=


∑
cj−1
cj+1
[pj,j−1P (cj−1−1,cj+1,cj+1;τ)+ pj,j+1P (cj−1,cj+1,cj+1−1;τ)]+
+
∑
cj+1,cj+2
[pj+1,jP (cj−1,cj+1+1,cj+2;τ)+ pj+1,j+2P (cj ,cj+1+1,cj+2−1;τ)]+
3As in previous calculations, we omit γ
N
until the final result for A′′ is obtained
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+
∑
cj−2,cj−1
[pj−1,j−2P (cj−2−1,cj−1+1,cj ;τ)+ pj−1,jP (cj−2,cj−1+1,cj−1;τ)]+
+
N∑
j′=1
j′ 6=j,
j′ 6=j−1,j+1
∑
cj′−1
cj′+1
cj′
[pj′,j′−1P (cj′−1−1,cj′+1,cj′+1;τ)+ pj′,j′+1P (cj′−1,cj′+1,cj′+1−1;τ)]


(A.11)
In the last part of Eq. (A.11) we have splitted the sum over j′ into four terms. The
three first factors correspond to those in which the probabilities pi,i′ depend on the capital
cj of player j; the last factor is simply the sum over the rest of terms where cj is not
present. We can perform the sum in the latter factor substituting the expressions for pi,i′
obtaining
N∑
j′=1
j′ 6=j
j′ 6=j−1,j+1
∑
cj′−1
cj′+1
cj′
1
cj′+1+cj′−1−1
[
cj′+1P (cj′−1−1,cj′+1,cj′+1,cj ;τ)+
+ cj′−1P (cj′−1,cj′+1,cj′+1−1,cj ;τ)
]
=
=
N∑
j′=1
j′ 6=j
j′ 6=j−1,j+1
∑
cj′−1,cj′+1
1
cj′+1+cj′−1−1
[
cj′+1P (cj′−1−1,cj′+1,cj ;τ)+cj′−1P (cj′−1,cj′+1−1,cj ;τ)
]
=
{
cj′−1−1−→cj′−1
cj′+1−1−→cj′+1
}
=
N∑
j′=1
j′ 6=j
j′ 6=j−1,j+1
P (cj ;τ) = (N − 3)P (cj ;τ). (A.12)
Due to the summations carried out for
∑
cj′−1
cj′+1
, we have changed the values for cj′+1
and cj′−1, increasing their values in one unit. We can now proceed with the remaining
three sums in Eq. (A.11). The sum with terms cj+1, cj−1 results in
∑
cj−1,cj+1
[
pj,j−1P (cj−1−1,cj+1,cj+1;τ)+ pj,j+1P (cj−1,cj+1,cj+1−1;τ)
]
=
∑
cj−1,cj+1
[
cj+1
cj+1 + cj−1
P (cj−1,cj+1,cj+1;τ)+
cj−1
cj+1 + cj−1
P (cj−1,cj+1,cj+1;τ)
]
=
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=
∑
cj−1,cj+1
P (cj−1,cj+1,cj+1;τ) = P (cj+1;τ). (A.13)
We are left now with the terms corresponding to the sums for cj+1, cj+2 and that for
cj−1, cj−2. In order to solve them, we must assume the following set of hypothesis,
P (cj−1,cj+2;τ)→P (cj ,cj+2−1;τ)
P (cj−2−1,cj ;τ)→P (cj−2,cj−1;τ)
}
τ →∞ (A.14)
In some sense, this hypothesis might imply that for large times τ two individuals
become indistinguishable. Therefore, by means of hypothesis (A.14), we are able to
perform the remaining sums as
∑
cj+1
cj+2
[
cj+2
cj+2+cj−1
P (cj−1,cj+1+1,cj+2;τ)+ cjcj+2+cj−1P (cj ,cj+1+1,cj+2−1;τ)
]
+
+
∑
cj−2
cj−1
[
cj
cj−2+cj−1
P (cj−2−1,cj−1+1,cj ;τ)+ cj−2cj−2+cj−1P (cj−2,cj−1+1,cj−1;τ)
]
=
=
∑
cj+2
[
cj+2
cj+2+cj−1
+
cj
cj+2+cj−1
]
P (cj−1,cj+2;τ)+
+
∑
cj−2
[
cj
cj+cj−2−1
+
cj−2
cj−2+cj−1
]
P (cj−2,cj ;τ) = P (cj−1;τ)+ P (cj ;τ). (A.15)
Finally, joining results from Eqs. (A.12),(A.13),(A.15) we obtain the desired result
for the term corresponding to game A′′
∑
c1..cN
γ
N
N∑
j′,j′′=1
[
pj′,j′′P (c1,..,cj′+1,..,cj′′−1,..,cN ;τ)
]
=
=
γ
N
[P (cj−1;τ)+ (N − 2)P (cj ;τ)+ P (cj+1;τ)] (A.16)
Finally, joining both Eqs. (A.6) and (A.16) what we obtain is exactly the same equa-
tion as (A.7) for the evolution of the probability P (cj ;τ) of a single player j.
Appendix B
Survival probabilities for duels and
truels
In this Appendix we will deduce the expressions corresponding to the survival proba-
bilities when playing either a duel or a truel. Both games can be described with discrete–
time Markov chains with a finite number of states. Besides, they are characterized by
the existence of a certain number of absorbing states, which means that once the system
reaches this state, it never leaves it (they correspond to those states where there is only
one survivor in the game). As we are dealing with finite Markov chains, it is certain [64]
that this system will eventually end up in one of its absorbent states. We will first calcu-
late the survival probabilities for the simplest case of duels in Sec. B.1, followed then by
their analogous in truels in Secs. B.2, B.2, B.3 and B.4.
B.1 Duels
In Fig. B.1 we show a Markov chain with three states 0, 1, 2 corresponding to the ran-
dom duel and also the opinion model. The Table in Fig. B.1 shows the correspondence
between the players remaining on the game and their corresponding state for both the
random duel and the opinion model.
r0
0 21
p p
01 02
Random Duel Opinion Duel
States Players Opinions
0 A B A B
1 A A A
2 B B B
Figure B.1. Table: description of the different states for the random duel and opinion model. Dia-
gram: Markov chain corresponding to both the random duel and opinion model with two opinions.
From Markov chain theory[41] we can calculate the probability uji that starting from
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state i we eventually end up in state j after a sufficiently large number of steps. We are
interested in calculating the probability that starting from state 0 we end up either in state
1 or state 2. The set of equations to be solved are
u10 = p01u
1
1 + r0u
1
1 (B.1)
u20 = p02u
2
2 + r0u
2
0 (B.2)
where the transition probabilities pij between states are given by :
r0 =
1
2
[2− a− b] , p01 = 1
2
a , p02 =
1
2
b (B.3)
Recalling that by definition ujj = 1 we may solve Eqs. (B.1), (B.2) obtaining
u10 =
p01
1− r0 , u
2
0 =
p02
1− r0 , (B.4)
Substituting the transition probabilities in the previous set of equations we obtain the
survival probabilities for player A (u10) and player B (u20)
πA =
a
a+ b
, πB =
b
a+ b
, (B.5)
We may now consider the Markov chain describing the sequential duel. It is com-
posed of four states 0, 1, 2, 3 and is depicted in Fig. B.2. The table from Fig. B.2 shows
the relation between the states and the players that are still on the game.
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p
01
p
02
p
10
p
13
3
States Remaining players
0 A B
1 A B
2 A
3 B
Figure B.2. Table: description of the different states for the sequential duel. Diagram: Markov chain
with four states corresponding to the sequential duel.
The set of equations to be solved are
u20 = p02u
2
2 + p01u
2
1 (B.6)
u30 = p01u
3
1 (B.7)
u21 = p10u
2
0 (B.8)
u31 = p13u
3
3 + p10u
3
0 (B.9)
where
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p01 = 1− a , p02 = a , p10 = 1− b , p13 = b (B.10)
The general solutions for Eqs. (B.6)–(B.9) are
u20 =
p02
1− p01p10 , u
3
0 =
p01p13
1− p01p10 , (B.11)
which, after substituting the transition probabilities give as a result
πA = u
2
0 =
a
1− (1− a)(1− b) , πB = u
3
0 =
b(1− a)
1− (1− a)(1− b) , (B.12)
B.2 Random firing
For this game there are seven possible states according to the remaining players. These
are labeled as 0, 1, . . . , 6. The allowed transitions between states are shown in the dia-
gram in Fig. B.3, where pij denotes the transition probability from state i to state j (the
self–transition probability pii is denoted by ri).
2
1
3
4
5
6
r3
r2
0
r1
5r
r6
4r
r0
p
01
p
02
p
03
p
14
24
p
15
p
35
p
26
p
p
36
States Remaining players
0 ABC
1 AB
2 AC
3 BC
4 A
5 B
6 C
Figure B.3. Table with the description of all possible states for the random firing game, and diagram
representing the allowed transitions between the states shown in the table.
From Markov chain theory [64] we can evaluate the probability uji that starting from
state i we eventually end up in state j after a sufficiently large number of steps. In
particular, if we start from state 0 (with the three players active), the nature of the game
is such that the only non-vanishing probabilities are u40, u50 and u60 corresponding to the
winning of the game by player A, B and C respectively. The relevant set of equations is
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u40 = p01 u
4
1 + p02 u
4
2 + p03 u
4
3 + r0 u
4
0, u
5
0 = p01 u
5
1 + p02 u
5
2 + p03 u
5
3 + r0 u
5
0,
u60 = p01 u
6
1 + p02 u
6
2 + p03 u
6
3 + r0 u
6
0, u
4
1 = p14 u
4
4 + r1 u
4
1,
u51 = p15 u
5
5 + r1 u
5
1, u
6
1 = r1 u
6
1,
u42 = p24 u
4
4 + r2 u
4
2, u
5
2 = r2 u
5
2,
u62 = r2 u
6
2 + p26u
6
6, u
4
3 = r3 u
4
3,
u53 = r3 u
5
3 + p35 u
5
5, u
6
3 = r3 u
6
3 + p36 u
6
6.
(B.13)
We can solve the previous set of equations for u40, u50 and u60, considering that by
definition ujj = 1 ∀j. The solutions are
u40 =
p01 p14
(1− r0)(1− r1) +
p02 p24
(1− r0)(1− r2) ,
u50 =
p01 p15
(1− r0)(1− r1) +
p03 p35
(1− r0)(1− r3) , (B.14)
u60 =
p02 p26
(1− r0)(1− r2) +
p03 p36
(1− r0)(1− r3) .
We can now derive the expressions for the transition probabilities pij . Remember
that we denote by a the probability that player A eliminates from the game the player he
has aimed at (and similarly for b and c), and that Pαβ (α =A,C,B and β = A,B,C,0) the
probability of player α choosing player β (or into the air if β = 0) as a target when it is
his turn to play (a situation that only appears when the three players are still active). We
have then:
r0 = 1− 13(a(1− PA0) + b(1− PB0) + c(1− PC0)), p01 = 13(aPAC + bPBC),
p02 =
1
3(aPAB + cPCB), p03 =
1
3(bPBA + cPCA),
p14 = p24 =
1
2a, p15 = p35 =
1
2b,
p26 = p36 =
1
2c, r1 = 1− 12(a+ b),
r2 = 1− 12(a+ c), r3 = 1− 12(b+ c). (B.15)
B.3 Sequential firing
As in the random firing case, we describe this game as a Markov chain composed of 11
different states, also with three absorbent states: 9 , 10 and 11. In Fig. B.4 we show the
corresponding diagram for this game, together with a table describing all possible states.
Based on this diagram, we can write down the relevant set of equations for the transition
probabilities uji :
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3
0
p
04
7
5
10
15
p
53
p
35
p
p
03
p
3 10
59
p
11
6 8
86
p
68
p
28
pp
16
1
2
27
p
p
12
p
20
p
01
p
74
p
47
p
4 11
6 11
p
8 10
p
9
79
p
States Remaining players
0 A B C
1 A B C
2 A B C
3 B C
4 A C
5 B C
6 A B
7 A C
8 A B
9 C
10 B
11 A
Figure B.4. Table: Description of the different states of the game for the case of sequential firing.
The highlighted player is the one chosen for shooting in that state. Diagram: scheme representing all
the allowed transitions between the states shown in the table for the case of a truel with sequential
firing in the order C→ B → A with a > b > c.
u90 = p03u
9
3 + p01u
9
1 + p04u
9
4, u
10
0 = p03u
10
3 + p01u
10
1 ,
u110 = p01u
11
1 + p04u
11
4 , u
10
1 = p12u
10
2 + p15u
10
5 + p16u
10
6 ,
u91 = p12u
9
2 + p15u
9
5, u
11
1 = p12u
11
2 + p16u
11
6 ,
u112 = p28u
11
8 + p27u
11
7 + p20u
11
0 , u
9
2 = p27u
9
7 + p20u
9
0,
u102 = p28u
10
8 + p20u
10
0 , u
9
3 = p35u
9
5,
u103 = p35u
10
5 + p3 10, u
9
4 = p47u
9
7,
u114 = p47u
11
7 + p4 11, u
9
5 = p53u
9
3 + p59,
u105 = p53u
10
3 , u
10
6 = p68u
10
8 ,
u116 = p68u
11
8 + p6 11, u
9
7 = p74u
9
4 + p79,
u117 = p74u
11
4 , u
10
8 = p86u
10
6 + p8 10,
u118 = p86u
11
6 .
(B.16)
The general solutions for the probabilities u90, u100 and u110 are given by
u90 =
1
1− p01p12p20
[
p59(p03p35 + p01p15)
1− p35p53 +
p79(p04p47 + p01p12p27)
1− p47p74
]
,
u100 =
1
1− p01p12p20
[
p3 10(p03 + p01p15p53)
1− p35p53 +
p01p8 10(p16p68 + p12p28)
1− p68p86
]
,
u110 =
1
1− p01p12p20
[
p4 11(p04 + p01p12p27p74)
1− p47p74 +
p01p6 11(p16 + p12p28p86)
1− p68p86
]
,
(B.17)
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with transition probabilities given by
p01 = (1− c) + cPC0, p03 = cPCA, p04 = cPCB,
p12 = (1− b) + bPB0, p15 = bPBA, p16 = bPCA,
p20 = (1− a) + aPA0, p27 = aPAB, p28 = aPAC ,
p35 = p86 = 1− b, p3 10 = p8 10 = b,
p47 = p68 = 1− a, p4 11 = p6 11 = a,
p53 = p74 = 1− c, p59 = p79 = c.
B.4 Convincing opinion
For this model we show in Fig. B.5 the diagram of the allowed states and transitions,
together with a table describing the possible states.
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73
93
p
r
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0
r
0
p
04
05
p
r
5
545
p
54
p
p
52
2
82
p
7
p
07
p
08
p
09
9
89
p
8
98
p
r
8
67
p
6
r
6
76
p
1
61
p
p
06
41
p
4
r
4
States Opinions
0 A B C
1 C C C
2 B B B
3 A A A
4 C C B
5 B B C
6 A C C
7 A A C
8 A B B
9 A A B
Figure B.5. Table: description of the different states of the opinion model. Diagram: scheme repre-
senting the allowed transitions between the states.
The corresponding set of equations describing this convincing opinion model, as de-
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rived from the diagram, are
u10 = r0u
1
0 + p06u
1
6 + p04u
1
4 + p05u
1
5 + p07u
1
7,
u20 = r0u
2
0 + p04u
2
4 + p05u
2
5 + p08u
2
8 + p09u
2
9,
u30 = r0u
3
0 + p08u
3
8 + p09u
3
9 + p07u
3
7 + p06u
3
6,
u14 = r4u
1
4 + p45u
1
5 + p41, u
2
4 = r4u
2
4 + p45u
2
5,
u15 = r5u
1
5 + p54u
1
4, u
2
5 = r5u
2
5 + p54u
2
4 + p52,
u16 = r6u
1
6 + p67u
1
7 + p61, u
3
6 = r6u
3
6 + p67u
3
7,
u17 = r7u
1
7 + p76u
1
6, u
3
7 = r7u
3
7 + p76u
3
6 + p73,
u28 = r8u
2
8 + p89u
2
9 + p82, u
3
8 = r8u
3
8 + p89u
3
9,
u29 = r9u
2
9 + p98u
2
8, u
3
9 = r9u
3
9 + p98u
3
8 + p93.
(B.18)
And the general solution for the probabilities u10, u20 and u30 is
u10 =
1
1− r0
[
p61(p06(1− r7) + p07p76)
(1− r6)(1− r7)− p67p76 +
p41(p04(1− r5) + p05p54)
(1− r4)(1− r5)− p45p54
]
,
u20 =
1
1− r0
[
p52(p04p45 + p05(1− r4))
(1− r4)(1− r5)− p45p54 +
p82(p08(1− r9) + p09p98)
(1− r8)(1− r9)− p89p98
]
,
u30 =
1
1− r0
[
p73(p06p67 + p07(1− r6))
(1− r6)(1− r7)− p67p76 +
p93(p09(1− r8) + p08p89)
(1− r8)(1− r9)− p89p98
]
,
(B.19)
where the transition probabilities are given by
p04 =
1
3cPCA, p06 =
1
3cPCB, p08 =
1
3bPBC ,
p05 =
1
3bPBA, p07 =
1
3aPAB, p09 =
1
3aPAC ,
p41 = p61 =
2
3c p45 = p98 =
1
3b, p54 = p76 =
1
3c,
p52 = p82 =
2
3b, p67 = p89 =
1
3a, p73 = p93 =
2
3a,
r0 =
1
3 [3− a− b− c], r4 = 23(1− c) + 13(1− b),
r5 =
1
3(1− c) + 23(1− b), r6 = 23(1− c) + 13(1− a),
r7 =
1
3(1− c) + 23(1− a), r8 = 23(1− b) + 13(1− a),
r9 =
1
3(1− b) + 23(1− a). (B.20)
Appendix C
Equilibrium points for truels and
the opinion model
In this Appendix we will demonstrate the existence of equilibrium points for the truel
games. Concretely we will show that either for the random truel and the opinion model
there exists a unique equilibrium point which is the so-called strongest opponent strategy.
For the sequential truel we will show the existence of two equilibrium points depending
on the values of the markmanships a, b, c of the players.
C.1 Random firing
Let us denote by πA(PA0, PAB, PAC) the survival probability for player A given the
values of the probability set {PA0, PAB, PAC} defining the strategy followed by player
A (the same notation follows for players B and C).
The general expressions for πA(PA0, PAB, PAC), πB(PB0, PBA, PBC) and
πC(PC0, PCA, PCB) with arbitrary values for the probabilities defining the strategies
and the markmanships a, b and c is too lengthy to present here. Instead, we will show the
following terms:
πA(1, 0, 0) =
a b(a+ c)PBC + a (a+ b)c PCB
(a+ b)(a+ c)(b(PBA + PBC) + c(PCA + PCB))
,
πA(0, 1, 0) =
a
(
a2 + (PBCb+ b+ cPCB)a+ b c(PBC + PCB)
)
(a+ b)(a+ c)(a+ b(PBA + PBC) + c(PCA + PCB))
,
πA(0, 0, 1) =
a(a+ c)(a+ b PBC) + a(a+ b)c PCB
(a+ b)(a+ c)(a+ b(PBA + PBC) + c(PCA + PCB))
,
πB(1, 0, 0) =
a b(b+ c)PAC + b(a+ b)cPCA
(a+ b)(b+ c)(a(PAB + PAC) + c(PCA + PCB))
,
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πB(0, 1, 0) =
b(b(b+ cPCA) + a(b(PAC + 1) + c(PAC + PCA)))
(a+ b)(b+ c)(b+ a(PAB + PAC) + c(PCA + PCB))
,
πB(0, 0, 1) =
b(b+ c)(b+ aPAC) + b(a+ b)c PCA
(a+ b)(b+ c)(b+ a(PAB + PAC) + c(PCA + PCB))
,
πC(1, 0, 0) =
a c(b+ c)PAB + b c(a+ c)PBA
(a+ c)(b+ c)(a(PAB + PAC) + b(PBA + PBC))
, (C.1)
πC(0, 1, 0) =
c(c(c+ bPBA) + a(c(PAB + 1) + b(PAB + PBA)))
(a+ c)(b+ c)(c+ a(PAB + PAC) + b(PBA + PBC))
,
πC(0, 0, 1) =
c(b+ c)(c+ aPAB) + b c(a+ c)PBA
(a+ c)(b+ c)(c+ a(PAB + PAC) + b(PBA + PBC))
.
We are interested in evaluating for all players which term π(1, 0, 0), π(0, 1, 0),
π(0, 0, 1) is greater depending on the values for a, b and c. This will give us the equilib-
rium point of the system. For that purpose we may define new terms Si as
S1 = πA(1, 0, 0)− πA(0, 1, 0),
S2 = πA(1, 0, 0)− πA(0, 0, 1),
S3 = πA(0, 1, 0)− πA(0, 0, 1),
S4 = πB(1, 0, 0)− πB(0, 1, 0),
S5 = πB(1, 0, 0)− πB(0, 0, 1), (C.2)
S6 = πB(0, 1, 0)− πB(0, 0, 1),
S7 = πC(1, 0, 0)− πC(0, 1, 0),
S8 = πC(1, 0, 0)− πC(0, 0, 1),
S9 = πC(0, 1, 0)− πC(0, 0, 1).
Thus, substituting the set of probabilities (C.1) in the previous expressions and after
some manipulation we obtain
S1 =
a2(−b(aPBA−cPBC+b(PBA+PBC))−(a+b)cPCA)
(a+b)(a+c)(b(PBA+PBC)+c(PCA+PCB))(a+b(PBA+PBC)+c(PCA+PCB))
,
S2 =
a2((b−c)cPCB−(a+c)(bPBA+cPCA))
(a+b)(a+c)(b(PBA+PBC)+c(PCA+PCB))(a+b(PBA+PBC)+c(PCA+PCB))
,
S3 =
a2(b−c)
(a+b)(a+c)(a+b(PBA+PBC)+c(PCA+PCB))
,
S4 =
b2(−a(bPAB−cPAC+a(PAB+PAC))−(a+b)cPCB)
(a+b)(b+c)(a(PAB+PAC)+c(PCA+PCB))(b+a(PAB+PAC)+c(PCA+PCB))
,
S5 = − b
2(a(b+c)PAB−acPCA+c(bPCB+c(PCA+PCB)))
(a+b)(b+c)(a(PAB+PAC)+c(PCA+PCB))(b+a(PAB+PAC)+c(PCA+PCB))
,
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S6 =
b2(a−c)
(a+b)(b+c)(b+a(PAB+PAC)+c(PCA+PCB))
,
S7 =
c2(−a(−bPAB+cPAC+a(PAB+PAC))−b(a+c)PBC)
(a+c)(b+c)(a(PAB+PAC)+b(PBA+PBC))(c+a(PAB+PAC)+b(PBA+PBC))
,
S8 = − c
2(a(b+c)PAC−abPBA+b(cPBC+b(PBA+PBC)))
(a+c)(b+c)(a(PAB+PAC)+b(PBA+PBC))(c+a(PAB+PAC)+b(PBA+PBC))
,
S9 =
(a−b)c2
(a+c)(b+c)(c+a(PAB+PAC)+b(PBA+PBC))
. (C.3)
We can clearly see that all denominators in the previous expressions are strictly posi-
tive. Therefore, if we want to evaluate the sign of Si we need only to analyze the sign of
the numerator.
Assuming that a > b > c we already obtain the result that S3 > 0, S6 > 0 and
S9 > 0 implying that
πA(0, 1, 0) > πA(0, 0, 1),
πB(0, 1, 0) > πB(0, 0, 1),
πC(0, 1, 0) > πC(0, 0, 1).
Thus, we conclude that aiming at the weakest player it is not a conceivable strategy
for any player and hence we may set PAC = PBC = PCB = 0. This lead us to the
following expressions
S1 =
−a2(a+ b)(bPBA + cPCA)
(a+ b)(a+ c)(bPBA + cPCA)(a+ bPBA + cPCA)
,
S2 =
−a2(a+ c)(bPBA + cPCA)
(a+ b)(a+ c)(bPBA + cPCA)(a+ bPBA + cPCA)
,
S3 =
a2(b− c)
(a+ b)(a+ c)(a+ bPBA + cPCA)
,
S4 =
−ab2PAB(b+ a)
(a+ b)(b+ c)(aPAB + cPCA)(b+ aPAB + cPCA)
,
S5 = − b
2(a(b+ c)PAB − cPCA(a+ c)
(a+ b)(b+ c)(aPAB + cPCA)(b+ aPAB + cPCA)
,
S6 =
b2(a− c)
(a+ b)(b+ c)(b+ aPAB + cPCA)
,
S7 =
−aPABc2(a− b)
(a+ c)(b+ c)(aPAB + bPBA)(c+ aPAB + bPBA)
,
S8 =
c2bPBA(a− b)
(a+ c)(b+ c)(aPAB + bPBA)(c+ aPAB + bPBA)
,
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S9 =
(a− b)c2
(a+ c)(b+ c)(c+ aPAB + bPBA)
. (C.4)
It can be clearly seen that whatever values a, b, c, PBA and PCA the terms S1 < 0
and S2 < 0; recalling that S3 > 0 we obtain for player A: πA(0, 1, 0) > πA(0, 0, 1) >
πA(1, 0, 0) and therefore PA0 = PAC = 0, PAB = 1.
Besides, the fact that S4 < 0 and S6 > 0 imposes πB(0, 1, 0) > πB(1, 0, 0) and
πB(0, 1, 0) > πB(0, 0, 1). Then for player B we obtain PB0 = PBC = 0 and PBA = 1.
Finally, S7 is also negative and together with S9 > 0 we obtain πC(0, 1, 0) > πC(1, 0, 0)
and πC(0, 1, 0) > πC(0, 0, 1). Hence PC0 = PCB = 0 and PCA = 1.
As a conclusion, we have demonstrated for the random truel the existence of a unique
equilibrium point, which is given by the strongest opponent strategy: PAB = PBA = PCA = 1.
C.2 Sequential firing
For the sequential truel we can proceed as in the previous section, and so we may first
present the expressions corresponding to π(1, 0, 0), π(0, 1, 0), π(0, 0, 1) for players A, B
and C. The expressions are
πA(1, 0, 0) =
acPCB
−ca+a+c − abPBC(c(PC0−1)+1)a(b−1)−b
1− (b(PB0 − 1) + 1)(c(PC0 − 1) + 1) ,
πA(0, 1, 0) =
a(cPCB−a(c−1)(b(PB0−1)+1)(c(PC0−1)+1))
−ca+a+c − abPBC(c(PC0−1)+1)a(b−1)−b
(a− 1)(b(PB0 − 1) + 1)(c(PC0 − 1) + 1) + 1 ,
πA(0, 0, 1) =
a(a(b−1)(b(PB0−1)+1)−bPBC)(c(PC0−1)+1)
a(b−1)−b +
acPCB
−ca+a+c
(a− 1)(b(PB0 − 1) + 1)(c(PC0 − 1) + 1) + 1 ,
πB(1, 0, 0) = −
abPAC(c(PC0−1)+1)
a(b−1)−b − bc(PC0+PCB−1)b(c−1)−c
1− (a(PA0 − 1) + 1)(c(PC0 − 1) + 1) ,
πB(0, 1, 0) = −
ab(PAC−bPAC)(c(PC0−1)+1)
a(b−1)−b − b(b(c−1)(c(PC0−1)+1)+c(PC0+PCB−1))b(c−1)−c
(b− 1)(a(PA0 − 1) + 1)(c(PC0 − 1) + 1) + 1 ,
πB(0, 0, 1) = −
b(aPAC−b(PACa+a−1))(c(PC0−1)+1)
a(b−1)−b − bc(PC0+PCB−1)b(c−1)−c
(b− 1)(a(PA0 − 1) + 1)(c(PC0 − 1) + 1) + 1 ,
πC(1, 0, 0) =
bc(PB0+PBC−1)
b(c−1)−c − ac(PA0+PAC−1)(b(PB0−1)+1)−ca+a+c
1− (a(PA0 − 1) + 1)(b(PB0 − 1) + 1) , (C.5)
πC(0, 1, 0) = −
a(1−c)c(PA0+PAC−1)(b(PB0−1)+1)
−ca+a+c +
c(c+b(−PB0−PBC+c(PB0+PBC−2)+1))
b(c−1)−c
(c− 1)(a(PA0 − 1) + 1)(b(PB0 − 1) + 1) + 1 ,
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πC(0, 0, 1) =
c(−ac+c+a(c−1)(PA0+PAC−1)(b(PB0−1)+1))
−ca+a+c − b(c−1)c(PB0+PBC−1)b(c−1)−c
(c− 1)(a(PA0 − 1) + 1)(b(PB0 − 1) + 1) + 1 .
The next step would be to substitute the previous expressions into the terms Si
from (C.2). However, we will not present them because the expressions obtained are
of considerable length. Nevertheless, it can be shown that the terms S3, S6 and S9 are
greater than zero. This implies that we can set PAC = PBC = PCB = 0, simplifying the
expressions for Si which now read
S1 =
−a2(1−c)(1−b(1−PB0))(1−c(1−PC0))
(a+c(1−a))(1−(1−a)(1−b(1−PB0))(1−c(1−PC0))) ,
S2 = − a
2(1−b)(1−b(1−PB0))(1−c(1−PC0))
(a(1−b)+b)(1−(1−a)(1−b(1−PB0))(1−c(1−PC0))) ,
S3 =
a2(b−c)(1−b(1−PB0))(1−c(1−PC0))
(a(b−1)−b)(a(c−1)−c)(−PC0c+c+a(1−b(1−PB0))(1−c(1−PC0))+b(PB0−1)(−PC0c+c−1)) ,
S4 =
b
“
c(PC0−1)
1−(a(PA0−1)+1)(c(PC0−1)+1)
− b(c−1)(c(PC0−1)+1)+c(PC0−1)
(b−1)(a(PA0−1)+1)(c(PC0−1)+1)+1
”
b(c−1)−c ,
S5 =
bc(PC0−1)
(b(c−1)−c)(1−(a(PA0−1)+1)(c(PC0−1)+1)) +
b
“
(a−1)b(−PC0c+c−1)
a(b−1)−b
+
c−cPC0
b(c−1)−c
”
(b−1)(a(PA0−1)+1)(c(PC0−1)+1)+1 ,
S6 =
b2(a−c)(c(PC0−1)+1)
(a(b−1)−b)(b(c−1)−c)(−cb+b+c+a(b−1)(PA0−1)(c(PC0−1)+1)+(b−1)cPC0) ,
S7 =
c2(−(b−1)(c−1)(PA0−1)(b(PB0−1)+1)a2+b(PA0−b(c−PA0)(PB0−1)−1)a+b2c(PB0−1))
D ,
S8 =
c2((b(c−1)−c)(PA0−1)(−PB0b+b−1)a2−b(b(c−1)−1)(PB0−1)a+b2(c−1)(PB0−1))
D ,
S9 =
(a−b)c2
(a(c−1)−c)(b(c−1)−c)(c+a(c−1)(PA0−1)(b(PB0−1)+1)+b(c−1)(PB0−1)) . (C.6)
where D = (a(c − 1) − c)(b(c − 1) − c)(a(PA0 − 1)(b(PB0 − 1) + 1) + b(PB0 −
1))(c+ a(c− 1)(PA0 − 1)(b(PB0 − 1) + 1) + b(c− 1)(PB0 − 1)).
It can easily be checked that both terms S1 and S2 are negative, which together with
the condition S3 > 0 give as a result that πA(0, 1, 0) > πA(0, 0, 1) > πA(1, 0, 0) and
hence PAC = PA0 = 0, PAB = 1. Substituting this result into S4 and S5 we get
S4 =
−b
( −c(1−PC0)
a+(1−a)(c−PC0) +
b(1−c)(1−c(1−PC0))+c(1−PC0)
1−(1−a)(1−b)(1−c(1−PC0))
)
c+ b(1− c) , (C.7)
S5 =
bc(1−PC0)
(c+b(1−c))(a+c(1−a)(1−PC0)) −
b
“
(1−a)b(1−c(1−PC0)
b+a(1−b)
+
c(1−PC0)
c+b(1−c)
”
1−(1−a)(1−b)(1−c(1−PC0)) . (C.8)
The previous equations for S4 and S5 are both negative either when PC0 = 0 or
PC0 = 1. Thus, this result together with S6 > 0 results in πB(0, 1, 0) > πB(0, 0, 1) >
πB(1, 0, 0), thus PBC = PB0 = 0 and PBA = 1.
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Finally, substituting these results into the equations S7, S8 and S9 we get
S7 =
−c2((1−c)(1−b)2a2−ba(1−bc)−b2c)
(a(1−c)+c)(b(1−c)+c)(a(1−b)+b)(c+a(1−c)(1−b)+b(1−c)) , (C.9)
S8 =
c2((c+b(1−c))(1−b)a2+ba−b2(1−c)(1−a))
(a(1−c)+c)(b(1−c)+c)(a(1−b)+b)(c+a(1−c)(1−b)+b(1−c)) , (C.10)
S9 =
(a−b)c2
(c+a(1−c))(c+b(1−c))(c+a(1−c)(1−b)+b(1−c)) . (C.11)
We know that S9 is positive, implying that πC(0, 1, 0) > πC(0, 0, 1). Besides, in
order to evaluate the sign in Eq. (C.9) we need only to analyze the numerator, as the
denominator is always positive. Defining the function g(a, b, c) = (1 − c)(1 − b)2a2 −
ba(1− bc)− b2c we have
• If g(a, b, c) > 0: S7 < 0, S9 > 0{
πC(0, 1, 0) > πC(1, 0, 0),
πC(0, 1, 0) > πC(1, 0, 0),
−→ PC0 = PCB = 0, PCA = 1
• If g(a, b, c) < 0: S7 > 0, S9 > 0{
πC(1, 0, 0) > πC(0, 1, 0),
πC(0, 1, 0) > πC(1, 0, 0),
−→ PCA = PCB = 0, PC0 = 1
Hence we see that depending on the sign of g(a, b, c) the equilibrium point will be
given by the strongest opponent strategyPAB = PBA = PCA = 1 when g(a, b, c) > 0
or by PAB = PBA = PC0 = 1 when g(a, b, c) < 0.
C.3 Convincing opinion
Following the same methodology as in previous sections we can write down the solutions
corresponding to the convincing probabilities of opinions A, B and C in terms of the
strategies adopted by the players
πA(1, 0, 0) =
a2(a3−(b(PBA−3)+c(PCA−3))a2+c(c−2b(PBA+PCA−4))a+b c(−PCAb+b−c(PBA−3)))
(a+b)2(a+c)2(a+b+c)
,
πA(0, 1, 0) =
a2(a3−(b(PBA−3)+c(PCA−3))a2+b(b−2c(PBA+PCA−4))a+b c(−PBAc+c−bPCA−3)))
(a+b)2(a+c)2(a+b+c)
,
πA(0, 0, 1) =
a2(a3−(b(PBA−3)+c(PCA−3))a2+c(c−2b(PBA+PCA−4))a+bc(−PCAb+b−c(PBA−3)))
(a+b)2(a+c)2(a+b+c)
,
πB(1, 0, 0) =
b2
“
b−a(PAB−3)
(a+b)2
+
cPCA
(b+c)2
”
a+b+c ,
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πB(0, 1, 0) =
b2((b+c(PCA+2))a2−((PAB−3)b2+2c(PAB−PCA−3)b+c2(PAB−1))a+b2(b+c(PCA+2)))
(a+b)2(b+c)2(a+b+c)
,
πB(0, 0, 1) =
b2
“
b−a(PAB−3)
(a+b)2
+
cPCA
(b+c)2
”
a+b+c ,
πC(1, 0, 0) =
c2(bPBA(a+c)2+(b+c)2(c+a(PAB+2)))
(a+c)2(b+c)2(a+b+c)
,
πC(0, 1, 0) =
c2((c+b(PBA+2))a2+(PABb2+2c(PAB+PBA+2)b+c2(PAB+2))a+c2(c+b(PBA+2)))
(a+c)2(b+c)2(a+b+c)
,
πC(0, 0, 1) =
c2(bPBA(a+c)2+(b+c)2(c+a(PAB+2)))
(a+c)2(b+c)2(a+b+c)
. (C.12)
And the terms Si read
S1 =
a2(c− b)(2bc+ a(b+ c))
(a+ b)2(a+ c)2(a+ b+ c)
,
S2 = 0,
S3 =
a2(b− c)(2bc+ a(b+ c))
(a+ b)2(a+ c)2(a+ b+ c)
,
S4 = − b
2(a− c)(bc+ a(b+ 2c))
(a+ b)2(b+ c)2(a+ b+ c)
,
S5 = 0, (C.13)
S6 =
b2(a− c)(bc+ a(b+ 2c))
(a+ b)2(b+ c)2(a+ b+ c)
,
S7 = − (a− b)c
2(2ab+ (a+ b)c)
(a+ c)2(b+ c)2(a+ b+ c)
,
S8 = 0,
S9 =
(a− b)c2(2ab+ (a+ b)c)
(a+ c)2(b+ c)2(a+ b+ c)
.
By the way markmanships a, b and c are defined, we see that S1 < 0, S3 > 0
and thus πA(0, 1, 0) > πA(1, 0, 0) = πA(0, 0, 1); besides, S4 < 0 and S6 > 0 im-
plying that πB(0, 1, 0) > πB(1, 0, 0) = πB(0, 0, 1); and finally S7 < 0 and S9 > 0
and so πC(0, 1, 0) > πC(1, 0, 0) = πC(0, 0, 1). Hence, there is only one equilib-
rium point in the opinion model that corresponds to the strongest opponent strategy:
PAB = PBA = PCA = 1.
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